LONDON (Reuters) - When Saudi King Abdullah arrived home last week, he came bearing gifts: handouts worth $37 billion, apparently intended to placate Saudis of modest means and insulate the world's biggest oil exporter from the wave of protest sweeping the Arab world.Raw Story: "‘Royal welfare’ costs Saudis tens of billions every year, leaked cables reveal."
But some of the biggest handouts over the past two decades have gone to his own extended family, according to unpublished American diplomatic cables dating back to 1996.
The cables, obtained by WikiLeaks and reviewed by Reuters, provide remarkable insight into how much the vast royal welfare program has cost the country -- not just financially but in terms of undermining social cohesion.
mandag den 28. februar 2011
Wikileaks: Et interessant indblik i den Saudi-Arabiske kongefamilies økonomi.
Dagens citat: Stig Dalager.
Mens vækstkurven i nationaløkonomien er for nedadgående og hundredtusinder af husejere som teknisk insolvente sidder fanget i en gældsfælde oven på den overophedede økonomi under Fogh Rasmussens kortsigtede lederskab, er vækstkurven for skandalesager omkring den nedslidte regering for opadgående:Fra kronikken "De trækker stikket til folkestyret ud"
Lederen af Det Konservative Folkeparti, Lene Espersen, måtte gå af som følge af dårlige udenrigsministerielle prioriteringer og i bedste fald vildledende ministersvar i Folketinget; Lars Løkke Rasmussen har klare forklaringsproblemer omkring en sandsynlig overbetaling til private hospitaler; Bertel Haarder gik amok på en TVA-journalist, fordi han stiller et uskyldigt kritisk spørgsmål i forbindelse med Haarders embedsførelse; tidligere forsvarsminister Søren Gade forlod sin ministerpost i skyggen af flere lækagesager, og efter hans afgang anklages han af sin tidligere spindoktor for at have lækket statshemmeligheder om jægerkorpset; Henriette Kjær, der en gang tidligere måtte forlade en ministerpost på grund af ægtemandens økonomiske uregelmæssigheder, måtte trække sig som ordfører i Det Konservative Folkeparti på grund af angiveligt endnu flere af slagsen; tidligere videnskabsminister Helge Sander synes at være dybt involveret i den voksende skandale omkring hjerneforskeren Milena Penkowa – en skandale, der i sig selv er ved at blive et symptom på den elite- og konkurrencementalitet og den demokratisk udhulede ledelse af universiteterne, som regeringen har fremmet.
torsdag den 17. februar 2011
fredag den 11. februar 2011
En Amerikansk Allieret Står for Fald.
Da Barack Obama gav sit første interview som amerikansk præsident til BBC i juni 2009, beskrev han Hosni Mubarak som en "stålsat allieret" og "en stabiliserende kraft i regionen". Til spørgsmålet "anser du Mubarak for at være en autoritær leder?" svarede Obama "nej" og tilføjede "jeg undlader at sætte mærkater på folk".
Holdningsmæssigt må disse udtalelser betegnes som en kovending. Små syv år tidligere, da Barack Obama den 2. oktober 2002 talte ved en anti-krigsdemonstration i Chicago, inkluderede talen hård kritik af USA's allierede i Ægypten og Saudi-Arabien:
"Lad os kæmpe for at sikre os, at vores såkaldte allierede i Mellemøsten, saudierne og ægypterne, stopper med at undertrykke deres egne befolkninger, at undertrykke regeringskritik, og at tolere korruption og ulighed, samt at misligeholde deres økonomier, så deres unge vokser op uden uddannelse, udsigter og uden håb, beredvillige rekrutter for terrorceller.”
Noget havde altså ændret sig, men det var ikke Mubarak-regimets magtpraksis, idet man ufortrø-dent fortsatte styrets voldshandlinger mod Ægyptens befolkning. Kan det tænkes, at Barack Obama og hans administration simpelthen ikke var bevidste om dette? Svaret er nej. I det amerikanske udenrigsministeriums egen menneskerettighedsrapport fra 2009 gør man sig ingen illusioner mht. Ægypten. Om tilstanden i landet i 2008 hedder det:
“Regeringens respekt for menneskerettigheder forblev lav, og seriøse misbrug fortsatte på mange områder … Sikkerhedsstyrkerne brugte uberettiget dødbringende vold og torturerede og misbrugte fanger og tilbageholdne, i de fleste tilfælde straffrit. Vilkårene i fængsler og arrester var dårlige. Sikkerhedsstyrker anholdte og tilbageholdte individer vilkårligt, i nogle tilfælde af politiske grunde, og man holdt dem langvarigt varetægtsfængslede. Den udøvende magt udøvede kontrol over og pres på den dømmende magt. Regeringens respekt for foreningsfriheden og religionsfriheden vedblev med at være lav gennem året og regeringen fortsatte med at begrænse NGO'ers virke. Regeringen begrænsede delvis ytringsfriheden.”
Til trods for ovenstående rapport om menneskerettighedernes og frihedsrettighedernes svære vilkår i Ægypten, fortsatte den økonomiske og militære støtte til den ægyptiske diktaturstat imidlertid under Obama. I en officiel rapport til Kongressen dateret 16. september 2010 får vi at vide, at den årlige støtte på cirka 3 milliarder dollars, som man hvert år har ydet til Ægypten siden 1979, var blevet reduceret en smule i 2009, idet Ægypten i 2009 "kun" modtog $200 millioner i økonomisk støtte og $1.3 milliarder i militær støtte. Reduktionen i støtten skyldtes til dels, at man havde skåret den økonomiske støtte ned til det halve, og dermed fjernet den del af støtten, som skulle gå til demokratifremmende formål. Om den militære støtte hedder det endvidere at: “Selv om der ikke eksisterer nogle verificerbare tal vedrørende Ægyptens totale militære udgifter, estimeres det, at amerikansk militærbistand dækker op mod 80% af forsvarsministeriets udgifter til fremskaffelse af våben.” Disse våben købes for en stor dels vedkommende i USA. hvorfor der altså synes at være tale om delvis skjult subsidiering af det amerikanske militær-industrielle kompleks.
Cairo-talen.
I sin nu berømte Cairo-tale gjorde Barack Obama det klart, at han var en dedikeret tilhænger af demokrati og menneskerettigheder: “Jeg har en urokkelig tro på, at alle mennesker længes efter visse ting; muligheden for at sige hvad man mener og til at have noget at skulle have sagt, hvad angår måden man bliver styret på; tillid til retssikkerheden og den ensartede administration af retfærdigheden; en regering som er gennemsigtig og som ikke stjæler fra folket; friheden til at leve som man ønsker. Disse er ikke kun amerikanske idéer, de er menneskerettigheder, og det er derfor, vi støtter dem alle vegne.”
Mange steder i den muslimske verden havde man imidlertid nok vanskeligt ved at se sammenhængen mellem retorikken og realiteterne, måske først og fremmest fordi man havde valgt at holde talen i Cairo, hovedstaden i Hosni Mubaraks amerikansk-støttede politistat, hvor ytringsfriheden, retssikkerheden, gennemsigtigheden og menneskerettighederne mestendels glimrer ved deres fravær. Dernæst var inkonsistensen mellem Obama's prisværdige værditilkendegivelser og så det faktum, at USA støtter en anseelig andel af Mellemøstens øvrige diktaturer både militært og økonomisk, nok smerteligt iøjnefaldende for mange. Sidst men ikke mindst lod fraværet af en kritisk stillingtagen til Israels krig mod Gaza nok meget tilbage at ønske for den muslimske verdens indbyggere.
Mange tænkte imidlertid nok også, at de ville give Obama tid til at bevise, at han rent faktisk mente sine ord, for Cairo-talen løb trods alt af stabelen samme år, som han tiltrådte som præsident, hvorfor tiden til at implementere de lovede forandringer havde været ret begrænset. Desværre har de nok endnu engang måttet sande, at der eksisterer en uforenelig afstand mellem tale og handling hos det amerikanske lederskab.
Det er imidlertid ikke kun inden for rammerne af Mellemøsten, at kløften mellem de proklamerede værdier og virkeligheden synes ganske udtalt. Hvis gennemsigtighed er blandt Obama's kerneværdier, har den i hvert fald været gemt godt af vejen i hele forløbet omkring Wikileaks' lækage af de amerikanske telegrammer! Hvis tillid til retssikkerheden ligger præsidentens hjerte så nært, hvordan hænger dette så sammen med fortsættelsen af Guantamo-lejren og de stærkt kritisable renditionsprogrammer, samt med den manglende ophævelse af Patriot Act, Military Commissions Act og Obama-administrationens immunisering af de teleselskaber, som udførte omfattende illegale aflytninger af den amerikanske befolkning under Bush II?
Et mønster viser sig.
USA's udenrigsminister Hillary Clinton opfordrede d. 25. januar Mubarak til reformer og gentog Cairo-talens ordlyd, men desværre sagde hun også i samme åndedrag, at den amerikanske administration anså Mubaraks regime for at være “stabilt”, og at den amerikanske vurdering af hændelserne i Ægypten var, at Mubaraks regering “leder efter måder, hvorpå man kan besvare det ægyptiske folks legitime behov og interesser.” Hosni Mubarak var altså pludselig kommet på bedre tanker efter tre årtiers jernnæve og undtagelsestilstand, hvis vi skal tro Hillary Clinton.
Talsmand for Det Hvide Hus, Robert Gibbs, omtalte Mubarak som en “nær og vigtig allieret” den 26. januar, og selveste præsidenten understregede den 27. januar den for USA gavnlige alliance med Mubarak. I stedet for at insistere på demokratisk forandring håbede han blot på, at Mubarak gjorde fremskridt mht. at reformere landet. Som dagene er gået, er et mønster begyndt at vise sig. Man har kontinuerligt opfordret begge sider af konflikten til at handle tilbageholdent og opfordret til en “ordentlig overgang”, hvilket synes at involvere bred vestlig opbakning til vicepræsident Omar Suleiman som spydspids for en overgangsregering frem til Mubaraks proklamerede tilbagetræden i september. Suleiman er imidlertid ikke mindre forhadt blandt ægypterne end Mubarak og hans familie, hvorfor han for ægypterne blot signalerer mere af det samme. Opbakning af Suleiman er desuden ganske interessant, apropos de mange fine ord om retssikkerhed og demokrati, idet Sulei-man har været en stærk støtte i CIAs extraordinary renditions program i kraft af sin tidligere stilling som leder af den ægyptiske efterretningstjeneste.
Frygt for islamisering?
De amerikanske udmeldinger bør for nogle ses som udtryk for frygt for en islamisering af Ægypten i tilfælde af Mubaraks fald, men virker dette egentlig plausibelt? USA støtter trods alt fortsat aktivt Saudi-Arabiens kong Abdullah, selvom monarkens styre må betegnes som alt andet end moderat, og historisk har man da heller ikke været tilbageholden med støtte til fundamentalistiske regimer eller grupperinger i den muslimske verden. Dette var eksempelvis tilfældet under Reagan, hvor man ganske aktivt støttede op om den fundamentalistiske pakistanske diktator Muhammed Zia ul-Haq.
I det ægyptiske tilfælde har denne påståede frygt selvfølgelig at gøre med Det Muslimske Broderskabs mulige rolle i et post-revolutionært Ægypten, men kan broderskabets ageren i de senere år betegnes som egentlig islamistisk? Det er der ikke meget, der tyder på. Tværtimod tyder meget på, at der er sket en reformering af Det Muslimske Broderskab gennem det seneste tiår. Alene repræsentanterne for organisationens handlinger i det ægyptiske parlament peger tydeligt i retning af dette, idet man komparativt set har ageret forbilledligt demokratisk i den parlamentariske proces. Dermed ikke sagt, at Det Muslimske Broderskab er sprunget ud som liberale demokrater af vestligt tilsnit, men at betegne broderskabet af i dag som 'islamistisk' er at tegne en karikatur af de faktiske forhold.
Realisterne og legitimitetsproblematikken.
Fremtrædende repræsentanter for den realistiske skole har bifaldet den amerikanske diplomatiske intervention i den gryende ægyptiske revolution og betegnet den som vellykket under omstændig-hederne. Man har fremhævet, at selvom man ikke offentlig har fremsat noget ufravigeligt krav om demokratisering, kan det meget vel være, at noget sådant er blevet foreslået i magtens korridorer. Denne vurdering hviler imidlertid på forudantagelsen af interventionens legitimitet, men hvori består denne legitimitet egentlig, da de amerikanske handlinger vel bør vurderes i kontekst af, at man fra amerikansk side blander sig i interne ægyptiske forhold, hvor befolkningen ikke har haft nogen som helst mulighed for på demokratisk vis at påvirke det amerikanske lederskabs sammensætning? Den diplomatiske intervention forekommer, uanset dens karakter, at være svært forenelig med tilkendegivelserne af, at man anser demokratiske processer, hvor befolkningen giver udtryk for deres tilhørsforhold og interesser, som noget man både foretrækker og anbefaler, idet ingen i Ægypten har stemt på det amerikanske lederskab.
Strategiske krav.
Obama-administrationens nylige krav til Hosni Mubarak bør nok vurderes som værende af strategisk snarere end af principiel karakter. Havde kravene været af principiel karakter ville lignende krav følgelig skulle stilles til USA's øvrige diktatoriske samarbejdspartnere, hvilket ikke har været tilfældet. Bemærk at Obama-administrationen ikke i samme ombæring beder Islam Karimov om at reformere Uzbekistan, endsige træde tilbage. Man beder ikke, i overensstemmelse med den herskende internationale konsensus, Israel om at forlade de besatte områder og trække sig tilbage til 1967 grænserne. Man beder ikke Saudi-Arabiens lederskab om at ophøre med at krænke befolkningens menneskerettigheder og med at undertrykke landets indbyggere. Disse amerikansk støttede udøvere af statslig vold er fortsat stabile, hvorfor man tilsyneladende vægter deres fortsatte formålstjenstlighed højere end de påståede idealer.
Den kyniske realpolitik udstilles netop nu og graveres yderligere af kløften mellem tale og handling. Læren synes (fortsat) at være, at så længe et diktatur er formålstjenstligt og stabilt, mødes regimets ledelse højst af kritik, som ikke bakkes op af egentlige samarbejdsmæssige konsekvenser. Destabiliseres regimet imidlertid i en sådan grad, at alt peger på dets fald, ændrer man strategi i håb om fortsat at kunne udøve indflydelse i landet under den kommende orden. Den strategiske kritik kan imidlertid meget vel risikere at blive mødt med enten skuldertræk eller vrede blandt ægypterne, og man fristes da også til at spørge, hvorfor en eventuel demokratisk orienteret regering i et post-diktatorisk Ægypten skulle være interesseret i fortsat amerikansk støtte og regeringssamarbejde med supermagten?
En supermagt taber terræn.
Hvis rygterne om, at Mubarak-familien besidder en formue i størrelsesordenen flere hundrede milliarder dollars, er blot tilnærmelsesvis sande, synes den mest åbenlyse handlingsplan at være, at man først og fremmest forsøger at fravriste denne illegitimt rekvirerede formue fra Mubarak-familien. Skulle dette lykkes, vil man ikke have stor bevæggrund for et fortsat økonomisk motiveret samarbejde med USA, idet en formue i denne størrelsesorden er lig flere hundrede års amerikansk økonomisk støtte, målt i dens nuværende form.
Udviklingen i Ægypten kan i det hele taget meget vel gå hen og få meget alvorlige konsekvenser for hegemonens magtradius, såfremt oprøret i Ægypten ender i en egentlig revolution, idet en sådan kan komme til at sprede sig som ringe i vandet og på sigt betyde, at USA vil miste indflydelse i regionen i et ganske betydeligt omfang. Et sådant indflydelsestab er allerede evident andetsteds, nemlig i Latin-Amerika, hvor man i lighed med befolkningerne i Mellemøsten ikke har det store at takke USA's årtier lange interventioner og indblanding i regionale affærer for. Så mens man altså ikke har den store grund til at frygte, at der kommer til at foregå en omfattende islamisering i tilfælde af Mubaraks fald, har man til gengæld nok god grund til at frygte de muslimske og kristne ægypteres insisteren på demokratisering og uafhængighed.
Holdningsmæssigt må disse udtalelser betegnes som en kovending. Små syv år tidligere, da Barack Obama den 2. oktober 2002 talte ved en anti-krigsdemonstration i Chicago, inkluderede talen hård kritik af USA's allierede i Ægypten og Saudi-Arabien:
"Lad os kæmpe for at sikre os, at vores såkaldte allierede i Mellemøsten, saudierne og ægypterne, stopper med at undertrykke deres egne befolkninger, at undertrykke regeringskritik, og at tolere korruption og ulighed, samt at misligeholde deres økonomier, så deres unge vokser op uden uddannelse, udsigter og uden håb, beredvillige rekrutter for terrorceller.”
Noget havde altså ændret sig, men det var ikke Mubarak-regimets magtpraksis, idet man ufortrø-dent fortsatte styrets voldshandlinger mod Ægyptens befolkning. Kan det tænkes, at Barack Obama og hans administration simpelthen ikke var bevidste om dette? Svaret er nej. I det amerikanske udenrigsministeriums egen menneskerettighedsrapport fra 2009 gør man sig ingen illusioner mht. Ægypten. Om tilstanden i landet i 2008 hedder det:
“Regeringens respekt for menneskerettigheder forblev lav, og seriøse misbrug fortsatte på mange områder … Sikkerhedsstyrkerne brugte uberettiget dødbringende vold og torturerede og misbrugte fanger og tilbageholdne, i de fleste tilfælde straffrit. Vilkårene i fængsler og arrester var dårlige. Sikkerhedsstyrker anholdte og tilbageholdte individer vilkårligt, i nogle tilfælde af politiske grunde, og man holdt dem langvarigt varetægtsfængslede. Den udøvende magt udøvede kontrol over og pres på den dømmende magt. Regeringens respekt for foreningsfriheden og religionsfriheden vedblev med at være lav gennem året og regeringen fortsatte med at begrænse NGO'ers virke. Regeringen begrænsede delvis ytringsfriheden.”
Til trods for ovenstående rapport om menneskerettighedernes og frihedsrettighedernes svære vilkår i Ægypten, fortsatte den økonomiske og militære støtte til den ægyptiske diktaturstat imidlertid under Obama. I en officiel rapport til Kongressen dateret 16. september 2010 får vi at vide, at den årlige støtte på cirka 3 milliarder dollars, som man hvert år har ydet til Ægypten siden 1979, var blevet reduceret en smule i 2009, idet Ægypten i 2009 "kun" modtog $200 millioner i økonomisk støtte og $1.3 milliarder i militær støtte. Reduktionen i støtten skyldtes til dels, at man havde skåret den økonomiske støtte ned til det halve, og dermed fjernet den del af støtten, som skulle gå til demokratifremmende formål. Om den militære støtte hedder det endvidere at: “Selv om der ikke eksisterer nogle verificerbare tal vedrørende Ægyptens totale militære udgifter, estimeres det, at amerikansk militærbistand dækker op mod 80% af forsvarsministeriets udgifter til fremskaffelse af våben.” Disse våben købes for en stor dels vedkommende i USA. hvorfor der altså synes at være tale om delvis skjult subsidiering af det amerikanske militær-industrielle kompleks.
Cairo-talen.
I sin nu berømte Cairo-tale gjorde Barack Obama det klart, at han var en dedikeret tilhænger af demokrati og menneskerettigheder: “Jeg har en urokkelig tro på, at alle mennesker længes efter visse ting; muligheden for at sige hvad man mener og til at have noget at skulle have sagt, hvad angår måden man bliver styret på; tillid til retssikkerheden og den ensartede administration af retfærdigheden; en regering som er gennemsigtig og som ikke stjæler fra folket; friheden til at leve som man ønsker. Disse er ikke kun amerikanske idéer, de er menneskerettigheder, og det er derfor, vi støtter dem alle vegne.”
Mange steder i den muslimske verden havde man imidlertid nok vanskeligt ved at se sammenhængen mellem retorikken og realiteterne, måske først og fremmest fordi man havde valgt at holde talen i Cairo, hovedstaden i Hosni Mubaraks amerikansk-støttede politistat, hvor ytringsfriheden, retssikkerheden, gennemsigtigheden og menneskerettighederne mestendels glimrer ved deres fravær. Dernæst var inkonsistensen mellem Obama's prisværdige værditilkendegivelser og så det faktum, at USA støtter en anseelig andel af Mellemøstens øvrige diktaturer både militært og økonomisk, nok smerteligt iøjnefaldende for mange. Sidst men ikke mindst lod fraværet af en kritisk stillingtagen til Israels krig mod Gaza nok meget tilbage at ønske for den muslimske verdens indbyggere.
Mange tænkte imidlertid nok også, at de ville give Obama tid til at bevise, at han rent faktisk mente sine ord, for Cairo-talen løb trods alt af stabelen samme år, som han tiltrådte som præsident, hvorfor tiden til at implementere de lovede forandringer havde været ret begrænset. Desværre har de nok endnu engang måttet sande, at der eksisterer en uforenelig afstand mellem tale og handling hos det amerikanske lederskab.
Det er imidlertid ikke kun inden for rammerne af Mellemøsten, at kløften mellem de proklamerede værdier og virkeligheden synes ganske udtalt. Hvis gennemsigtighed er blandt Obama's kerneværdier, har den i hvert fald været gemt godt af vejen i hele forløbet omkring Wikileaks' lækage af de amerikanske telegrammer! Hvis tillid til retssikkerheden ligger præsidentens hjerte så nært, hvordan hænger dette så sammen med fortsættelsen af Guantamo-lejren og de stærkt kritisable renditionsprogrammer, samt med den manglende ophævelse af Patriot Act, Military Commissions Act og Obama-administrationens immunisering af de teleselskaber, som udførte omfattende illegale aflytninger af den amerikanske befolkning under Bush II?
Et mønster viser sig.
USA's udenrigsminister Hillary Clinton opfordrede d. 25. januar Mubarak til reformer og gentog Cairo-talens ordlyd, men desværre sagde hun også i samme åndedrag, at den amerikanske administration anså Mubaraks regime for at være “stabilt”, og at den amerikanske vurdering af hændelserne i Ægypten var, at Mubaraks regering “leder efter måder, hvorpå man kan besvare det ægyptiske folks legitime behov og interesser.” Hosni Mubarak var altså pludselig kommet på bedre tanker efter tre årtiers jernnæve og undtagelsestilstand, hvis vi skal tro Hillary Clinton.
Talsmand for Det Hvide Hus, Robert Gibbs, omtalte Mubarak som en “nær og vigtig allieret” den 26. januar, og selveste præsidenten understregede den 27. januar den for USA gavnlige alliance med Mubarak. I stedet for at insistere på demokratisk forandring håbede han blot på, at Mubarak gjorde fremskridt mht. at reformere landet. Som dagene er gået, er et mønster begyndt at vise sig. Man har kontinuerligt opfordret begge sider af konflikten til at handle tilbageholdent og opfordret til en “ordentlig overgang”, hvilket synes at involvere bred vestlig opbakning til vicepræsident Omar Suleiman som spydspids for en overgangsregering frem til Mubaraks proklamerede tilbagetræden i september. Suleiman er imidlertid ikke mindre forhadt blandt ægypterne end Mubarak og hans familie, hvorfor han for ægypterne blot signalerer mere af det samme. Opbakning af Suleiman er desuden ganske interessant, apropos de mange fine ord om retssikkerhed og demokrati, idet Sulei-man har været en stærk støtte i CIAs extraordinary renditions program i kraft af sin tidligere stilling som leder af den ægyptiske efterretningstjeneste.
Frygt for islamisering?
De amerikanske udmeldinger bør for nogle ses som udtryk for frygt for en islamisering af Ægypten i tilfælde af Mubaraks fald, men virker dette egentlig plausibelt? USA støtter trods alt fortsat aktivt Saudi-Arabiens kong Abdullah, selvom monarkens styre må betegnes som alt andet end moderat, og historisk har man da heller ikke været tilbageholden med støtte til fundamentalistiske regimer eller grupperinger i den muslimske verden. Dette var eksempelvis tilfældet under Reagan, hvor man ganske aktivt støttede op om den fundamentalistiske pakistanske diktator Muhammed Zia ul-Haq.
I det ægyptiske tilfælde har denne påståede frygt selvfølgelig at gøre med Det Muslimske Broderskabs mulige rolle i et post-revolutionært Ægypten, men kan broderskabets ageren i de senere år betegnes som egentlig islamistisk? Det er der ikke meget, der tyder på. Tværtimod tyder meget på, at der er sket en reformering af Det Muslimske Broderskab gennem det seneste tiår. Alene repræsentanterne for organisationens handlinger i det ægyptiske parlament peger tydeligt i retning af dette, idet man komparativt set har ageret forbilledligt demokratisk i den parlamentariske proces. Dermed ikke sagt, at Det Muslimske Broderskab er sprunget ud som liberale demokrater af vestligt tilsnit, men at betegne broderskabet af i dag som 'islamistisk' er at tegne en karikatur af de faktiske forhold.
Realisterne og legitimitetsproblematikken.
Fremtrædende repræsentanter for den realistiske skole har bifaldet den amerikanske diplomatiske intervention i den gryende ægyptiske revolution og betegnet den som vellykket under omstændig-hederne. Man har fremhævet, at selvom man ikke offentlig har fremsat noget ufravigeligt krav om demokratisering, kan det meget vel være, at noget sådant er blevet foreslået i magtens korridorer. Denne vurdering hviler imidlertid på forudantagelsen af interventionens legitimitet, men hvori består denne legitimitet egentlig, da de amerikanske handlinger vel bør vurderes i kontekst af, at man fra amerikansk side blander sig i interne ægyptiske forhold, hvor befolkningen ikke har haft nogen som helst mulighed for på demokratisk vis at påvirke det amerikanske lederskabs sammensætning? Den diplomatiske intervention forekommer, uanset dens karakter, at være svært forenelig med tilkendegivelserne af, at man anser demokratiske processer, hvor befolkningen giver udtryk for deres tilhørsforhold og interesser, som noget man både foretrækker og anbefaler, idet ingen i Ægypten har stemt på det amerikanske lederskab.
Strategiske krav.
Obama-administrationens nylige krav til Hosni Mubarak bør nok vurderes som værende af strategisk snarere end af principiel karakter. Havde kravene været af principiel karakter ville lignende krav følgelig skulle stilles til USA's øvrige diktatoriske samarbejdspartnere, hvilket ikke har været tilfældet. Bemærk at Obama-administrationen ikke i samme ombæring beder Islam Karimov om at reformere Uzbekistan, endsige træde tilbage. Man beder ikke, i overensstemmelse med den herskende internationale konsensus, Israel om at forlade de besatte områder og trække sig tilbage til 1967 grænserne. Man beder ikke Saudi-Arabiens lederskab om at ophøre med at krænke befolkningens menneskerettigheder og med at undertrykke landets indbyggere. Disse amerikansk støttede udøvere af statslig vold er fortsat stabile, hvorfor man tilsyneladende vægter deres fortsatte formålstjenstlighed højere end de påståede idealer.
Den kyniske realpolitik udstilles netop nu og graveres yderligere af kløften mellem tale og handling. Læren synes (fortsat) at være, at så længe et diktatur er formålstjenstligt og stabilt, mødes regimets ledelse højst af kritik, som ikke bakkes op af egentlige samarbejdsmæssige konsekvenser. Destabiliseres regimet imidlertid i en sådan grad, at alt peger på dets fald, ændrer man strategi i håb om fortsat at kunne udøve indflydelse i landet under den kommende orden. Den strategiske kritik kan imidlertid meget vel risikere at blive mødt med enten skuldertræk eller vrede blandt ægypterne, og man fristes da også til at spørge, hvorfor en eventuel demokratisk orienteret regering i et post-diktatorisk Ægypten skulle være interesseret i fortsat amerikansk støtte og regeringssamarbejde med supermagten?
En supermagt taber terræn.
Hvis rygterne om, at Mubarak-familien besidder en formue i størrelsesordenen flere hundrede milliarder dollars, er blot tilnærmelsesvis sande, synes den mest åbenlyse handlingsplan at være, at man først og fremmest forsøger at fravriste denne illegitimt rekvirerede formue fra Mubarak-familien. Skulle dette lykkes, vil man ikke have stor bevæggrund for et fortsat økonomisk motiveret samarbejde med USA, idet en formue i denne størrelsesorden er lig flere hundrede års amerikansk økonomisk støtte, målt i dens nuværende form.
Udviklingen i Ægypten kan i det hele taget meget vel gå hen og få meget alvorlige konsekvenser for hegemonens magtradius, såfremt oprøret i Ægypten ender i en egentlig revolution, idet en sådan kan komme til at sprede sig som ringe i vandet og på sigt betyde, at USA vil miste indflydelse i regionen i et ganske betydeligt omfang. Et sådant indflydelsestab er allerede evident andetsteds, nemlig i Latin-Amerika, hvor man i lighed med befolkningerne i Mellemøsten ikke har det store at takke USA's årtier lange interventioner og indblanding i regionale affærer for. Så mens man altså ikke har den store grund til at frygte, at der kommer til at foregå en omfattende islamisering i tilfælde af Mubaraks fald, har man til gengæld nok god grund til at frygte de muslimske og kristne ægypteres insisteren på demokratisering og uafhængighed.
Anbefalelsesværdig kommentar af Robert Fisk
There is nothing like an Arab revolution to show up the hypocrisy of your friends. Especially if that revolution is one of civility and humanism and powered by an overwhelming demand for the kind of democracy that we enjoy in Europe and America. The pussyfooting nonsense uttered by Obama and La Clinton these past two weeks is only part of the problem. From "stability" to "perfect storm" – Gone With the Wind might have recommended itself to the State Department if they really must pilfer Hollywood for their failure to adopt moral values in the Middle East – we've ended up with the presidential "now-means-yesterday", and "orderly transition", which translates: no violence while ex-air force General Mubarak is put out to graze so that ex-intelligence General Suleiman can take over the regime on behalf of America and Israel.
Fox News has already told its viewers in America that the Muslim Brotherhood – about the "softest" of Islamist groups in the Middle East – is behind the brave men and women who have dared to resist the state security police, while the mass of French "intellectuals" (the quotation marks are essential for poseurs like Bernard-Henri Lévy have turned, in Le Monde's imperishable headline, into "the intelligentsia of silence".
And we all know why. Alain Finkelstein talks about his "admiration" for the democrats but also the need for "vigilance" - and this is surely a low point for any 'philosophe' – "because today we know above all that we don't know how everything is going to turn out." This almost Rumsfeldian quotation is gilded by Lévy's own preposterous line that "it is essential to take into account the complexity of the situation". Oddly enough that is exactly what the Israelis always say when some misguided Westerner suggests that Israel should stop stealing Arab land in the West Bank for its colonists.
Indeed Israel's own reaction to the momentous events in Egypt – that this might not be the time for democracy in Egypt (thus allowing it to keep the title of "the only democracy in the Middle East") – has been as implausible as it has been self-defeating. Israel will be much safer surrounded by real democracies than by vicious dictators and autocratic kings. To his enormous credit, the French historian Daniel Lindenberg told the truth this week. "We must, alas, admit the reality: many intellectuals believe, deep down, that the Arab people are congenitally backward."
There is nothing new in this. It applies to our subterranean feelings about the whole Muslim world. Chancellor Merkel of Germany announces that multiculturalism doesn't work, and a pretender to the Bavarian royal family told me not so long ago that there were too many Turks in Germany because "they didn't want to be part of German society". Yet when Turkey itself – as near a perfect blend of Islam and democracy as you can find in the Middle East right now – asks to join the European Union and share our Western civilisation, we search desperately for any remedy, however racist, to prevent her membership.
In other words, we want them to be like us, providing they stay away. And then, when they prove they want to be like us but don't want to invade Europe, we do our best to install another American-trained general to rule them. Just as Paul Wolfowitz reacted to the Turkish parliament's refusal to allow US troops to invade Iraq from southern Turkey by asking if "the generals don't have something to say about this", we are now reduced to listening while US defence secretary Robert Gates fawns over the Egyptian army for their "restraint" – apparently failing to realise that it is the people of Egypt, the proponents of democracy, who should be praised for their restraint and non-violence, not a bunch of brigadiers.
So when the Arabs want dignity and self-respect, when they cry out for the very future which Obama outlined in his famous – now, I suppose, infamous – Cairo speech of June 2009, we show them disrespect and casuistry. Instead of welcoming democratic demands, we treat them as a disaster. It is an infinite relief to find serious American journalists like Roger Cohen going "behind the lines" on Tahrir Square to tell the unvarnished truth about this hypocrisy of ours. It is an unmitigated disgrace when their leaders speak. Macmillan threw aside colonial pretensions of African unpreparedness for democracy by talking of the "wind of change". Now the wind of change is blowing across the Arab world. And we turn our backs upon it.
The Independent: Robert Fisk: Hypocrisy is exposed by the wind of change.
torsdag den 10. februar 2011
Journalists førstehåndsberetning om det ægyptiske tortur-regime.
The sickening, rapid click-click-clicking of the electrocuting device sounded like an angry rattlesnake as it passed within inches of my face. Then came a scream of agony, followed by a pitiful whimpering from the handcuffed, blindfolded victim as the force of the shock propelled him across the floor.
A hail of vicious punches and kicks rained down on the prone bodies next to me, creating loud thumps. The torturers screamed abuse all around me. Only later were their chilling words translated to me by an Arabic-speaking colleague: "In this hotel, there are only two items on the menu for those who don't behave – electrocution and rape."...
The Guardian: 28 hours in the dark heart of Egypt's torture machine.
Ægypten: Fremtrædende medlemmer af regeringspartiet træder tilbage
MP Mamdouh Hosny, director of the Industry and Energy Committee and ruling National Democratic Party’s (NDP) representative for the Ghirbal district in Alexandria, resigned from the party.Al Masry Al Youm: Senior NDP officials resign from party.
A source from within the Federation of Industries also revealed that a number of its members planned to resign from the party.
The same source said that Mahmoud Suleiman, the Deputy Chairman of the Chamber of Chemical Industries and the NDP’s Economic Committee member in parliament, had also resigned from the party several days ago.
Karzai: USA ønsker permanente baser i Afghanistan
Afghan President Hamid Karzai confirmed Tuesday that the United States are seeking to establish permanent bases in Afghanistan to target al-Qaeda and Taliban hideouts in the region.
The bases would enable US troops to remain in the area beyond the planned transfer of security responsibility from US and NATO troops to Afghan forces by end of 2014, a process due to begin in the spring.
Addressing a press conference in his fortified presidential palace, Karzai said that his government was negotiating with US officials on a range of strategic agreements, including the establishment of permanent military bases in Afghanistan.
The president said that several US officials and senators had told him, 'Yes they want this (permanent bases) and we have been negotiating with them.'
'We believe that a long-term relationship with the United States is in the interest of Afghanistan,' Karzai said. He said he hoped for a relationship 'that brings security to Afghanistan, that brings economic prosperity to Afghanistan and an end to violence.'
Information Clearinghouse / Deutsche Presse Agentur.
Kina: Lad Ægypterne bestemme selv.
China said on Thursday foreign powers should stay out of Egypt's affairs, in an oblique swipe at the United States and some European countries that have put pressure on embattled President Hosni Mubarak to step down.Reuters: China says Egypt should decide future on its own.
"China advocates that Egyptian affairs should be determined by the Egyptian people, and should not face outside interference," Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Ma Zhaoxu said at a regular press briefing.
"We believe Egypt has the wisdom and ability to find the proper solution and get through this difficult time," he added.
Beijing's stance reflects its reluctance to criticise authoritarian governments in the developing world and its long-held policy of denouncing foreign interference in domestic affairs, especially external criticism of Chinese policies.
Wikileaks: Ægyptens torturbødler har modtaget træning hos FBI.
According to leaked diplomatic cables, the head of the Egyptian state security and investigative service (SSIS) thanked the US for “training opportunities” at the FBI academy in Quantico, Virginia. The SSIS has been repeatedly accused of using violence and brutality to help prop up the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. In April, 2009, the US ambassador in Cairo stated that “Egypt’s police and domestic security services continue to be dogged by persistent, credible allegations of abuse of detainees.
“The Interior Ministry uses SSIS to monitor and sometimes infiltrate the political opposition and civil society. SSIS suppresses political opposition through arrests, harassment and intimidation.”
In October, 2009, “credible” human rights lawyers representing alleged Hizbollah detainees provided details of the techniques employed by the SSIS. The cable states: “The lawyers told us in mid-October that they have compiled accounts from several defendants of GOE [Government of Egypt] torture by electric shocks, sleep deprivation, and stripping them naked for extended periods.
The Telegraph: WikiLeaks: Egyptian 'torturers' trained by FBI
Den ægyptiske hær tilbageholder og torturerer demonstranter
The Egyptian military has secretly detained hundreds and possibly thousands of suspected government opponents since mass protests against President Hosni Mubarak began, and at least some of these detainees have been tortured, according to testimony gathered by the Guardian.
The military has claimed to be neutral, merely keeping anti-Mubarak protesters and loyalists apart. But human rights campaigners say this is clearly no longer the case, accusing the army of involvement in both disappearances and torture – abuses Egyptians have for years associated with the notorious state security intelligence (SSI) but not the army [...]
Among those detained have been human rights activists, lawyers and journalists, but most have been released. However, Hossam Bahgat, director of the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights in Cairo, said hundreds, and possibly thousands, of ordinary people had "disappeared" into military custody across the country for no more than carrying a political flyer, attending the demonstrations or even the way they look. Many were still missing.
"Their range is very wide, from people who were at the protests or detained for breaking curfew to those who talked back at an army officer or were handed over to the army for looking suspicious or for looking like foreigners even if they were not," he said. "It's unusual and to the best of our knowledge it's also unprecedented for the army to be doing this."
The Guardian: Egypt's army 'involved in detentions and torture'.
tirsdag den 8. februar 2011
Fremragende baggrundsartikel om Omar Suleiman
Under the Bush administration, in the context of "the global war on terror", US renditions became "extraordinary", meaning the objective of kidnapping and extra-legal transfer was no longer to bring a suspect to trial - but rather for interrogation to seek actionable intelligence. The extraordinary rendition program landed some people in CIA black sites - and others were turned over for torture-by-proxy to other regimes. Egypt figured large as a torture destination of choice, as did Suleiman as Egypt’s torturer-in-chief. At least one person extraordinarily rendered by the CIA to Egypt — Egyptian-born Australian citizen Mamdouh Habib — was reportedly tortured by Suleiman himself....Al Jazeera: Suleiman: The CIA's man in Cairo.
...A far more infamous torture case, in which Suleiman also is directly implicated, is that of Ibn al-Sheikh al-Libi. Unlike Habib, who was innocent of any ties to terror or militancy, al-Libi was allegedly a trainer at al-Khaldan camp in Afghanistan. He was captured by the Pakistanis while fleeing across the border in November 2001. He was sent to Bagram, and questioned by the FBI. But the CIA wanted to take over, which they did, and he was transported to a black site on the USS Bataan in the Arabian Sea, then extraordinarily rendered to Egypt. Under torture there, al-Libi "confessed" knowledge about an al-Qaeda–Saddam connection, claiming that two al-Qaeda operatives had received training in Iraq for use in chemical and biological weapons. In early 2003, this was exactly the kind of information that the Bush administration was seeking to justify attacking Iraq and to persuade reluctant allies to go along. Indeed, al-Libi’s "confession" was one the central pieces of "evidence" presented at the United Nations by then-Secretary of State Colin Powell to make the case for war...
...Omar Suleiman is not the man to bring democracy to the country. His hands are too dirty, and any 'stability' he might be imagined to bring to the country and the region comes at way too high a price. Hopefully, the Egyptians who are thronging the streets and demanding a new era of freedom will make his removal from power part of their demands, too.
mandag den 7. februar 2011
Dagens Citat: Chris Hedges.
Empires communicate in two languages. One language is expressed in imperatives. It is the language of command and force. This militarized language disdains human life and celebrates hypermasculinity. It demands. It makes no attempt to justify the flagrant theft of natural resources and wealth or the use of indiscriminate violence. When families are gunned down at a checkpoint in Iraq they are referred to as having been “lit up.” So it goes. The other language of empire is softer. It employs the vocabulary of ideals and lofty goals and insists that the power of empire is noble and benevolent. The language of beneficence is used to speak to those outside the centers of death and pillage, those who have not yet been totally broken, those who still must be seduced to hand over power to predators. The road traveled to total disempowerment, however, ends at the same place. It is the language used to get there that is different.
Chris Hedges: Recognizing the Language of Tyranny.
Reagans sande arv.
Professor i politologi, Peter Dreier, skriver i The Nation om Reagans sande arv:
...Many Americans credit Reagan with reducing the size of government. In reality, he increased government spending, cut taxes and turned the United States from a creditor to a debtor nation. During his presidency, Reagan escalated the military budget while slashing funds for domestic programs that assisted working-class Americans and protected consumers and the environment. Not surprisingly, both George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush followed in Reagan’s footsteps.The Nation: Reagan's Real Legacy.
But, unfortunately, so did Bill Clinton. During his first campaign for the presidency, Clinton correctly observed that “the Reagan-Bush years have exalted private gain over public obligation, special interests over the common good, wealth and fame over work and family. The 1980s ushered in a Gilded Age of greed and selfishness, of irresponsibility and excess, and of neglect.” But a few years later, as president, Clinton proclaimed, echoing Reagan, that “the era of big government is over,” which he carried out by slashing welfare benefits for poor children.
Indeed, Reagan’s most important domestic legacy is our government’s weakened ability to do its job protecting families, consumers, workers and the environment.
How did Reagan revise America’s thinking about the role of government? Before Reagan took office, the American public was already growing more skeptical about government and politicians, exacerbated by the lies told by Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon about the Vietnam war, Nixon’s Watergate scandal and President Jimmy Carter’s inability to deal with the twin problems of rising prices and unemployment, often called “stagflation.” But Reagan—with his avuncular style, optimism and just-plain-folks demeanor—turned government-bashing into an art form.
And he had a lot of help. Accompanying the Reagan era was the rise of a well-oiled corporate-funded conservative propaganda machine—including think tanks and lobby groups, endowed professorships at universities, legal advocacy organizations, magazines, and college student internships to train the next generation—designed to demonize activist government and glorify unregulated markets. Years before Rush Limbaugh began his radio ministry to his conservative congregation of ditto-heads, Reagan and this right-wing echo chamber were on the job.
Reagan’s fans give him credit for restoring the nation’s prosperity. But whatever economic growth occurred during the Reagan years mostly benefitted those already well off. The income gap between the rich and everyone else in America widened. Wages for the average worker declined and the nation’s homeownership rate fell. During Reagan’s two terms in the White House, the minimum wage was frozen at $3.35 an hour, while prices rose, thus eroding the standard of living of millions of low-wage workers. The number of people living beneath the federal poverty line rose from 26.1 million in 1979 to 32.7 million in 1988. Meanwhile, the rich got much richer. By the end of the decade, the richest 1 percent of Americans had 39 percent of the nation’s wealth....
Dina Guirguis: After Mubarak, What's Next for Egypt?
Egyptians seek a democratic transformation, not another military dictatorship or a theocracy. Hosni Mubarak should transfer his presidential powers and step down. A transitional national unity government representing diverse political forces and composed of respected independent figures should be installed; their first order of business should be to lift Egypt's notorious "emergency" law, with which Mubarak has governed the country for 30 years. Next, they should approve the formation of a committee of independent legal experts to draft a new constitution enshrining principles of true citizenship, religious and political pluralism, and the civil (non-religious) nature of the Egyptian state. The military should preserve and protect Egypt's newly drafted constitution and the civil nature of the state.
Washington Post: After Mubarak, What's Next for Egypt?
ElBaradei: Mubarak should leave office to keep his dignity.
Potential presidential candidate Mohamed ElBaradei said President Mubarak should retire and leave office to keep his dignity.Al Masry Al Youm: ElBaradei: Mubarak should leave office to keep his dignity.
In an interview with On TV satellite channel late on Sunday, ElBaradei said the Egyptian regime had lost its credibility and legitimacy, describing it as "pharaonic" for depending on only one person. The young protestors in Tahrir Square think Mubarak's resignation will resolve many of the problems they are protesting about.
“I hope Mubarak will respond,” ElBaradei added. “The regime is eroding as National Democratic Party figures quit, and many ministers have been referred to trial. The regime depends solely on Mubarak. Speaking of a void that would occur if Mubarak leaves proves the whole regime depends on him--which should never happen in any country.”
ElBaradei said Egyptian youth took to the streets on 25 January to call for a free, democratic system that does not rely on individuals.
We shouldn’t concern ourselves with the US stance towards the protests in Egypt, he pointed out, saying change will be achieved by Egyptians.
He also said “I don’t think the Muslim Brotherhood will come to power. They told me they won’t nominate anyone for the presidential elections and will run for only 30 percent of parliamentary seats. They don’t represent the majority of Egyptians."
West Backs [Suleiman's] Gradual Egyptian Transition.
The United States and leading European nations on Saturday threw their weight behind Egypt’s vice president, Omar Suleiman, backing his attempt to defuse a popular uprising without immediately removing President Hosni Mubarak from power.
American officials said Mr. Suleiman had promised them an “orderly transition” that would include constitutional reform and outreach to opposition groups.
“That takes some time,” Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton said, speaking at a Munich security conference. “There are certain things that have to be done in order to prepare.”
But the formal endorsement came as Mr. Suleiman appeared to reject the protesters’ main demands, including the immediate resignation of Mr. Mubarak and the dismantling of a political system built around one-party rule, according to leaders of a small, officially authorized opposition party who spoke with Mr. Suleiman on Saturday.
Nor has Mr. Suleiman, a former general, former intelligence chief and Mr. Mubarak’s longtime confidant, yet reached out to the leaders designated by the protesters to negotiate with the government, opposition groups said.
Instead of loosening its grip, the existing government appeared to be consolidating its power: The prime minister said police forces were returning to the streets, and an army general urged protesters to scale back their occupation of Tahrir Square.
NYTimes: West Backs Gradual Egyptian Transition.
søndag den 6. februar 2011
2 Detained Reporters Saw Police’s Methods
To New York Times journalisters vidnesbyrd omhandlende deres møde med det ægyptiske styres hemmelige politi.
Captivity was terrible. We felt powerless — uncertain about where and how long we would be held. But the worst part had nothing to do with our treatment. It was seeing — and in particular hearing through the walls of this dreadful facility — the abuse of Egyptians at the hands of their own government.NYTimes: 2 Detained Reporters Saw Police’s Methods.
For one day, we were trapped in the brutal maze where Egyptians are lost for months or even years. Our detainment threw into haunting relief the abuses of security services, the police, the secret police and the intelligence service, and explained why they were at the forefront of complaints made by the protesters.
Many journalists shared this experience, and many were kept in worse conditions — some suffering from injuries as well.
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, over the period we were held there were 30 detentions of journalists, 26 assaults and 8 instances of equipment being seized. We saw a journalist with his head bandaged and others brought in with jackets thrown over their heads as they were led by armed men.
In the morning, we could hear the strained voice of a man with a French accent calling out in English: “Where am I? What is happening to me? Answer me. Answer me.”
This prompted us into action — pressing to be released with more urgency, and indeed fear, than before. A plainclothes officer who said his name was Marwan gestured to us. “Come to the door,” he said, “and look out.”
We saw more than 20 people, Westerners and Egyptians, blindfolded and handcuffed. The room had been empty when we arrived the evening before.
“We could be treating you a lot worse,” he said in a flat tone, the facts speaking for themselves. Marwan said Egyptians were being held in the thousands. During the night we heard them being beaten, screaming after every blow.
Chomsky: It's Not Radical Islam That Worries The US – It's Independence
The current hope appears to be Mubarak loyalist Gen. Omar Suleiman, just named Egypt’s vice president. Suleiman, the longtime head of the intelligence services, is despised by the rebelling public almost as much as the dictator himself.Chomsky: It's Not Radical Islam That Worries The US – It's Independence.
A common refrain among pundits is that fear of radical Islam requires (reluctant) opposition to democracy on pragmatic grounds. While not without some merit, the formulation is misleading. The general threat has always been independence. In the Arab world, the United States and its allies have regularly supported radical Islamists, sometimes to prevent the threat of secular nationalism.
A familiar example is Saudi Arabia, the ideological center of radical Islam (and of Islamic terror). Another in a long list is Zia ul-Haq, the most brutal of Pakistan’s dictators and President Reagan’s favorite, who carried out a program of radical Islamization (with Saudi funding).
Dagens citat: Sarah Palin
"Time is our most precious resource. How we choose to spend time I think is a reflection on what's most important to us. I am going to read my Bible every day. I am going to dig in there and seek God's wisdom and direction in every step that I take so I prioritize time to make sure that daily devotion is available."
Kilde.
Kilde.
It Ain't Just Mubarak -- 7 of the Worst Dictators the U.S. Is Backing to the Hilt
Embattled Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak, whose regime has received billions in U.S. aid, has been in the global media spotlight of late. He's long been “our bastard,” but he's not alone.Alternet: It Ain't Just Mubarak - 7 of the Worst Dictators the U.S. Is Backing to the Hilt.
Egypt: Exchanging a Dictator for a Torturer.
As it now stands, the United States appears content to contemplate exchanging Hosni Mubarak for Egypt's new Vice President, Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian spy master--that is, one dictator for another-- to maintain the status quo. Of course, Israel must sign off on this deal, assuring the U.S. that Egypt can remain as its main base in the region, straddling as it does North Africa and the Middle East. Without it, the U.S. would most definitely have to rethink its entire neo-colonial policies in the region.Mother jones: Egypt: Exchanging a Dictator for a Torturer.
As for Suleiman, he looks to be a nasty piece of work....
Are We Witnessing the Start of a Global Revolution?
It seems as if the world is entering the beginnings of a new revolutionary era: the era of the ‘Global Political Awakening.’ While this ‘awakening’ is materializing in different regions, different nations and under different circumstances, it is being largely influenced by global conditions. The global domination by the major Western powers, principally the United States, over the past 65 years, and more broadly, centuries, is reaching a turning point. The people of the world are restless, resentful, and enraged. Change, it seems, is in the air. As the above quotes from Brzezinski indicate, this development on the world scene is the most radical and potentially dangerous threat to global power structures and empire. It is not a threat simply to the nations in which the protests arise or seek change, but perhaps to a greater degree, it is a threat to the imperial Western powers, international institutions, multinational corporations and banks that prop up, arm, support and profit from these oppressive regimes around the world. Thus, America and the West are faced with a monumental strategic challenge: what can be done to stem the Global Political Awakening? Zbigniew Brzezinski is one of the chief architects of American foreign policy, and arguably one of the intellectual pioneers of the system of globalization. Thus, his warnings about the 'Global Political Awakening' are directly in reference to its nature as a threat to the prevailing global hierarchy. As such, we must view the 'Awakening' as the greatest hope for humanity. Certainly, there will be mainy failures, problems, and regressions; but the 'Awakening' has begun, it is underway, and it cannot be so easily co-opted or controlled as many might assume.Global Research: Are We Witnessing the Start of a Global Revolution?
The reflex action of the imperial powers is to further arm and support the oppressive regimes, as well as the potential to organize a destabilization through covert operations or open warfare (as is being done in Yemen). The alterantive is to undertake a strategy of "democratization" in which Western NGOs, aid agencies and civil society organizations establish strong contacts and relationships with the domestic civil society in these regions and nations. The objective of this strategy is to organize, fund and help direct the domestic civil society to produce a democratic system made in the image of the West, and thus maintain continuity in the international hierarchy. Essentially, the project of "democratization" implies creating the outward visible constructs of a democratic state (multi-party elections, active civil society, "independent" media, etc) and yet maintain continuity in subservience to the World Bank, IMF, multinational corporations and Western powers.
It appears that both of these strategies are being simultaneously imposed in the Arab world: enforcing and supporting state oppression and building ties with civil society organizations. The problem for the West, however, is that they have not had the ability to yet establish strong and dependent ties with civil society groups in much of the region, as ironically, the oppressive regimes they propped up were and are unsurprisingly resistant to such measures. In this sense, we must not cast aside these protests and uprisings as being instigated by the West, but rather that they emerged organically, and the West is subsequently attempting to co-opt and control the emerging movements.
lørdag den 5. februar 2011
Frankrig stopper våbenhandel med Ægypten.
The French prime minister's office has confirmed that France has suspended sales of arms and tear gas to Egypt.
The decision was made by the prime minister's office at a Jan. 27 meeting, an aide to Prime Minister Francois Fillon told Agence France Press on Saturday, confirming a report on the website of the French daily Le Monde.
Export permits to send police equipment to Egypt, such as tear gas grenades, were suspended Jan. 25, the aide told AFP.
Group releases photos of uncontacted tribe to raise awareness.
(CNN) -- In an effort to ramp up pressure for Peru to crack down on illegal loggers in its region of the Amazon, an indigenous rights organization has released what it says are photos of an uncontacted tribe in Brazil that is threatened by the logging across the border.
Survival International says the previously unpublished aerial photos, which it released Monday, show members of an uncontacted Brazilian tribe that is likely to get drawn into conflicts with Peruvian tribes who are fleeing their homes because of the logging.
Shibley Telhami - Upheaval in Egypt: Not about the U.S.
When the Bush administration used the Iraq War as a vehicle to spread democratic change in the Middle East, anger with the United States on foreign policy issues — particularly Iraq and the Arab-Israeli conflict — and deep suspicion of U.S. intentions put the genuine democracy advocates in the region on the defensive. The outcome has been that, every year since the Iraq War began, polls of Arabs revealed their sense that the Middle East is even less democratic than before.
As we witness the remarkable and inspiring events in both Tunisia and Egypt, one has to wonder whether these events could have taken place even earlier had there not been the diversion of the Iraq War — and whether these upheavals might have swept away Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship without shots being fired from the outside.
Even in Iran, where there is obvious public opposition to the clerical regime, as indicated by the contestation over the 2009 presidential election, one wonders whether the Iranian people might succeed if the regime were robbed of its ability to point fingers at the West.
Politico.
Shamir Hamid: Understanding Revolutionary Egypt.
Leder af Brookings Institutes Doha Center, Shamir Hamid, om Det Muslimske Broderskab og deres mest sandsynlige rolle i et post-Mubarak Ægypten.
Foreign Policy - Shamir Hamid: Understanding Revolutionary Egypt.
I was in Egypt covering the Nov. 28 parliamentary elections - quite possibly the most rigged in the country's history. In Medinat Nasr and Shubra, I talked to the Muslim Brotherhood "whips" (the representatives who count the votes). They ran me through all the violations, one by one. They didn't seem angry as much as resigned.
Today, though, the Brotherhood finds itself in a markedly different situation. They are the country's largest, best organized opposition force at a time when anti-regime protesters are searching for leadership, and not finding it. But this leadership void has also placed Egypt's Islamists in the unenviable position of being a potentially decisive force just as the world becomes increasingly nervous at the prospect of their rise.
The Brotherhood -- the slow, bumbling giant it is -- is unlikely to fully awaken just yet. The group has always believed that it had history on its side. Whenever I would ask Brotherhood leader Esam al-Erian why they didn't seem to have a clear strategy for change, he would just sit back and say, "we are patient." Now, it knows for sure: One day, Egypt will become democratic. And one day it will be in government, although most likely as junior partner in a liberal-leftist coalition.
Foreign Policy - Shamir Hamid: Understanding Revolutionary Egypt.
Juan Cole: Top Ten Accomplishments of Egypt Demonstrators.
The protest movement in Egypt scored several victories on Friday, but did not actually succeed in getting President Hosni Mubarak to step down. Their accomplishments include:
1. The hundreds of thousands (the Egyptian Arabic press is saying a million nationwide) of demonstrators showed that they had not been cowed by the vicious attacks of Ministry of Interior goons on Wednesday and Thursday, which killed 7 and wounded over 1,000.
2. By their determination and steadfastness, they put the Egyptian army in the position of having to protect them from further attacks by the petty criminals and plainclothes secret police deployed by the Interior Ministry. The alternative would have been a bloodbath that could have destabilized the country and would have attracted further international condemnation.
3. They showed that they still have substantial momentum and that the cosmetic changes made in the government (switching out corrupt businessmen for authoritarian generals as cabinet ministers) have not actually met their demands for reform.
4. They showed that they are a broad-based, multi-class movement, with working-class Egyptians clearly making up a significant proportion of the crowd in Tahrir Square.
5. They demonstrated that they are a nation-wide movement, bringing hundreds of thousands out in Alexandria, Suez, Ismailiya, Mansoura, Luxor, Aswan and elsewhere.
6. They put pressure on the Obama administration to hold Mubarak’s feet to the fire about an early departure.
7. They so reassured Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that they are the future of Egypt that he took the risk of calling for Mubarak to step down.
8. By making a Mubarak departure seem sure, they tempted new presidential candidates into the arena, as with the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, who visited the crowds at Tahrir Square to some acclaim.
9. The optimism created by crowd actions caused Nobel prize winner Mohamed Elbaradei to make an about-face and affirm that he would be willing to run for president if drafted.
10. Gave cover to to Ayman Nur of the Tomorrow (Ghad) Party and other leaders of opposition political parties to continue to demand Mubarak’s departure.
Juan Cole.
1. The hundreds of thousands (the Egyptian Arabic press is saying a million nationwide) of demonstrators showed that they had not been cowed by the vicious attacks of Ministry of Interior goons on Wednesday and Thursday, which killed 7 and wounded over 1,000.
2. By their determination and steadfastness, they put the Egyptian army in the position of having to protect them from further attacks by the petty criminals and plainclothes secret police deployed by the Interior Ministry. The alternative would have been a bloodbath that could have destabilized the country and would have attracted further international condemnation.
3. They showed that they still have substantial momentum and that the cosmetic changes made in the government (switching out corrupt businessmen for authoritarian generals as cabinet ministers) have not actually met their demands for reform.
4. They showed that they are a broad-based, multi-class movement, with working-class Egyptians clearly making up a significant proportion of the crowd in Tahrir Square.
5. They demonstrated that they are a nation-wide movement, bringing hundreds of thousands out in Alexandria, Suez, Ismailiya, Mansoura, Luxor, Aswan and elsewhere.
6. They put pressure on the Obama administration to hold Mubarak’s feet to the fire about an early departure.
7. They so reassured Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan that they are the future of Egypt that he took the risk of calling for Mubarak to step down.
8. By making a Mubarak departure seem sure, they tempted new presidential candidates into the arena, as with the Secretary General of the Arab League, Amr Moussa, who visited the crowds at Tahrir Square to some acclaim.
9. The optimism created by crowd actions caused Nobel prize winner Mohamed Elbaradei to make an about-face and affirm that he would be willing to run for president if drafted.
10. Gave cover to to Ayman Nur of the Tomorrow (Ghad) Party and other leaders of opposition political parties to continue to demand Mubarak’s departure.
Juan Cole.
Foreign Policy: Egypt sacks top party bosses.
In a seeming tactical victory for the thousands of protesters still occupying Cairo's Tahrir Square, top members of Egypt's ruling party resigned Saturday, according to Egyptian state television.
Safwat el-Sherif, the widely reviled chief of the National Democratic Party, is out, to be replaced by Hossam al-Badrawy, a doctor who was previously the party's secretary for business. Gone, too, is Gamal Mubarak, the president's son, as well as the other four members of the Steering Committee that runs the NDP.
Protesters were clearly not satisfied by the announcement.
"It's a good step, a good tactical gain for the protest movement," said Ghad Party secretary-general Wael Nawara, calling instead for the full dissolution of the NDP. "So far they have not responded to any of our demands," he said. "Instead they have been sacrificing scapegoats."
Foreign Policy: Egypt sacks top party bosses.
Reuters: Intellectuals lead Milan rally against Berlusconi.
(Reuters) - Writers, intellectuals and a former president of the constitutional court rallied in Milan on Saturday against scandal-hit Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, accusing him of wrecking Italy's international reputation.
Reuters.
NYTimes: Obama Backs Suleiman-Led Transition
The Obama administration on Saturday formally threw its weight behind a gradual transition in Egypt, backing attempts by the country’s vice president, Gen. Omar Suleiman, to broker a compromise with opposition groups and prepare for new elections in September.Nytimes.
Analyse af Professor Paul Amar.
Professor i internationale og globale studier ved University of California, Paul Amar, har skrevet en læsværdig (meta)analyse, der går i rette med det Amar anser for letbenede binære analyser af oprøret i Ægyptens gader.
Al Jazeera: Mubarak's phantom presidency.
...Many international media commentators – and some academic and political analysts – are having a hard time understanding the complexity of forces driving and responding to these momentous events. This confusion is driven by the binary "good guys versus bad guys" lenses most used to view this uprising. Such perspectives obscure more than they illuminate.
There are three prominent binary models out there and each one carries its own baggage: (1) People versus Dictatorship, a perspective that leads to liberal naïveté and confusion about the active role of military and elites in this uprising; (2) Seculars versus Islamists, a model that leads to a 1980s-style call for "stability" and Islamophobic fears about the containment of the supposedly extremist "Arab street"; or, (3) Old Guard versus Frustrated Youth, a lens which imposes a 1960s-style romance on the protests but cannot begin to explain the structural and institutional dynamics driving the uprising, nor account for the key roles played by many 70-year-old Nasser-era figures.
To map out a more comprehensive view, it may be helpful to identify the moving parts within the military and police institutions of the security state and how clashes within and between these coercive institutions relate to shifting class hierarchies and capital formations...
Al Jazeera: Mubarak's phantom presidency.
fredag den 4. februar 2011
Pentagon Paid Billions To Contractors Suspended For Fraud.
"The military paid a total of $285 billion to more than 100 contractors between 2007 and '09, even though those same companies were defrauding taxpayers in the same period, according to a new Defense Department report.Huffington Post: Pentagon Paid Billions To Contractors Suspended For Fraud.
What's perhaps most shocking is that billions of dollars went to contractors who had been either suspended or debarred for misusing taxpayer funds. The Pentagon also spent $270 billion on 91 contractors involved in civil fraud cases that resulted in judgments of more than $1 million. Another $682 million went to 30 contractors convicted of criminal fraud."
Ægypten-ekspert Shadi Hamid om Det Muslimske Broderskab
While there are legitimate concerns about the group's positions on both domestic and foreign policy, the Brotherhood of today is not the Brotherhood of yesterday. Decades ago, it renounced violence. More recently, the group has publicly committed itself, in Arabic, to many of the foundational components of democratic life, including alternation of power, popular sovereignty, and judicial independence. In its political programs, the Brotherhood has largely stripped its programs of traditional Islamist content. Where the Brotherhood once talked endlessly about "application of shariah law" (tatbiq al-shariah), it now settles for vague expressions promoting Islamic values and morals. Meanwhile, its vocabulary has shifted from favoring an "Islamic state" to a "civil, democratic state with an Islamic reference."
The Brotherhood, to be sure, is not a force for liberalism, nor is it likely to become so anytime soon. The group holds views that most Americans would be uncomfortable with, including on women's rights and segregation of the sexes. But we're not voting in Egyptian elections; Egyptians are.
Ultimately, though, American fears about the Brotherhood are not about gender equality or religious freedom. After all, one of America's closest allies is the most theocratic country in the world. Saudi Arabia, as conservative as it is, supports U.S. security objectives in the region. The real concern is whether the Brotherhood, known for its inflammatory rhetoric against Israel and the United States, would work against U.S. regional interests. Crucially, would it attempt to cancel the peace treaty with Israel—long the cornerstone of the U.S.-Egypt relationship? Such an outcome is unlikely; the Brotherhood is well aware that this is a red line for the international community. Any new, transitional government—which will be tasked with rebuilding a battered country—will not want to harm its relationship with Washington and risk losing billions of dollars in much-needed assistance.
Slate: Should We Fear The Muslim Brotherhood.
Robert Fisk live fra Ægypten på Democracy Now.
Den legendariske journalist Robert Fisk gav i går et interview til det progressive amerikanske nyhedsmedie Democracy Now.
"One of the blights of history will now involve a U.S. president who held out his hand to the Islamic world and then clenched his fist when it fought a dictatorship and demanded democracy"
Democracy Now.
"One of the blights of history will now involve a U.S. president who held out his hand to the Islamic world and then clenched his fist when it fought a dictatorship and demanded democracy"
Democracy Now.
USAs diktatorvenner.
PÅ Salon.com kan man læse om USAs øvrige diktatorvenner, nærmere bestemt Saudi-Arabiens konge Abdullah, Jordans konge Abdullah II, Guineas Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, Uzbekistans Islam Karimov og Turkmenistans Kurbanguly Berdymukhamedov.
Salon.com: What other dictators does the U.S. support?
Salon.com: What other dictators does the U.S. support?
onsdag den 2. februar 2011
Shamir Hamid: "Two models of democratic change are emerging."
Mellemøstekspert Shamir Hamid: "...Two models of democratic change are emerging. One is the Tunisia-Egypt-Yemen model of overturning the regime. This would seem to apply in republics, where protesters have one simple, overarching demand – that the president give up power. The person of the president, because of his dominating, partisan role, provides a rallying point for protesters. This is conducive to opposition unity. They disagree on a lot, but last they can agree on the most important thing.
The other model of change focuses around constitutional reform in the Arab monarchies. In countries like Jordan and Morocco, there are reasonably free elections. But elections have limited relevance because it’s the king who has final decision-making authority. The problem here is not necessarily the king himself but the institution of the monarchy and its disproportionate power. The solution, then, is constitutional reform that shifts power away from the king toward an elected parliament and an independent judiciary. This is what opposition groups are calling for in Jordan.
While different, both models are about altering political structures rather than gradual, slow reform. Leaders have not caught on. They seem to still think they can offer half-measures to appease their people. But the lesson of Tunisia and Egypt – as well as Yemen, Jordan, and many others – is that Arab populations, after waiting and waiting, have run out of patience."
The other model of change focuses around constitutional reform in the Arab monarchies. In countries like Jordan and Morocco, there are reasonably free elections. But elections have limited relevance because it’s the king who has final decision-making authority. The problem here is not necessarily the king himself but the institution of the monarchy and its disproportionate power. The solution, then, is constitutional reform that shifts power away from the king toward an elected parliament and an independent judiciary. This is what opposition groups are calling for in Jordan.
While different, both models are about altering political structures rather than gradual, slow reform. Leaders have not caught on. They seem to still think they can offer half-measures to appease their people. But the lesson of Tunisia and Egypt – as well as Yemen, Jordan, and many others – is that Arab populations, after waiting and waiting, have run out of patience."
Noam Chomsky: “This is the Most Remarkable Regional Uprising that I Can Remember”
In recent weeks, popular uprisings in the Arab world have led to the ouster of Tunisian dictator Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, the imminent end of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak’s regime, a new Jordanian government, and a pledge by Yemen’s longtime dictator to leave office at the end of his term. We speak to MIT Professor Noam Chomsky about what this means for the future of the Middle East and U.S. foreign policy in the region. When asked about President Obama’s remarks last night on Mubarak, Chomsky said: "Obama very carefully didn’t say anything... He’s doing what U.S. leaders regularly do. As I said, there is a playbook: whenever a favored dictator is in trouble, try to sustain him, hold on; if at some point it becomes impossible, switch sides."
Source: Democracy Now.
Source: Democracy Now.
Wikileaks: U.S. intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman “most successful”
New cables released by Wikileaks reveal that the U.S. government has been quietly anticipating as well as cultivating Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian spy chief, as the top candidate to take over the country should anything happen to President Hosni Mubarak. On Saturday, this expectation was proved correct when Mubarak named Suleiman to the post of vice-president making him the first in line to assume power.
An intelligence official who trained at the U.S. Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, Suleiman became head of the spy agency in 1993 which brought him into close contact with the Central Intelligence Agency. Recently he took up a more public role as chief Egyptian interlocuter with Israel to discuss the peace process with Hamas and Fatah, the rival Palestinian factions.
Wikileaks: Egypt - U.S. intelligence collaboration with Omar Suleiman “most successful”
Pensioneret CIA-veteran om USAs udenrigspolitik i Mellemøsten.
Tidligere CIA-mand Robert Grenier kommenterer på oprøret i Ægypten og irrelevansen af den amerikanske administrations udmeldinger.
"...the US's entire frame of reference in the region is hopelessly outdated, and no longer has meaning: As if the street protesters in Tunis and Cairo could possibly care what the US thinks or says; as if the political and economic reform which president Obama stubbornly urges on Mubarak while Cairo burns could possibly satisfy those risking their lives to overcome nearly three decades of his repression; as if the two-state solution in Palestine for which the US has so thoroughly compromised itself, and for whose support the US administration still praises Mubarak, has even the slightest hope of realisation; as if the exercise in brutal and demeaning collective punishment inflicted upon Gaza, and for whose enforcement the US, again, still credits Mubarak could possibly produce a decent or just outcome; as if the US refusal to deal with Hezbollah as anything but a terrorist organisation bore any relation to current political realities in the Levant."Al-Jazeera: The Triviality of US Mideast Policy.
Why the Army Won’t Shoot Protesters
"Khalid Ibrahim Al-Laisi has been a soldier in the Egyptian army for 20 years. Today, far from shooting protesters, he says the time has come "to revolt against oppression."IPS News: Why the Army Won’t Shoot Protesters.
"A high-ranking Egyptian official confirmed that the Egyptian Army will not shoot at protesting people. The officers are expressing the sentiment of the soldiers, says Al-Laisi. "Who are we going to shoot? Our brothers and sisters?"
Žižek: Why fear the Arab revolutionary spirit?
Den slovenske filosof og samfundsrevser, Slavoj Žižek, kommenterer på den revolutionære arabiske ånd i The Guardian:
What cannot but strike the eye in the revolts in Tunisia and Egypt is the conspicuous absence of Muslim fundamentalism. In the best secular democratic tradition, people simply revolted against an oppressive regime, its corruption and poverty, and demanded freedom and economic hope. The cynical wisdom of western liberals, according to which, in Arab countries, genuine democratic sense is limited to narrow liberal elites while the vast majority can only be mobilised through religious fundamentalism or nationalism, has been proven wrong.
Juan Cole: Why Egypt 2011 is not Iran 1979.
Den amerikanske professor i Mellemøstens historie Juan Cole har en interessant komparativ analyse af den iranske revolution og det ægyptiske oprør på sin blog.
"Egypt is, unlike Iran, not primarily an oil state. Its sources of revenue are tourism, Suez Canal tolls, manufactured and agricultural exports, and strategic rent (the $1.5 bn. or so in aid from the US comes under this heading). Egypt depends on the rest of the world for grain imports. Were it to adopt a radical and defiant ideology like that of Iran, all its major sources of income would suddenly evaporate, and it might have trouble even just getting enough imported food. Moreover, the social forces making the revolution in Egypt have a significantly different profile and different dynamics than in Iran. [...] The white collar and labor activists are far more central to the organization of the Egyptian protests than had been their counterparts in the Iranian Revolution. The Egyptian “bazaar” is much less tied to the Muslim clergy than was the case in Iran, and far less likely to fund clerical politicians. Whereas Iran’s bazaar merchants often suffered from Western competition, Egypt’s bazaar depends centrally on Western tourism. Secular parties, if we count the NDP, have an organizational advantage over the religious ones, since they have been freer to meet and act under Mubarak. It is not clear that the law banning religious parties will be changed, in which case the Brotherhood would again be stuck with running its candidates under other rubrics. And, Sunni Muslims don’t have a doctrine of owing implicit obedience to their clergy, and the clergy are not as important in Sunni religious life as the Shiite Ayatollahs are in Iran. The Muslim Brotherhood, a largely lay organization, has a lot of support, but it is not clear that they could gain more than about a third of seats even if they were able to run in free elections."
Dagens citat: Tony Blair om Mubarak.
"Where you stand on him depends on whether you've worked with him from the outside or on the inside. I've worked with him on the Middle East peace process between the Israelis and the Palestinians so this is somebody I'm constantly in contact with and working with and on that issue, I have to say, he's been immensely courageous and a force for good"
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