Kommentar til tredje TV-debat ml. Romney og Obama (anden del).

I første del af min kommentar til den tredje præsidentdebat kom jeg ind på debattens snævre holdningsspektrum hvad droneprogrammet angår. En forsnævring af debatten som er nært sammenhængende med, at alle tredjepartskandidater er udelukket fra debatterne, hvorfor kun et smalt udbud af de officielle præsidentkandidaters holdninger når ud til verdens befolkning under de nøje iscenesatte begivenheder (mere herom senere).

Irans Atomprogram.

Hele debatten bar præg af en så høj grad af enighed mellem de to kandidater, at man med rette kan spørge om der overhovedet var tale om en debat? Heller ikke hvad angår spørgsmålet om den amerikanske udenrigspolitiske stillingtagen til det iranske atomprogram var der nogen nævneværdig divergens mellem kandidaterne. Barack Obama havde følgende at sige om sagen:

"...as long as I’m president of the United States, Iran will not get a nuclear weapon. I made that clear when I came into office. We then organized the strongest coalition and the strongest sanctions against Iran in history, and it is crippling their economy. Their currency has dropped 80 percent. Their oil production has plunged to the lowest levels since they were fighting a war with Iraq 20 years ago. So their economy is in a shambles. 

And the reason we did this is because a nuclear Iran is a threat to our national security, and it is a threat to Israel's national security. We cannot afford to have a nuclear arms race in the most volatile region of the world. Iran is a state sponsor of terrorism. And for them to be able to provide nuclear technology to non-state actors, that's unacceptable. And they have said that they want to see Israel wiped off the map. 

So, the work that we’ve done with respect to sanctions now offers Iran a choice: they can take the diplomatic route and end their nuclear program, or they will have to face a united world and a United States president, me, who said we’re not going to take any options off the table. 

The disagreement I have with Governor Romney is that, during the course of this campaign, he’s often talked as if we should take premature military action. I think that would be a mistake, because when I’ve sent young men and women into harm’s way, I always understand that that is the last resort, not the first resort.”

Først og fremmest bør man i ovenstående citat bide mærke i, at Obama taler om det iranske atomprogram som om dets formål er militært. Han vil forhindre, at Iran får atomvåben og de "forkrøblende" sanktionernes formål er, at bevirke at præstestyret opgiver programmet. Spørgsmålet er imidlertid hvorfra præsidenten har, at det iranske atomprogram har militære formål?

Hvad dette angår kender præsidenten selvfølgelig til de samme israelske og amerikanske efterretningskilder som offentligheden kender til. Hverken disse eller IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) har på noget tidspunkt været i stand til at fremvise en såkaldt rygende pistol som klart indikerer, at det iranske præstestyre er ved at udvikle et atomprogram med andet end civile formål. Førend denne rygende pistoler foreligger kan vi derfor ikke godtage præmissen bag Obamas konfrontatoriske kurs.

Bemærkelsesværdigt er det desuden, at Obama omtaler sanktionerne mod Iran som "forkrøblende". Et interessant ordvalg må man sige, men desværre lader det ikke til, at det er præstestyret der forkrøbles af sanktionerne. Det er snarere den iranske civilbefolkning.

Lad os et kort øjeblik skrue tiden tilbage, til dengang i midthalvfemserne hvor Obama's udenrigsminister var førstedame i Det Hvide Hus, under hendes mand præsident Bill Clintons administration. Under Clinton påtvang man den irakiske civilbefolkning hvad der skulle vise sig, at være ikke blot forkrøblende, men intet mindre end massemorderiske sanktioner, idet denne form for kollektivt afstraffende økonomisk krigsførelse iflg. FN resulterede i omegnen af en halv million børns alt for tidlige død. Konfronteret med disse tal i nyhedsprogrammet 60 Minutes, gjorde USAs daværende udenrigsminister Madeleine Albright det klart for hele verden, at hun og Clinton-administration fandt det var prisen værd.

Så det er altså ikke fordi Obama-administrationen ikke er klar over de potentielle civile omkostninger denne form for økonomisk krigsførelse kan medføre, idet administrationens udenrigsminister, Hillary Clinton, boede i Det Hvide Hus dengang man påtvang den irakiske befolkning samme form for kollektive afstraffelse. Præsident Obama - og hans nærmeste folk i administrationen hvad udenrigspolitiske anliggender angår - må altså derfor antages, at være fuldt ud klar over, at de "forkrøblende sanktioner” som han taler om, potentielt kan få konsekvenser for civilbefolkningen, i folkemordets størrelsesorden.

Dette er mildest talt bekymrende og de facto en krigserklæring mod både præstestyret og den iranske civilbefolkning, selvom der er ikke er tale om en krigserklæring i streng juridisk forstand. Kollektiv afstraffelse er ikke noget man tager let på i folkeretten. Den Fjerde Genevekonvention betragter ganske enkelt kollektiv afstraffelse som en krigsforbrydelse. Heldigvis for Obama-administrationen bør dette ikke forvolde de store bekymringer, da Den Fjerde Genevekonvention ikke gælder så længe der ikke de jure er tale om en krig mod Iran. Her kan man dog med rette spørge hvorfor kollektiv afstraffelse af en uskyldig civilbefolkning skulle være mindre moralsk forkastelig blot fordi der er tale om en situation der officielt ikke udspiller sig i krigstid?  

Når vi har det in mente, at den siddende præsident har sin faglige baggrund indenfor jura - et fag som han har både har praktiseret og undervist i - har man god grund til at antage, at han nok er bekendt med nøgledokumenter indenfor folkeretten. Når præsidenten gentagent har truet det iranske præstestyre og landets befolkning med vold (”all options are on the table”) kan vi derfor med god ret antage, at dette sker i fuld bevidsthed om, at voldstrusler er i lodret strid med ordlyden i De Forenede Nationers Pagt, nærmere bestemt kapitel 1, artikel 2 stykke 4: 

"All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”

Skulle man være i tvivl om hvad der menes med FNs formål kan man blive klogere ved at læse artikel 1 i samme kapitel, hvor man får at vide, at formålet er:

"To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace."

Lars Løkke: "Iran ér en trussel"

Statsminister Lars Løkke Rasmussen udtalte i forbindelse med NATO-topmødet, at "Iran ér en trussel" hvorfor "det afgørende er at få truffet nogle beslutninger om, at opbygge det missilskjold, som kan øge vores sikkerhed i forhold til de trusler, som vi er omgærdet af. I den sammenhæng er Iran et af de steder, man kan få øje på."[1]

Dette er han ikke alene om at mene. Udviklingsminister Søren Pind skrev i 2008, at Iran for alt i verden måtte forhindres i at udvikle en atomar våbenkapacitet, til trods for at der ikke var det store belæg for at formode, at Iran var i gang med dette. Han sagde: "Den vestlige verden kan ikke leve med, at Iran får atomvåben. Så hellere krigen. Mine børn skal ikke opleve den knugende skræk for det atomare ragnarok, jeg selv måtte vokse op under. Det skal, om nødvendigt, med vold og magt, forhindres."[2] Men hvordan forholder det sig egentlig med Iran? Er landet rent faktisk en trussel mod verdens største militære organisation og dens medlemslande eller er der tale om en opfundet trussel?

En officiel men først for nylig deklassificeret amerikansk vurdering af Irans militære kapacitet lyder: "Iran har meget store militære styrker, men de ville være relativt ineffektive mod et direkte angreb fra et veluddannet, sofistikeret militær såsom USA's eller dets allierede. På nuværende tidspunkt er Irans styrker kun nok til at forhindre eller forsvare sig mod konventionelle trusler fra Irans svagere naboer... men mangler luftstøtte og logistisk evne til at projicere magtmidler længere væk fra Irans grænser eller til at konfrontere regionale stormagter som Tyrkiet eller Israel."[3]

Professor i mellemøsthistorie Juan Cole foretager følgende sammenligning: "Irans militære budget er på lidt over 6 milliarder dollars om året. Sverige, Singapore og Grækenland har alle større militære budgetter. Desuden er Iran et land med 70 mio. indbyggere, således at udgifter til forsvar per capita er lille i forhold til de andre, da de er meget mindre lande med hensyn til befolkning. Iran bruger mindre per indbygger på sit militær end noget andet land i Den Persiske Golf-region med undtagelse af De Forenede Arabiske Emirater."[4] Den amerikanske Harvard-professor i international politik Stephen Walt har endvidere en komparativ analyse af Irans og USAs militære kapaciteter på sin blog.

Ideen om at Iran skulle udgøre en militær trussel mod Vesten står altså i skarp kontrast til fakta omhandlende landets militære kapacitet og Iran har da heller ikke angrebet noget andet land i flere hundrede år. Landet er omringet på begge sider af USAs og NATOs styrker i Irak og Afghanistan og har været under konstante trusler om militær intervention fra israelsk side i årevis, men Iran har ikke fundet at dette udgør grund nok til voldshandlinger, hvilket da også er ganske forståeligt. Iranerne er efter alt dømme pragmatiske nok til at vide, at skulle man begynde på noget sådant ville det næppe falde ud til Irans fordel da man militært såvel som økonomisk er underlegen.

Manglende vilje til aggression er til gengæld ikke noget der karakteriserer Israel som pt. er den eneste atommagt i Mellemøsten og som har udviklet sin atomare våbenkapacitet i modstrid med gældende internationale aftaler, vel at mærke uden at dette har haft nogle nævneværdige konsekvenser for den enorme økonomiske, militære og politiske støtte som landet modtager fra USA. Iran er berettiget til at udvikle atomreaktorer til fredelige formål idet landet er underskriver af ikke-spredningsaftalen og der er pt. intet belæg for at hævde, at Irans atomprogram skulle have andre formål end fredelige. Israel har derimod aldrig underskrevet aftalen eller nogensinde bekymret sig stort om international lov og med den mangeårige aggressive Israelske udenrigspolitik in mente burde man måske bekymre sig mere om hvorvidt Israel udgør en trussel mod freden.

Noget kunne derfor tyde på, at NATO - og folk som Løkke og Pind - opfinder trusler i en verden efter Den Kolde Krig hvor NATOs fortsatte eksistensberettigelse kan drages i tvivl, hvilket betyder at NATO, fremfor at være garant for freden, selv er gået hen og blevet en stigende trussel i verden.

De danske oversættelser i ovenstående er lavet af Poyâ Pâkzâd.

Post-Election Iranian demonstrations. [Frequently updated]

IMPORTANT NOTICE: THE MOST RECENT NEWS/COMMENTARY/ANALYSIS ARE POSTED IN THE TOP!!!!

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Reuters: Iran's Revolutionary Guards threaten crackdown.


Youtube's New Citizen Tube Channel with footage from Iran.

Telegraph: Tehran Protest Diary: An angry muslim mother reports from inside Iran


Tehran Bureau: Iran Update.

Professor of Middle Eastern History, Juan Cole's blogpiece from today.

مکان: خیابان کارگر، تقاطع خسروی و شهید صالحی، ساعت 7:20 مورخه 20 ژوئن، سی خرداد، Basij shots to death a young woman in Tehran's Saturday June 20th protests

At 19:05 June 20th
Place: Karekar Ave., at the corner crossing Khosravi St. and Salehi st.

A young woman who was standing aside with her father watching the protests was shot by a basij member hiding on the rooftop of a civilian house. He had clear shot at the girl and could not miss her. However, he aimed straight her heart. I am a doctor, so I rushed to try to save her. But the impact of the gunshot was so fierce that the bullet had blasted inside the victim's chest, and she died in less than 2 minutes.
The protests were going on about 1 kilometers away in the main street and some of the protesting crowd were running from tear gass used among them, towards Salehi St.
The film is shot by my friend who was standing beside me.
Please let the world know.

Tehran Bureau: Iran Makes History Again.

REUTERS: EU leaders step up Iran election criticism.

BBC NEWS: Khamenei Speech - Iran Reaction.

REUTERS: Highlights from Iran leader Khamenei's address to nation.

Professor of Middle Eastern history, Juan Cole, has an extensive piece on his blog on the most recent developments in Iran.

Teheran Bureau: Iran Updates.

SPREAD THIS!!!!!

"What I have witnessed." A powerful note from a female medical student in Iran, translated from Farsi by a trusty reader.

Hello,

It's painful to watch what's happening.

I don't want anything to do with what has been said this far, as I neither have the strength nor the resilience to face all these unfathomable events.

I only want to speak about what I have witnessed. I am a medical student. There was chaos last night at the trauma section in one of our main hospitals. Although by decree, all riot-related injuries were supposed to be sent to military hospitals, all other hospitals were filled to the rim. Last night, nine people died at our hospital and another 28 had gunshot wounds. All hospital employees were crying till dawn. They (government) removed the dead bodies on back of trucks, before we were even able to get their names or other information. What can you even say to the people who don't even respect the dead. No one was allowed to speak to the wounded or get any information from them. This morning the faculty and the students protested by gathering at the lobby of the hospital where they were confronted by plain cloths anti-riot militia, who in turn closed off the hospital and imprisoned the staff. The extent of injuries are so grave, that despite being one of the most staffed emergency rooms, they've asked everyone to stay and help--I'm sure it will even be worst tonight.

What can anyone say in face of all these atrocities? What can you say to the family of the 13 year old boy who died from gunshots and whose dead body then disappeared?

This issue is not about cheating(election) anymore. This is not about stealing votes anymore. The issue is about a vast injustice inflected on the people. They've put a baton in the hand of every 13-14 year old to smash the faces of "the bunches who are less than dirt" (government is calling the people who are uprising dried-up torn and weeds)

This is what sickens me from dealing with these issues. And from those who shut their eyes and close their ears and claim the riots are in opposition of the government and presidency!! No! The people's complaint is against the egregious injustices committed against the people.

International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran: Mass Arrests and Detentions Signal Increasing Repression.

TEHERAN BUREAU: Why Ahmadinejad Did not Win.

Important news from Iranian human rights activists: 32 deaths confirmed
Dead

17th of June 2009

Source: Majmu‘e-ye fa‘âlân-e hoquq-e bashar dar irân, Human Rights Activists in Iran
http://hra-iran.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1276:464&catid=103:107&Itemid=261

Numbers of dead in recent violence in Iran reach 32

Wednesday, June 17, 2009, 11:29.

The Association of Human Rights Activists in Iran can confirm the deaths of 32 Iranian citizens connected to the events of June 14 and June 15, based on its own fieldwork and despite numerous other reports.

Most of these citizens lost their lives in the attack on Tehran University dormitories on June 14 and the opening of fire by the paramilitary Basij forces on June 15. The violence started after Iranian citizens protested against the results of the tenth presidential elections, and the interference of security and paramilitary forces connected to the government.

In a statement, the public relations office of The Office to Consolidate Unity [Iran’s biggest student organization] yesterday reported the killing of at least seven students during the attack on dormitories of Tehran University and other universities around the country (Amnesty International said on June 15 there had been five deaths).

According to numerous and confirmed reports, the morgue at the Rasul Akram Hospital in Tehran has also stored eight people, who lost their lives during the shooting at defenseless people on Monday June 15.

In addition, Azerbaijani human rights activists have reported the killing of two citizens of Orumiyeh during fights in that city on June 15.

Finally, sources among the doctors at Erfan Hospital (which contains ICU, CCU, NICU and 14 emergency operation rooms) in Western Tehran reported that 15 people were dead in the hospital, all connected to the shooting on June 15.

Reports of civilian deaths across the country received by the Association are very high. However, it is impossible to confirm these because of the highly militarized atmosphere and widespread arrests, so the Association can only vouch for the deaths detailed above but will continue the process of documentation and reporting.

PICTURES FROM THE UPRISING.

Wikipedia article on the election protests.

Analysis by Iran-expert Rasmus Elling of Carsten Niebuhr Institute, Copenhagen University.

Q&A with NYU Prof. Clay Shirky on Twitter and Iran

TEHERAN BUREAU: Iran’s Rural Vote and Election Fraud




June 16th.





Esfahan. 16th June 2009.



Support Demonstration in NY.





Where's My Vote?

Location: Toronto, Canada

This is my way of showing support for the millions of courageous people in Iran who are protesting the results of the Iranian Presidential Elections that took place on June 12, 2009. We must work together to give Iranians a voice outside of Iran.

Israel, Gaza War, Return of “Emboldened Iran,” and Obama

Farideh Farhi - fra bloggen Informed Comment.

A curious pattern characterizes the recent military adventures in the Middle East. Overwhelming and disproportionate force is utilized in the name of at least temporarily popular objective – combating terrorism, preventing WMD proliferation, restoring deterrence, bringing democracy and so on. But once the human costs and efficacy of attacks in terms of stated objectives begin to be questioned, the narrative shifts and the argument for the sustenance of war, refusal of ceasefire, or even the need for “victory” begins to rely on the line that if a certain party or organization in question is not crushed, all the extremist forces in the Middle East led by Iran will be emboldened.

The justification for the continuation of reckless and indefensible violence shifts and the putative objective becomes, above all, to ensure that Iran does not expand its influence in the region as the leader of regional “resistance.” Even if one objected to the initial military foray, it is said, there should be agreement that leaving the mess in the middle and not finishing the job – whatever that means – will lead to the worst of all possible worlds: an angrier crowd that is allowed to survive and cause mischief at the direction of hegemony-seeking Iran. In its latest version, we are told by no less a figure than Israeli president Shimon Peres, “Our goals are clear. We do not want to make Gaza a satellite of Iran.”

I am not going to dwell on the insanity and immorality of violence imposed on a defenseless people based on a future possibility. The callous squander of lives and livelihoods in Iraq, Lebanon, and now Gaza speak for themselves. And, as far as know, no one is claiming that the lengthening of violence in Iraq or Lebanon stopped the presumed process of emboldening Iran.

My bet, like almost everyone else’s at this point, is that whatever the result in Gaza, it will do little to shift the narrative one way or another. There is nothing in the cards that suggest that what has not worked in the past will magically work today.

Hamas as an organization is likely to survive. And in an era in which mere survival against what is perceived to be an uncontrolled Behemoth is considered victory, its fortunes or the fortunes of elements even more bent on “resistance” will rise within Palestinian politics and this will be considered yet another feather in Iran’s – or “the leader of the resistance camp” – cap; a feather Tehran’s bickering leaders will happily or grudgingly accept depending on circumstances and political positions probably with little concern or inability to do much for additional Palestinians who lose lives and are made miserable in their names.

Even if Hamas is dismantled - remember the PLO was also forced to pack its bags once and move to Tunis - there are still others left and a standing, even if presumably weakened Iran, will continue to be a problem. In the midst of an angry region, even the crushing defeat of a foe such as Hamas and sacrifice of a good number of people for the purpose of weakening Iran does not assure a strategic overhaul.

It is true that we are told that such a crushing may help build a better Middle East in which the adversary will be weakened and hence will become more pliant and passive. But common sense tells us that it is difficult for violence to give birth to passivity; not when it is watched in living rooms and squalors alike all over the world and in the Middle East.

But the narrative of emboldened Iran and the need to weaken it by crushing its so-called proxies persists because the picture of a threatening and emboldened Iran is not only necessary for a dysfunctional Israeli polity always in need of leaders showing their martial grit but also for another fight; the fight over how to deal with Iran.

As usual nothing occurs in a vacuum. In all the three countries heavily vested in the drama –Israel, the United States, and Iran – there are folks who for whatever reasons – it really doesn’t matter anymore whether the reasons are justified or not – are ideologically, institutionally, politically, and economically vested in the continuation of animosity.

Call them hardliners, hawks, radicals, demagogues, economic profiteers or ideologues, polarization is to their benefit and each has its own fears, including loss of power. They operate in the midst of societies in which the population is also divided – again for whatever reason - and they are contenders for influence. Theirs is politics of fear, worry, as well as actual and advocated violence. They are not necessarily a united bunch in their respective countries. In fact, in all three countries, the art of bickering has been perfected. But bickering should not be confused with withdrawal and lack of power.

At the same time, in all three polities, there are also a good number of people and leaders who are either tired of ideological thinking or just simply tired of the consequences of never-ending animosity. In Iran, ideologues were set aside for a few years and there is good reason to believe that the kind of politics and foreign policy that was practiced during those years would have had a better chance of lowering tensions in the region after 9/11 had the Bush Administration approached Iran in a more conciliatory manner than it did after the two countries cooperation based on their shared interest in Afghanistan.

But bygones are bygones. What is at hand today is that a reformist or pragmatist is the elected president of the United States backed by a good chunk of American people who have invested in him their hope for re-direction, common sense, and human decency.

For someone like me, an Iranian-American with vested interest in the reconciliation of the two parts of my identity – for mundane reasons such as easier travel and money exchange as well as bigger ones such as fear of a military attack against the rather large family I have left behind - the question is whether trends in the United States will have a better chance at lowering tensions and reducing violence.

The answer obviously rests not in who Obama is - notwithstanding his palpable human decency that has allowed many us to pin our hopes on him - but what he does. It is not the question of goodwill begets goodwill, as George Bush the father once famously said but whether still the most powerful country in the world can lead by setting example and itself becoming less ideological, violent, and insecure at a time of global economic crisis that is bound to get worse; whether the United States can become a more or less competent seeker of solutions or will it remain wedded to and chained by reactive and reactionary institutions and ideas and dysfunctional relationships.

Having watched Iranian politics and foreign policy closely for years, I am convinced that despite all the hurled insults and maneuvering, a change of direction in American foreign policy will impact Iran in significant ways. Iranian leaders of all variety have been sending messages that they are ready to engage in serious conversation about redefining Iran’s role in US’ regional policies. The point they are trying to make is that instead of the attempted pitting of the region against Iran and search for security at its expense, the United States will be better off accepting Iran’s appropriate regional role which should be commensurate with its geographical size, resources, and regional political clout.

Tehran’s reaction to events in Gaza confirm this message and has included a combination of theatrics, genuine expression of sorrow, a bit of diplomacy - much of it with Syria which has a bigger stake in the Israeli-Gaza conflict and Turkey which also has a bigger stake because of its close relations with Israel in the face of a population angered by the Gaza tragedy - and a good dose of wait and see attitude. This is a bed Israelis have made for themselves and they are the ones that have to figure out a way to tidy it. This is why Iran's chief of Islamic Revolution’s Guard Corp (IRGC) rather calmly rules out providing military support to Hamas, saying "Gazan resistance does not need other countries' military help."

Iranian leaders are not stupid. They also worry about Israel being "emboldened.” But generally speaking they think that Israel is digging its own grave by going into Gaza. This is what Iran’s president Mahmud Ahmadinejad means when he says that Israel will wither away in the pages of history; it will fall based on its own contradictions and policies.

Iran's game is one of expression of genuine anger and resentment - it is hard to be from that part of the world and not be angry at what is being seen on television - and playing to the crowd. On this latter front, the real targets are Arab regimes - Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and not Israel per se. The intent is to use the support for Iran's anti-Israeli position in the Arab street as an instrument in preventing the creation of anti-Iranian front by Arab governments. Iran’s leaders would be stupid and delinquent to only play the wait and see game and ignore the possibility that the Obama administration will essentially follow the Bush Administration policy of trying to pit the region against Iran and search for security at its expense.

But playing to the crowds has its limits, at least inside Iran. People were encouraged to demonstrate and volunteer to be sent to Gaza after supreme leader Ali Khamenei declared that anyone dying for the cause of Gaza will be considered a martyr. But after the demonstrations began to entail attacks of foreign embassies, they had to be told publicly by his representative to the universities to calm down and respect international laws and treaties.

And when volunteers for Gaza sat in Tehran airport and angrily demanded from government officials to be sent to Gaza “to fulfill the leader’s command,” again they were told in no uncertain terms by that their task was conscious-raising and moral support. The supreme leader himself acknowledged Iran’s hands were tied while blessing and thanking the volunteers for their dedication in a simple one liner.

The bottom line message: Palestine is not as important to us as you think. It only becomes important for ideological purposes and in response to what we consider to be attempts that are intended to create regime or territorial insecurity. If you don’t believe us, just compare our energetic behavior and policies in Iraq and Afghanistan – countries of high interest for security reasons – to our rather lackadaisical approach to the Gaza conflict.

Another message: We are not about to let excited crowds run our foreign policy.

As is often the case, the Iranian regime may be over-playing its hands and expecting too much. Perhaps the Bush Administration’s support for the continuation of violence in Gaza is intended as a parting gift to Obama. A crushed Hamas, the thought goes, will weaken Iran’s hand in the impending talks with the Untied States and as such must be accepted as an Israeli gift. Surely the people of Gaza are the not first sacrificed at the altar of geopolitics.

Given the added drop in oil prices and the disaster Ahmadinejad’s presidency has brought to the Iranian economy, the Obama Administration may even be tempted to go further and play hard ball, thinking that a weaker Iran is an Iran that will finally say yes to demands that it has said no to throughout the Bush Administration.

Within this frame, Obama’s new Iran policy will just be a variation of the policies that have been going on for many years. In this new iteration, the presumption is that a little more pressure along with more incentives will do the trick. Perhaps! One can never speak in absolute terms about the future.

But if it doesn't, we will be facing an uglier Iran in the future that is bound to be even more restrictive at home and problematic in the region, indeed risking war. In short, a weakened Iran pressured to do what it does not want to do, in all likelihood, will also be an angrier and more hard-line Iran.

Those of us who advocate some sort of compromise with Iran, based on a process of give and take, do so on the premise that such a compromise will be good for Iran, the United States and ultimately the region because it will have to be based on a process in which broad spectrums of the public and elite in both countries end up being okay with the compromise.

Reaching such an acceptance inside Iran is harder because it is the country under pressure to give in on what its broad public considers a right. Even if Iran's leaders buckle under, without such an acceptance, a group of unhappy trouble makers will continue to exist, constantly intent to undermine the new equilibrium which to them will be mainly a concrete and unhappy manifestation of the American will egged by the Israelis. Were these folks an insignificant member of the Iranian society, in terms of numbers and power, I wouldn't worry. But they are not.

The Obama Administration can continue to ignore this domestic predicament and negotiate in order to put Iran in its place in the same way the Israelis and its American enablers have continued to ignore the Palestinian predicament and reality of occupation and have repeatedly pinned their hope on breaking the Palestinian will to resist.

Or, it can change course. It can seriously begin approaching the region with the objective of solving conflicts, rather than picking fights and sides. It will of course not be easy to go against interests that are vested in conflict. But given the disaster that the Middle East has become, no one is asking for a lot at this point; just a sense that a different kind of approach is being contemplated and hopefully tried.

Ahmadinejad's tale i FN d. 24-9-2008

KLIK

Iran: Consequences of a war

Paul Rogers som er professor i fredsstudier udgav for Oxford Research Group i februar et papir med titlen "Iran: Consequences of a war" som stadigvæk må siges at være særdeles interessant

Highlights fra rapporten:

"The perception of Iran as the major threat to US interests in the Middle East stems, in part, from the long-term consequences of seeing the apparently secure, authoritarian and pro-American regime of the Shah so easily deposed in a matter of weeks in 1979. The Shah’s Iran had been seen as the lynch-pin of US security interests in the Gulf – a bulwark against Soviet interference. The sudden regime collapse, followed by the traumatic impotence of the United States at the time of the hostage crisis and the subsequent and bitter antagonism to the US demonstrated by the Islamic Republic under Ayatollah Khomenei, meant that Iran was a direct and persistent obstacle to US regional interests.

These were, and are, centred on the Gulf region’s immense oil reserves and the trend of the United States becoming increasingly dependent on imported oil. If the oil factor was important at the start of the 1990s, it is far more so 15 years later, with US oil import dependency increasing year by year, with China in a similar position, and with Gulf fossil fuel resources likely to make the region of profound geopolitical significance over the next thirty years or more.

In such circumstances it is fundamentally unacceptable to the United States for a “rogue” state such as Iran to be allowed to get even remotely near having its own nuclear capability. Such a “deterrent” would greatly limit US options in the region, and would provide a threat to its closest ally – Israel. While Washington may not be implacably opposed to diplomatic options to ensure that Iran does not go down the path of a major nuclear infrastructure, if those fail, then it has to be recognised that destruction of the suspected nuclear weapons infrastructure and associated facilities is likely to be undertaken at some stage."

"Israel has maintained a nuclear capability since the late 1960s and is believed to have around 200 nuclear warheads, principally for delivery by aircraft or surface-to-surface missiles. It may also be developing warheads for submarine-launched cruise missiles. Even so, Israel regards it as essential to its security that it is the only state in the region with a nuclear capability."

Rapporten Konkluderer:

"A US military attack on Iranian nuclear infrastructure would be the start of a protracted military confrontation that would probably involve Iraq, Israel and Lebanon as well as the United States and Iran, with the possibility of west Gulf states being involved as well. An attack by Israel, although initially on a smaller scale, would almost certainly escalate to involve the United States, and would also mark the start of a protracted conflict.

Although an attack by either state could seriously damage Iran’s nuclear development potential, numerous responses would be possible making a protracted and highly unstable conflict virtually certain. Moreover, Iran would be expected to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty and engage in a nuclear weapons programme as rapidly as possible. This would lead to further military action against Iran, establishing a highly dangerous cycle of violence.

The termination of the Saddam Hussein regime was expected to bring about a free-market client state in Iraq. Instead it has produced a deeply unstable and costly conflict with no end in sight. That may not prevent a US or an Israeli attack on Iran even though it should be expected that the consequences would be substantially greater. What this analysis does conclude is that a military response to the current crisis in relations with Iran is a particularly dangerous option and should not be considered further – alternative approaches must be sought, however difficult these may be."

læs resten her:

http://www.iranbodycount.org/analysis/