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søndag den 23. september 2012

Two Paradigms of History.

By Richard Tarnas

A paradox concerning the character and fate of the West confronts every sensitive observer: On the one hand, we recognize a certain dynamism, a luminous, heroic impulse, even a nobility at work in Western civilization and Western thought. We see this in the great achievements of Greek philosophy and culture, and in the profound moral and spiritual strivings of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. We see it embodied in the Sistine Chapel and other Renaissance masterpieces, in the plays of Shakespeare, in the music of Beethoven. We recognize it in the brilliance of the Copernican revolution and the long sequence of dazzling scientific advances in many disciplines that have unfolded in its wake. We see it in the titanic space flights of a generation ago that landed men on the Moon, or, more recently, in the spetacular images of the vast cosmos coming from the Hubble Space Telescope that have opened up uprecendented perspectives reaching back in time and outward into space billions of years and lightyears to the primal origins of the universe itself. No less vividly, we find it in the great democratic revolutions of modernity and the powerful emancipatory movements of our own era, all with deep sources in the Western intellectual and spiritual tradition.

Yet at the same time, if we attempt to perceive the larger reality beyond the conventional heroic narrative, we cannot fail to recognize the shadow of this great luminosity. The same cultural tradition and historical trajectory that brought forth such noble achievements has also caused immense suffering and loss, for many other cultures and peoples, for many people within Western culture itself, and for many other forms of life on the Earth. Moreover, the West has played the central role in bringing about a subtly growing and seemingly inexorable crisis – one of multidimensional complexity, affecting all aspects of life from the ecological and economic to the psychological and spiritual. To say that our global civilization is becoming dysfunctional scarcely conveys the gravity of the situation. For many forms of life on the Earth, catastrophe has already begun, as our planet undergoes the most massive extinction of species since the demise of the dinosaurs. How can we make sense of this tremendous paradox in the character and meaning of the West?

If we examine many of the major debates in the post-traditional intellectual culture of our time, it is possible to see looming behind them two fundamental paradigms, two great myths, diametrically opposite in character, concerning human history and the evolution of human consciousness. As genuine myths, these underlying paradigms represent not mere illusory beliefs or arbitrary collective fantasies, naive delusions contrary to fact, but rather those enduring archetypal structures of meaning that so profoundly inform our cultural psyche and shape our beliefs that they constitute the very means through which we construe something as fact. They invisibly constellate our vision. They filter and reveal our data, structure our imagination, permeate our ways of knowing and acting.

The first paradigm familiar to all of us from our education, describes human history and the evolution of human consciousness as an epic narrative of human progress, a long heroic journey from a primitive world of dark ignorance, suffering and limitation to a brighter modern world of ever-increasing knowledge, freedom and well-being. This great trajectory of progress is seen as having been made possible by the sustained development of human reason and, above all, by the emergence of the modern mind. This view informs much, perhaps most, of what we see and hear on the subject and and is easily recognized whenever we encounter a book or program with a title such as The Ascent of Man, The Discoverers, Man's Conquest of Space or the like. The direction of history is seen as onward and upward. Humanity is typically personified as man” (anthropos, homo, l'uomo, l'homme, el hombre, chelovek, der Mensch) and imaged, at least implicitly, as a masculine hero, rising above the constraints of nature and tradition, exploring the great cosmos, mastering his environment, determining his own destiny: restless, bold, brilliantly innovative, ceaselessly pressing forward with his intelligence and will, breaking out of the structures and limits of the past, ascending to ever-higher levels development, forever seeking greater freedom and new horizons, discovering ever-wider arenas for self-realization. In this perspective the apex of human achievement commenced with the rise of modern science and democratic individualism in the centuries following the Renaissance. The view of history is one of progressive emancipation and empowerment. It is a vision that emerged fully in the course of the European Enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, though its roots are as old as Western civilization itself.

As with all powerful myths, we have been, and many perhaps remain, largely unconscious of this historical paradigm's hold on our collective imagination. It animates the vast majority of contemporary books and essays, editorial columns, book reviews, science articles, research papers, and television documentaries, as well as political, social, and economic policies. It is so familiar to us, so close to our perception, that in many respects it has become our common sense, the form and foundation of our self-image as modern humans. We have been so long identified with this progressive understanding of the human project, and particularly of the modern Western project, that it is only in recent decades that we have begun to be able to see it as a paradigm – that is to be able to see, at least partly, from outside of its sphere of influence.

The other great historical vision tells a very different story. In this understanding, human history and the evolution of human consciousness are seen as a predominantly problematic, even tragic narrative of humanity's gradual but radical fall and separation from an original state of oneness with nature and an encompassing spiritual dimension of being. In its primordial condition, humankind had possessed an instictive knowledge of the profound sacred unity and interconnectedness of the world, but under the influence of the Western mind, especially its modern expression, the course of history brought about a deep schism between humankind and nature, and a desacralization of the world. This development coincided with an increasingly destructive exploitation of nature, the devastation of traditional indigenous cultures, a loss of faith in spiritual realities, and an increasingly unhappy state of the human soul, which experienced itself as ever more isolated, shallow and unfulfilled. In this perspective, both humanity and nature are seen as having suffered grievously under a long exploitative, dualistic vision of the world, with the worst consequences being produced by the oppressive hegemony of modern industrial societies empowered by Western science and technology. The nadir of this fall is the present planetary turmoil, ecological crisis and spiritual distress, which are seen as the direct consequence of human hubris, embodied above all in the spirit and structure of the mordern Western mind and ego. This second historical perspective reveals a progressive impoverishment of human life and the human spirit, a fragmentation of original unities, a ruinous destruction of the sacred community of being.

Something like these two interpretations of history, here described in starkly contrasting terms for the sake of easy recognition, can be seen to inform many of the specific issues of our age. They represent two basic antithetical myths of historical self-understanding: the myth of Progress and what in its earlier incarnations was called the myth of the Fall. These two historical paradigms appear today in many variations, combinations, and compromise formations. They underlie and influence discussions of the environmental crisis, globalization, multiculturalism, fundamentalism, feminism and patriarchy, evolution and history. One might say that these opposing myths constitute the underlying argument of our time: Whither humanity? Upward or downward? How are we to view Western civilization, the Western intellectual tradition, its canon of great works? How are we to view modern science, modern rationality, modernity itself? How are we to view man”? Is history ultimately a narrative of progress or of tragedy?

John Stuart Mill made a shrewd, and wise, observation about the nature of most philosophical debates. In his splendid essay on Coleridge, he pointed out that both sides in intellectual controversies tended to be in the right in what they affirmed, though in the wrong in what they denied.” Mill's insight into the nature of intellectual discourse shines light on many disagreements: Whether it is conservatives debating liberals, parents arguing with their children, or a lovers' quarrel, almost invariably something is being repressed in the service of making one's point. But his insight seems to apply with particular aptness to the conflict of historical paradigms just described. I believe that both parties to this dispute has grasped an essential aspect of our history, that both views are in a sense correct, each with compelling arguments within its own frame of reference, but also that they are both intensely partial views, as a result of which they both misread a larger story.

It is not only that each perspective possesses a significant grain of truth. Rather, both historical paradigms are at once fully valid and yet also partial aspects of a larger frame of reference, a metanarrative, in which two opposite interpretations are precisely intertwined to form a complex, integrated whole. The two historical dramas actually constitute each other. Not only are they simultaneously true; they are embedded in each other's truth. They underlie and inform each other, implicate each other, make each other possible. One might compare the way the two opposites coalesce while appearing to exclude each other to those gestalt-experiment illustrations that can be perceived in two different equally cogent ways, such as the precisely ambigous figure that can be seen either as a white vase or as two black profiles in silhouette. By means of a gestalt shift in perception, the observer can move back and forth between two images, though the figure itself, the original body of data, remains unchanged.

One is reminded here of Niels Bohr's axiom in quantum physics, the opposite of a profound truth may well be another profound truth,” or Oscar Wilde's A truth in art is that whose contradictory is also true.” What is difficult, of course, is to see both images, both truths, simultaneously: to suppress nothing, to remain open to paradox, to maintain the tension of opposites. Wisdom, like compassion, often seems to require of us that we hold multiplies realities in our consciousness at once. This may be the task we must begin to engage if we wish to gain a deeper understanding of the evolution of human consciousness, and the history of the Western mind in particular: to see that long intellectual and spiritual journey, moving through stages of increasing differentiation and complexity, as having brought about both a progressive ascent to autonomy and a tragic fall from unity – and, perhaps, as having prepared the way for a synthesis on a new level. From this perspective, the two paradigms reflect opposite but equally essential aspects of an immense dialectical process, an evolutionary drama that has been unfolding for thousands of years and that now appears to be reaching a critical, perhaps climactic moment of transformation.

Yet there is another important party to this debate, another view of human history, one that instead of integrating the two opposite historical perspectives into a larger, more complex one appears to refute them both altogether. This third view, articulated with increasing frequency and sophistication in our own time, holds that no coherent pattern actually exists in human history or evolution, at least none that is independent of human interpretation. If an overarching pattern is history is visible, that pattern has been projected onto history by the human mind under the influence of various non-empirical factors: cultural, political, economic, social, sociobiological, psychological. In this view, the pattern, the myth or story – ultimately resides in the human subject, not the historical object. The object can never be perceived without being selectively shaped by an interpretive framework, which itself is shaped and constructed by forces beyond itself and beyond the awareness of the interpreting subject. Knowledge of history, as of anything else, is ever-shifting, free-floating, ungrounded in objective reality. Patterns are not so much recogized as read into them. History is, finally, only a construct.

On the one hand, this robust skepticism that pervades much of our post-modern thought is not far from that necessary critical perspective that allows us to discuss paradigms at all, to make comparisons and judgments about underlying conceptual structures such as those made above. Its recognition of the radically interpretive factor in all human experience and knowledge – its understanding that we are always seeing by means of myths and theories, that our experience and knowledge are always patterned and even constituted by various changing a priori and usually unconscious structures of meaning – is essential to the entire exercise we have been pursuing.

On the other hand, this seemingly paradigm-free relativism, whereby no pattern or meaning exists in history except as constructed and projected onto history by the human mind, is itself clearly another paradigm. It recognizes that we always see by means of myths and interpretive categories, but fails to apply that recognition consistently to itself. It excels at seeing through,” but perhaps has not seen through enough. In one sense, this form of the postmodern vision may be best understood as a direct outgrowth, possibly an inevitable one, of the progressive modern mind in its ever-deepening critical reflexivity – questioning, suspecting, striving for emancipation through critical awareness – reaching here in its most extreme development what is essentially a stage of advanced self-deconstruction. Yet this perspective may also be understood as the natural consequence of the Enlightenment vision beginning to encounter its own shadow – the darkly problematic narrative articulated by its opposing historical paradigm – and being challenged and reshaped by that encounter. For just this reason, the deconstructive postmodern perspective may present a crucial element in the unfolding of a new and more comprehensive understanding. There is a deep truth in this view, though it too may also be a deeply partial truth, an essential aspect of a much larger, more embracing, and still more complex vision. The postmodern mind may eventually be seen as having constituted a necessary transitional stage between epochs, a period of dissolving and opening between larger sustained cultural paradigms.

fredag den 25. januar 2008

Online Papers om bevidsthed og relaterede emner

Filosofiproffesor David Chalmers har lavet en meget udførlig liste over online- tilgængelige papers vedrørende studier af bevidsthed i dets mange manifestationer samt relaterede emner, så hvis du mangler læsestof til de kolde vinteraftener, er det her et godt sted at starte.

onsdag den 23. januar 2008

Dagens citat: George Berkeley om filosofi

Philosophy is just the study of wisdom and truth, so one might reasonably expect that those who have spent most time and care on it would enjoy a greater calm and serenity of mind, know things more clearly and certainly, and be less disturbed with doubts and difficulties than other men. But what we find is quite different, namely that the illiterate majority of people, who walk the high road of plain common sense and are governed by the dictates of nature, are mostly comfortable and undisturbed. To them nothing that is familiar appears hard to explain or to understand. They don’t complain of any lack of certainty in their senses, and are in no danger of becoming sceptics. But as soon as we depart from sense and instinct to follow the light of a higher principle - that is, to reason, meditate, and reflect on the nature of things - a thousand doubts spring up in our minds concerning things that we previously seemed to understand fully. We encounter many prejudices and errors of the senses; and when we try to correct these by reason, we are gradually drawn into crude paradoxes, difficulties, and inconsistencies, which multiply and grow upon us as our thoughts progress; until finally, having wandered through many intricate mazes, we find ourselves back where we started or - which is worse - we sit down in a forlorn scepticism.

- George Berkeley “Principles of Human Knowledge” udgivet i 1710.

fredag den 11. januar 2008

En Erkendelsesteoretisk dialog mellem Rabh og Talmidh, af Erwin Neutzsky-Wulff

DEL I

Talmidh: Hvordan vinder jeg indsigt?

Rabh: Hvorfor spørger du mig om det?

Talmidh: Man har ladet mig vide at du besidder en sådan.

Rabh: Jeg er ikke ganske sikker på, at jeg forstår, i hvilket ærinde du kommer til mig. Jeg må altså først bede dig om at besvare nogle enkle spørgsmål, hvis du ikke har noget imod det?

Talmidh: Nej, naturligvis ikke.

Rabh: Allerførst må du isge mig, hvad du mener med indsigt, eftersom det åbenbart er det, du kræver af mig. Jeg ser, at dette spørgsmål virker overraskende på dig, og jeg vil derfor prøve at lede dig lidt på vej. Du ville vel ikke undre dig, hvis jeg spurgte dig, hvad det er, du ønsker at opnå indsigt i eller kundskab om?

Talmidh: Nej. Og jeg ville sikkert svare “om verden” eller “om livet”.

Rabh: Det tænkte jeg nok. Du ville sikkert også give mig ret i, at der i dit spørgsmål ligger, at kundskab og verden er to forskellige ting?
Jeg kan se jeg har forvirret dig, og må derfor hellere forklare, hvad jeg mener med mit spørgsmål. Lad mig derfor prøve at beskrive, hvad du mener, når du taler om at erhverve kundskab om verden. Derefter kan du fortælle mig, om jeg har forstået dig rigtigt.

Talmidh: Ja, det er nok en god idé.

Rabh: Nuvel, keg vil da sige, at det forekommer mig, at du mener, at det med disse ting forholder sig, ligesom når en maler frembringer et portræt. Jeg vil endvidere foreslå, at du mener, at et sådant portræt kan være mere eller mindre vellignende, alt efter kunstnerens evner.

Jeg må altså forstå det således, at du forlanger af mig, at jeg skal male et vellignende portræt af verden til dig. Dog mener du ikke, jeg skal frembringe dette billede for dine øjne, men at jeg skal vække det for din tanke med mine ord.

Talmidh: Det er ganske rigtigt.

Rabh: Men sig mig nu, hvordan kan du vide, i hvilken grad det billede, jeg på denne måde skaber, ligner den verden, det er et billede af? Hvis al kundskab, som du siger, er et billede af verden, hvordan skal vi da komme til kundskab om, hvorvidt det ligner eller ej? Alt, vi i givet fald kunne sammenligne vores billede med, ville jo være et andet billede.

Talmidh: Hvis jeg forstår dig ret, siger du altså, at det ikke er muligt at opnå kundskab?

Rabh: Det kunne jeg måske føle mig fristet til at sige, hvis det ikke var, fordi vi begge til daglig oplever, at folk der opfører sig tåbeligt på grund af uvidenhed, kommer galt af sted. Det kunne altså synes, som om der findes noget sådant som kundskab, som det endvidere er gavnligt for et menneske at tilegne sig, men at vi ikke ganske har forstået dennes natur. Men her bliver jeg nok igen nødt til at forklare, hvad jeg mener. Forestil dig en gartner, der hemmeligt elsker sit herskabs unge datter. En dag hører han af en af pigerne, at den unge kvinde også elsker den fattige gartner, og om natten har sneget sig ud i haven og der efterladt et budskab til ham. Ganske uvidende om, at der blot er tale om en spøg, begynder han straks at gennemsøge bedene, men finder naturligvis ingenting. Han tænker da, at hans elskede af frygt for opdagelse ikke har vovet at efterlade et brev, som en anden kunne finde, og som ad den vej kunne falde i hænderne på forældrene. Han begynder efterfølgende at undersøge de former, blomsterne i bedene og bladene på træerne synes at dannw, idet han tænker, at disse kunne være opstået ved, at hans elskede havde plukket nogle og ladet andre stå. Imens han er optaget af alt dette forsømmer han sit arbejde og bliver afskediget af familien. Endelig forlyder det, at han er blevet gal, at han om natten klatrer over muren og graver haven op. Men hvori består hans galskab? Skønt han er gartner, glemmer han, at blomster blot er blomster, og at blade blot er blade, og at der altså ikke skjuler sig noget budskab i nogle af delene. Nok havde han været bedre faren ved blot at gøre, hvad hans fader gjorde før ham! Dog kunne det velsagtens være gået værre. Gartneren kunne jo nemlig have overtalt resten af tyendet til at at deltage i eftersøgningen af det skjulte budskab. Det ville sikkert have undret herskabet, men da de kendte disse folk som fornuftige og pålidelige, ville de måske selv med tiden have forsøgt sig, bistået af deres lydige datter. Endelig ville den pige som var årsag til hele miseren, holde det for utænkeligt, at hendes herskabs vældige sysler, skulle have noget med hende at gøre. Også hun vil snart gøre sig til, at at det mystiske budskab skulle blive kendt

Talmidh: Men ville alle disse ikke på et tidspunkt opgive en eftersøgning, som dog måtte være ganke frugtesløs?

Rabh: Jo, ganske givet. Anderledes forholder set sig imidlertid med en bonde, der pløjer sin mark i forventning om at finde en skjult guldskat. I dette tilfælde vil hans galskab jo nemlig ikke afholde ham fra at udføre sit arbejde, men tværtimod bidrage til, at han får det gjort. Vi begyndte jo med at medgive, at det er muligt at opføre sig klogt og tåbeligt, og som du ved, mener folk, at denne klogskab og tåbelighed hænger sammen med, om malerens portræt portræt ligner, og om vi er i stand til at tyde budskabet i haven. Og det har de naturligvis på en måde ret i, eftersom den dovne bonde ikke vil få pløjet, hvis han ikke tænkte på guldskatten i marken, og hans familie i dette tilfælde ville sulte.

Talmidh: Du påstår altså, at denne opfattelse, skønt den deles af alle i landet, er fejlagtig?

Rabh: Det kommer an på, hvad du mener, når du kalder den fejlagtig. Lad mig altså spørge dig, om du mener, at det er rigtigt, at man ikke bør stjæle og myrde?

Talmidh: Javist.

Rabh: Lad mig derefter spørge dig, om du mener, at det er rigtigt i nogen anden forstand, end at landets borgere er blevet enige om, at det forholder sig således?

Talmidh: Nej, det har du ret i. Men forstår jeg dig ret, når jeg mener, at det, du påstår, er, at der ikke er nogen verden at opnå kundskab om, men kun denne kundskab, at den med andre ord er et billede, der ikke afbilder noget?

Rabh: Hvilken egenskab skulle vi tilkende en sådan verden, som ikke netop er en egenskab ved billedet, som nødvendigvis er alt, hvad vi ser?

Talmidh: Det forstår jeg, men det forekommer mig dog alligevel, at der sikkert må være en mængde indsigelser imod en så indlysende sandhed, siden den ikke for længst er blevet accepteret, og jeg tror da også straks, jeg kan komme i tanker om et par stykker.

Rabh: Lad høre!

Talmidh: Så vil jeg først så vidt muligt gentage, hvad du har sagt mig, for at vi begge kan være sikre på, at jeg har forstået dig rigtigt.

Rabh: Udmærket.

Talmidh: Nuvel, det forekommer mig altså, at du siger, at dette træ ikke befinder sig noget andet sted end i min tanke?

Rabh: Jeg er nødt til at korrigere dig på dette punkt, også selv om det måske ikke vil forekomme dig, at min korrektion gør den store forskel. Når du siger “tanke”, forekommer det mig således, at du bruger dette ord som en modsætning til noget andet, men da det, vi påstår, netop er, at der ikke er noget “uden for” denne tanke, bliver denne brug af ordet, som du sikkert kan indse, ganske meningsløs. Det er, som hvis du ville hævde, at den verden, vi lever i, er blændværk.

Talmidh: Det kunne jeg let komme til, hvis jeg skulle karakterisere dit synspunkt.

Rabh: Det tænkte jeg nok. På den anden side vil du nok give mig ret i, at det er ganske meningsløst, at tale om, at noget er blændværk, hvis der ikke er noget, der i samme forstand er virkeligt. Du vil altså se, at jeg på ingen påstår, at intet er virkeligt eller sandt, men kun, at intet er virkeligt eller sandt i den forstand, at det står i et mystisk forhold til noget principielt uerkendeligt.

Talmidh: Javel, men det forekommer mig dog alligevel, at du siger, at intet er virkeligt eller sandt under henvisning til noget, vi ikke oplever.

Rabh: Det har du ret i.

Talmidh: Hvis jeg altså har forstået dig ret, siger du, at træet ikke er til i nogen anden forstand end den, at vi erfarer det.

Rabh: Korrekt igen.

Talmidh: Men så er du jo heller ikke til i nogen anden forstand end den, at jeg erfarer dig, og du ville jo kunne sige det samme om mig. Men hvem er det så, der gør den erfaring, der ifølge din filosofi er den eneste virkelighed?

Rabh: Her må jeg atter korrigere dig. Træet er kun virkeligt i den forstand, at vi erfarer det. Eller sagt på anden måde: Den individuelle iagttagelse, du bruger som argument, eksisterer ikke, og hvis du overvejer sagen, vil du sikkert indse, hvorfor det forholder sig således. Vi ville jo nemlig ikke meningsfuldt kunne påstå, at det var forkert at stjæle, hvis vi ikke var istand til at tilvejebringe den enighed, som var en forudsætning for en sådan påstand. Som du snart vil erkende, bygger alle dine indsigelser imod min filosofi på, at du ikke har forstået den og således været i stand til at indgå på dens præmisser. Hvis jeg forsøger at forklare dig, at folk på teatret ikke virkelig dør, vil det jo heller ikke hjælpe dig stort, at henvise til, at i den sidste akt af det og det stykke dør den og den person. Du har således accepteret, at den måde, hvorpå vi afgør, om noget er virkeligt, er at spørge en anden, om han erfarer det samme – ja, selv vise mænd, der mener at udgrunde naturen, holder dette for eneste kriterium. På den anden side forsøger du at snige din overtro om en virkelighed, ind ad bagvejen, ved at tale om en iagttagelse, der ikke bygger på en sådan enighed. Inden du er i stand til at kritisere min mening, må du altså først gøre sig klart, hvad du selv mener. Hvis du således mener, at der kun kan blive tale om virkelighed, i det øjeblik den erfares af andre, kan du ikke meningsfuldt tale om, hvad et menneske erfarer. Hvis du derimod ønsker at fragå denne opfattelse af, hvad det vil sige, at noget er virkeligt, tvinges du til at påstå at der ikke er nogen mulighed for at kritisere nogen påstand, i hviket tilfælde også din egen påstand bliver meningsløs.

Talmidh: Du har naturligvis ret. Jeg indser nu, at den påstand, jeg mente at se som en konsekvens af din filosofi, i virkeligheden er en følge af min egen. Men skønt jeg indser alt dette, forekommer det mig stadig så besynderligt, at jeg har venskeligt ved at se, hvordan jeg skal forstå det. Det forekommer mig nemlig, at jeg, hvis du forlod mig, stadig ville se træet, og endvidere, at jeg har set et træ længe før jeg havde mulighed for at tale med nogen om det?

Rabh: Sådan kan det meget vel forekomme dig, eftersom du, når du mener at se tilbage på den tid, hvor du endnu ikke kunne tale, benytter dig af de begreber, som du først langt senere erhvervede. Hvis du, når du ser op i himlen, mener at se et mørkt tæppe gennemskinnet af et bagvedliggende lys, og jeg derefter fortæller dig, at stjerner har deres eget lys, tror du da, at du derefter vil kunne se dem på nogen anden måde? Og hvis du tænker tilbage på en nat, inden dette skete, hvad tror du da, at du vil huske, mine eller dine stjerner? Hvad din første indvending angår, skal du tænke på hvad vi sagde om teateret. Alle de begreber, du benytter dig af, hører jo nemlig til det stykke, som opføres. Hvad vil det sige, at jeg “forlader dig”, hvis ikke, at personer rejser til fjerne lande, når de går ud i kulissen, eller at den person, der, idet han ser ud i den, beskriver et rytterslag, betragter dette.

Talmidh: Du har naturligvis ret, men ikke desto mindre forekommer det hele mig dog temmelig underligt.

Rabh: Det forstår jeg. Når et barn første gang får at vide, at den faste jord, det står på, er hvirvlende kugle, vel dets første reaktion også uværgerligt være, at dette umuligt kan passe. Også blandt voksne mennesker er der sådanne børn, der, stillet over for fornuftsgrunde, som de ikke er i stand til at imødegå og derfor vælger ikke at give agt på, fremturer i deres vildfarelse. En klog mand afholder sig fra at indlade sig i ordstrid med sådanne, derimod svarer han gerne på indvendinger, der røber at spørgeren ønsker at forstå. De første skal du kende på deres vrede latter, de sidste på deres ydmyge videbegær. Ingen kan nemlig opnå kundskab, hvis han ikke først indser, at han mangler den.

Talmidh: Alt dette indser jeg klart og vil ved at gennemtænke mine indvendinger forsøge at gennemskue disse, for således at opdage, om de er veritable eller blot skriver sig fra en manglende forståelse af det, jeg mener at kritisere. På endnu et punkt behøver jeg dog din hjælp, idet min anden indvending imod din filosofi forekommer mig så uomgængelig, at jeg ikke ser hvordan jeg skulle kunne forlige mig med den.

Rabh: Udmærket.

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Ovenstående er et uddrag fra Erwin Neutzsky-Wulffs seneste roman 'Hjernen'og kan købes her