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onsdag den 25. maj 2011
søndag den 13. marts 2011
onsdag den 2. marts 2011
torsdag den 25. december 2008
Tuneserloven: Tidligere PET-Chef "Terrordebat er farlig".
Skrevet af: Christian Lehmann
Den tidligere øverste PET-chef Ole Stig Andersen har fået nok af den indskrænkning af afgørende retsprincipper, som politikerne er villige til at acceptere i terrorsager. Unødvendigt og underminerende for retsstaten, kalder han det
Danske politikeres terrorfrygt har nu nået et punkt, hvor man er villig til at underminere respekten for domstolene og tilsidesætte altafgørende principper i vores retsstat.
Sådan lyder de hårde anklager fra Ole Stig Andersen, der var øverste chef for Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET) fra 1975 til 1984.
Som den første tidligere øverste PET-chef nogensinde tager han nu bladet fra munden og giver sin uforbeholdne mening om de indskrænkninger af retssikkerheden, som politikerne er villige til at acceptere, lige så snart det handler om 'terror' og 'statens sikkerhed'.
"Det sakrale begreb - statens sikkerhed - bliver brugt til alt for meget unødvendigt hemmelighedskræmmeri.
Nu er man endda også villig til at oprette hemmelige særdomstole. Så har man tabt respekten for domstolssystemet," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Hans kritik er især udløst af sagen om de to tunesere og en dansk-marokkaner, der af PET mistænkes for at ville dræbe tegneren Kurt Westergaard. Begge tuneserne er administrativt udvist på grundlag af bevismateriale, som PET af hensyn til sine kilder ikke har villet fremlægge for en dommer.
"Man kan sagtens tænke sig terror så voldsom, at det er rimeligt at tale om statens sikkerhed. Men hvad har mordplaner mod en tegner med statens sikkerhed at gøre," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Agenter kan lyve
Han erkender, at PET og politiet har et behov for at beskytte sine kilder.
"Men hvorfor er en agent, der arbejder for PET i Vollsmose, mere hemmelig og sårbar end en agent, der arbejder i et meget kriminelt og farligt narkomiljø? Forklaringen er nok, at efterforskning i terrorsager finder sted i efterretningstjenesterne. Og dermed har man overtaget det samme begrebsapparat om statens sikkerhed og forholdet til fremmede magter som dengang, hvor man bekæmpede spionage og KGB. Det fører til langt mere hemmelighedskræmmeri end i andre kriminelle sager, der ellers kan være lige så alvorlige og endnu mere destabiliserende for det danske samfund," siger den tidligere PET-chef og henviser til bandekrige, menneskehandel og narkokriminalitet som områder, som politiet sagtens kan håndtere uden yderligere hemmeligholdelse.
- Et argument i debatten har været, at PET også er nødt til at beskytte fortroligt materiale, man har modtaget fra andre landes efterretningstjenester?
"Ja, men alt internationalt politisamarbejde forudsætter, at myndighederne kan stole på hinanden. Og generelt er hensynet til fremmede stater ikke større i disse terrorsager end i sager om for eksempel menneskesmugling eller narkokriminalitet," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Han henviser til, at en tiltalt og hans forsvarer allerede i dag kan unddrages indsigt i dybt fortroligt efterforskningsmateriale.
"Og hvis jeg sad som dommer, så ville jeg gerne kende efterforskningsgrundlaget. Jeg vil gerne vide, hvilken fremmed efterretningstjeneste en oplysning kommer fra, og hvordan den er fremkommet. Agenter kan sige forkerte ting eller synge den sang, som ophavsgiveren ønsker, at de synger. Og når det kommer til oplysninger fra fremmede magter, så ved både du og jeg, at man selv i USA bruger waterboarding - og under tortur tilstår alle jo alt."
Brug for domstolskontrol
I debatten om tunesersagen har politikere med Pia Kjærsgaard (DF) i spidsen udtrykt fuld tillid til, at PET har grundlaget i orden for sine anklager. Og justitsminister Brian Mikkelsen (K) - der så vidt vides har haft lejlighed til at se hele PET's materiale - har stået ved sin beslutning om at anbefale udvisning.
"Men hvorfor skal man stole mere på en minister end på en højesteretsdommer? En stat, hvor den udøvende magt kan holde sager uoplyste for domstolene, fordi man ikke stoler på dem - synes vi, at det er en stat, der lyder rigtig? "
- Men kan man ikke stole på PET?
"Jo, selvfølgelig kan man det - i langt de fleste tilfælde. Men det er fuldstændigt absurd at basere en retsstat på en blind tro på, at politiet altid har ret. For hvad skulle vi så have domstolskontrol til overhovedet? Så kunne vi lige så godt fjerne domstolskontrollen. Så mangler vi bare et 'Kærlighedsministerium' til at afrette borgerne til at tænke de rigtige tanker," siger Ole Stig Andersen med henvisning til George Orwells berømte roman '1984'.
- For myndighederne kan også begå fejl?
"Det kan jeg godt love dig for, at de gør - og hvis de laver fejl, så indrømmer de det nødigt bagefter. Du er nødt til at erkende, at offentlige myndigheder er mennesker på godt og ondt. Og du er også nødt til at erkende, at magt korrumperer. Det er derfor, at vi har behov for en effektiv, altomfattende domstolskontrol. Og det er også derfor, at vi ikke kan undvære Folketingets Ombudsmand."
Bange for at tage ansvar
Ifølge Ole Stig Andersen er de danske politikere ramt af en "ansvarsfobi", der får dem til at sige ja til alt for villigt at indskrænke af borgernes retssikkerhed og frihed i kampen mod terror.
"Hvis en minister i min tid udsultede PET, og ulykken skete, og de sovjetiske styrker så kom tromlende - så ville der næppe være et Folketingsvalg, hvor den ansvarlige minister kunne holdes ansvarlig bagefter. Men sådan er situationen ikke i dag. Hvis der sker det helt store brag, og du kunne holdes ansvarlig for ikke at have gjort nok, så ville du aldrig overleve som politiker. Det er det, de er bange for. Der er ingen, der tør sige: Nok er nok - og jeg tager ansvaret, hvis der sker noget," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Source URL: http://www.information.dk/177426
Den tidligere øverste PET-chef Ole Stig Andersen har fået nok af den indskrænkning af afgørende retsprincipper, som politikerne er villige til at acceptere i terrorsager. Unødvendigt og underminerende for retsstaten, kalder han det
Danske politikeres terrorfrygt har nu nået et punkt, hvor man er villig til at underminere respekten for domstolene og tilsidesætte altafgørende principper i vores retsstat.
Sådan lyder de hårde anklager fra Ole Stig Andersen, der var øverste chef for Politiets Efterretningstjeneste (PET) fra 1975 til 1984.
Som den første tidligere øverste PET-chef nogensinde tager han nu bladet fra munden og giver sin uforbeholdne mening om de indskrænkninger af retssikkerheden, som politikerne er villige til at acceptere, lige så snart det handler om 'terror' og 'statens sikkerhed'.
"Det sakrale begreb - statens sikkerhed - bliver brugt til alt for meget unødvendigt hemmelighedskræmmeri.
Nu er man endda også villig til at oprette hemmelige særdomstole. Så har man tabt respekten for domstolssystemet," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Hans kritik er især udløst af sagen om de to tunesere og en dansk-marokkaner, der af PET mistænkes for at ville dræbe tegneren Kurt Westergaard. Begge tuneserne er administrativt udvist på grundlag af bevismateriale, som PET af hensyn til sine kilder ikke har villet fremlægge for en dommer.
"Man kan sagtens tænke sig terror så voldsom, at det er rimeligt at tale om statens sikkerhed. Men hvad har mordplaner mod en tegner med statens sikkerhed at gøre," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Agenter kan lyve
Han erkender, at PET og politiet har et behov for at beskytte sine kilder.
"Men hvorfor er en agent, der arbejder for PET i Vollsmose, mere hemmelig og sårbar end en agent, der arbejder i et meget kriminelt og farligt narkomiljø? Forklaringen er nok, at efterforskning i terrorsager finder sted i efterretningstjenesterne. Og dermed har man overtaget det samme begrebsapparat om statens sikkerhed og forholdet til fremmede magter som dengang, hvor man bekæmpede spionage og KGB. Det fører til langt mere hemmelighedskræmmeri end i andre kriminelle sager, der ellers kan være lige så alvorlige og endnu mere destabiliserende for det danske samfund," siger den tidligere PET-chef og henviser til bandekrige, menneskehandel og narkokriminalitet som områder, som politiet sagtens kan håndtere uden yderligere hemmeligholdelse.
- Et argument i debatten har været, at PET også er nødt til at beskytte fortroligt materiale, man har modtaget fra andre landes efterretningstjenester?
"Ja, men alt internationalt politisamarbejde forudsætter, at myndighederne kan stole på hinanden. Og generelt er hensynet til fremmede stater ikke større i disse terrorsager end i sager om for eksempel menneskesmugling eller narkokriminalitet," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Han henviser til, at en tiltalt og hans forsvarer allerede i dag kan unddrages indsigt i dybt fortroligt efterforskningsmateriale.
"Og hvis jeg sad som dommer, så ville jeg gerne kende efterforskningsgrundlaget. Jeg vil gerne vide, hvilken fremmed efterretningstjeneste en oplysning kommer fra, og hvordan den er fremkommet. Agenter kan sige forkerte ting eller synge den sang, som ophavsgiveren ønsker, at de synger. Og når det kommer til oplysninger fra fremmede magter, så ved både du og jeg, at man selv i USA bruger waterboarding - og under tortur tilstår alle jo alt."
Brug for domstolskontrol
I debatten om tunesersagen har politikere med Pia Kjærsgaard (DF) i spidsen udtrykt fuld tillid til, at PET har grundlaget i orden for sine anklager. Og justitsminister Brian Mikkelsen (K) - der så vidt vides har haft lejlighed til at se hele PET's materiale - har stået ved sin beslutning om at anbefale udvisning.
"Men hvorfor skal man stole mere på en minister end på en højesteretsdommer? En stat, hvor den udøvende magt kan holde sager uoplyste for domstolene, fordi man ikke stoler på dem - synes vi, at det er en stat, der lyder rigtig? "
- Men kan man ikke stole på PET?
"Jo, selvfølgelig kan man det - i langt de fleste tilfælde. Men det er fuldstændigt absurd at basere en retsstat på en blind tro på, at politiet altid har ret. For hvad skulle vi så have domstolskontrol til overhovedet? Så kunne vi lige så godt fjerne domstolskontrollen. Så mangler vi bare et 'Kærlighedsministerium' til at afrette borgerne til at tænke de rigtige tanker," siger Ole Stig Andersen med henvisning til George Orwells berømte roman '1984'.
- For myndighederne kan også begå fejl?
"Det kan jeg godt love dig for, at de gør - og hvis de laver fejl, så indrømmer de det nødigt bagefter. Du er nødt til at erkende, at offentlige myndigheder er mennesker på godt og ondt. Og du er også nødt til at erkende, at magt korrumperer. Det er derfor, at vi har behov for en effektiv, altomfattende domstolskontrol. Og det er også derfor, at vi ikke kan undvære Folketingets Ombudsmand."
Bange for at tage ansvar
Ifølge Ole Stig Andersen er de danske politikere ramt af en "ansvarsfobi", der får dem til at sige ja til alt for villigt at indskrænke af borgernes retssikkerhed og frihed i kampen mod terror.
"Hvis en minister i min tid udsultede PET, og ulykken skete, og de sovjetiske styrker så kom tromlende - så ville der næppe være et Folketingsvalg, hvor den ansvarlige minister kunne holdes ansvarlig bagefter. Men sådan er situationen ikke i dag. Hvis der sker det helt store brag, og du kunne holdes ansvarlig for ikke at have gjort nok, så ville du aldrig overleve som politiker. Det er det, de er bange for. Der er ingen, der tør sige: Nok er nok - og jeg tager ansvaret, hvis der sker noget," siger Ole Stig Andersen.
Source URL: http://www.information.dk/177426
mandag den 15. december 2008
Det vi ved, at vi ikke ved
Skrevet af: Rune Lykkeberg
I anledning af den offentlige sandhed om, at to tunesere har planlagt et mord på en tegner er det måske på tide, at minde om Donald Rumsfelds filosofi om det vi ved, og det vi ikke ved
'As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know here are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns. The ones we don't know we don't know.'
- Donald Rumsfeld
Trist, sagde Pia Kjærsgaard. Og trist sagde studieværten i TV-Avisen bagefter. De var enige om, at der var tale om en trist udvikling. Det handlede om den ene af de to tunesere, som tidligere på året blev administrativt udvist af Integrationsministeriet. Den anden, som var den, der som kampsportsspecialist ifølge Politiets Efterretningstjeneste skulle kvæle tegneren Kurt Westergaard, har allerede forladt landet.
Der var også en tredje mand involveret. Han blev sigtet for mordforsøg på tegneren, men statsadvokaten valgte siden at frafalde sigtelsen på grund af manglende beviser. Den minister, som havde ansvaret for den administrative udvisning, udtalte allerede dengang, at hun "ikke var begejstret". Det har hun siden gentaget.
Højesteret anmodede i sommeren 2008 om en undersøgelse af det bevismateriale, som skulle ligge til grund for udvisningerne og antagelsen om, at de to var i færd med at planlægge et mord på Kurt Westergaard. PET afviste at udlevere al materiale, men det viste sig, at den tuneser, som er blevet i Danmark, angiveligt er mistænkt for at planlægge mordet på Kurt Westergaard, fordi han har set en selvmordsvideo på nettet, og fordi han i 2005 var i færd med at købe en bil, der ifølge tjenesten skulle bruges til flugten.
Det viste sig også, at den pistol, som PET havde fundet hos den nu bortrejste tuneser, ikke var et potentielt dræbende skydevåben, men derimod en gaspistol, der oven i købet var i stykker.
Det Pia Kjærsgaard mandag aften kaldte "en trist udvikling" var, at den tuneser, som er forblevet i Danmark, ikke kan fængsles, fordi han ikke er dømt. Og ganske påfaldende blev hendes politiske vurdering gentaget af journalisten i studiet: "Det er en trist udvikling."
En vurdering fra Politiets Efterretningstjeneste er således vandret til at blive et politisk udsagn og endelig til en sandhed, som gentages af en studievært på tv.
Den troværdige agent
Det bliver sagt, som om det er noget vi ved positivt, at denne mand skulle være til fare for statens sikkerhed. Justitsministeren har også på trods af Højesterets afgørelse udtalt, at der er tale om "en farlig mand". Men hvis der er noget, vi ved positivt, så er det ikke, at vi ikke ved det. Som den forhenværende amerikanske forsvarsminister Donald Rumsfeld berømt udtalte, må man skelne det, vi ved, at vi ved, det vi ved, at vi ikke ved, og endelig det, som vi ikke ved, at vi ikke ved.
Det sidste er det selvsagt svært at give eksempler på, og det første giver sig selv. Men om PET's vurdering af de to tunesere ved vi, at en af de ansvarlige ministre, der har set grundlaget for den administrative udvisning ikke var begejstret. Vi ved også, at PET's rolle er blevet udvidet med antiterrorloven. Efterretningstjenesten skal ikke længere kun forhindre angreb. Den skal også føre sager ved domstolene. Vi ved, at PET har tabt flere af disse sager.
Ved den såkaldte Glostrup-sag ved vi også, at bevisførelserne mod de fire terrortiltalte i høj grad baserede sig på vurderinger af ydre tegn på de sigtedes religionsforhold: Langt skæg blev eksempel brugt som indicium. Det påfaldende var, at disse indicier blev vurderet som overbevisende af domsmændene, hvorefter dommerne valgte at skride ind og slå fast, at der ikke var tale om beviser. Tre ud af fire tiltalte blev således frifundet. Vi ved også, at PET siden 1999 er blevet undersøgt af en kommission, som blev nedsat ved lov. Meget ved vi ikke om denne kommissions langvarige arbejde, fordi det meste foregår for lukkede døre. Vi ved også, at PET i den såkaldte Vollsmose-sag brugte en civil agent, som af klassekammerater og tidligere kolleger var kendt for både voldsomme overdrivelser og rene løgnehistorier. Han meldte sig selv til PET som angiver og blev af tjenesten vurderet som troværdig. Hans vidneudsagn var med til sende terrormistænkte i fængsel i op til 12 år.
Derudover ved vi, at PET tidligere har løjet for offentligheden. Efter anholdelserne af de terrormistænke i Vollsmose i 2006 kom det frem, at PET havde trukket hætter ned over hovederne på de anholdte, hvilket er i strid med torturkonventionen. De anholdte fortalte selv om hætterne. Først benægtede PET brugen af hætterne, siden indrømmede tjenesten det.
Den triste udvikling
Vi ved altså, at PET ikke altid siger sandheden. Vi ved også, at det ikke er PET's opgave at sige sandheden til borgerne. Derfor ved vi også, at der en masse, vi ikke ved. Det er ikke kontroversielle eller systemkritiske antagelser. Det er forhold, som PET sikkert selv vil bekræfte. Det forekommer på den baggrund besynderligt, at en kritisk offentlighed, der som regel tager for givet, at danskerne er anti-autoritære og ikke vil påduttes andres dogmer, tilsyneladende ophøjer PET's postulater til sandheder.
Det regnes for helt sikkert, at Kurt Westergaard skulle være genstand for planer om et attentat. Og tuneserne regnes for dem, der skulle gøre det. Der tales i offentligheden, som om, det er noget, vi ved. Men det, vi ved, er faktisk, at vi ikke ved det. Vi kan ikke påberåbe os den uskyld, som tilkommer dem, der ikke ved, at de ikke ved det. Og når dette enten behændigt glemmes eller bevidst ignoreres, synes det berettiget at tale om en trist udvikling.
I anledning af den offentlige sandhed om, at to tunesere har planlagt et mord på en tegner er det måske på tide, at minde om Donald Rumsfelds filosofi om det vi ved, og det vi ikke ved
'As we know, there are known knowns. There are things we know we know. We also know here are known unknowns. That is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns. The ones we don't know we don't know.'
- Donald Rumsfeld
Trist, sagde Pia Kjærsgaard. Og trist sagde studieværten i TV-Avisen bagefter. De var enige om, at der var tale om en trist udvikling. Det handlede om den ene af de to tunesere, som tidligere på året blev administrativt udvist af Integrationsministeriet. Den anden, som var den, der som kampsportsspecialist ifølge Politiets Efterretningstjeneste skulle kvæle tegneren Kurt Westergaard, har allerede forladt landet.
Der var også en tredje mand involveret. Han blev sigtet for mordforsøg på tegneren, men statsadvokaten valgte siden at frafalde sigtelsen på grund af manglende beviser. Den minister, som havde ansvaret for den administrative udvisning, udtalte allerede dengang, at hun "ikke var begejstret". Det har hun siden gentaget.
Højesteret anmodede i sommeren 2008 om en undersøgelse af det bevismateriale, som skulle ligge til grund for udvisningerne og antagelsen om, at de to var i færd med at planlægge et mord på Kurt Westergaard. PET afviste at udlevere al materiale, men det viste sig, at den tuneser, som er blevet i Danmark, angiveligt er mistænkt for at planlægge mordet på Kurt Westergaard, fordi han har set en selvmordsvideo på nettet, og fordi han i 2005 var i færd med at købe en bil, der ifølge tjenesten skulle bruges til flugten.
Det viste sig også, at den pistol, som PET havde fundet hos den nu bortrejste tuneser, ikke var et potentielt dræbende skydevåben, men derimod en gaspistol, der oven i købet var i stykker.
Det Pia Kjærsgaard mandag aften kaldte "en trist udvikling" var, at den tuneser, som er forblevet i Danmark, ikke kan fængsles, fordi han ikke er dømt. Og ganske påfaldende blev hendes politiske vurdering gentaget af journalisten i studiet: "Det er en trist udvikling."
En vurdering fra Politiets Efterretningstjeneste er således vandret til at blive et politisk udsagn og endelig til en sandhed, som gentages af en studievært på tv.
Den troværdige agent
Det bliver sagt, som om det er noget vi ved positivt, at denne mand skulle være til fare for statens sikkerhed. Justitsministeren har også på trods af Højesterets afgørelse udtalt, at der er tale om "en farlig mand". Men hvis der er noget, vi ved positivt, så er det ikke, at vi ikke ved det. Som den forhenværende amerikanske forsvarsminister Donald Rumsfeld berømt udtalte, må man skelne det, vi ved, at vi ved, det vi ved, at vi ikke ved, og endelig det, som vi ikke ved, at vi ikke ved.
Det sidste er det selvsagt svært at give eksempler på, og det første giver sig selv. Men om PET's vurdering af de to tunesere ved vi, at en af de ansvarlige ministre, der har set grundlaget for den administrative udvisning ikke var begejstret. Vi ved også, at PET's rolle er blevet udvidet med antiterrorloven. Efterretningstjenesten skal ikke længere kun forhindre angreb. Den skal også føre sager ved domstolene. Vi ved, at PET har tabt flere af disse sager.
Ved den såkaldte Glostrup-sag ved vi også, at bevisførelserne mod de fire terrortiltalte i høj grad baserede sig på vurderinger af ydre tegn på de sigtedes religionsforhold: Langt skæg blev eksempel brugt som indicium. Det påfaldende var, at disse indicier blev vurderet som overbevisende af domsmændene, hvorefter dommerne valgte at skride ind og slå fast, at der ikke var tale om beviser. Tre ud af fire tiltalte blev således frifundet. Vi ved også, at PET siden 1999 er blevet undersøgt af en kommission, som blev nedsat ved lov. Meget ved vi ikke om denne kommissions langvarige arbejde, fordi det meste foregår for lukkede døre. Vi ved også, at PET i den såkaldte Vollsmose-sag brugte en civil agent, som af klassekammerater og tidligere kolleger var kendt for både voldsomme overdrivelser og rene løgnehistorier. Han meldte sig selv til PET som angiver og blev af tjenesten vurderet som troværdig. Hans vidneudsagn var med til sende terrormistænkte i fængsel i op til 12 år.
Derudover ved vi, at PET tidligere har løjet for offentligheden. Efter anholdelserne af de terrormistænke i Vollsmose i 2006 kom det frem, at PET havde trukket hætter ned over hovederne på de anholdte, hvilket er i strid med torturkonventionen. De anholdte fortalte selv om hætterne. Først benægtede PET brugen af hætterne, siden indrømmede tjenesten det.
Den triste udvikling
Vi ved altså, at PET ikke altid siger sandheden. Vi ved også, at det ikke er PET's opgave at sige sandheden til borgerne. Derfor ved vi også, at der en masse, vi ikke ved. Det er ikke kontroversielle eller systemkritiske antagelser. Det er forhold, som PET sikkert selv vil bekræfte. Det forekommer på den baggrund besynderligt, at en kritisk offentlighed, der som regel tager for givet, at danskerne er anti-autoritære og ikke vil påduttes andres dogmer, tilsyneladende ophøjer PET's postulater til sandheder.
Det regnes for helt sikkert, at Kurt Westergaard skulle være genstand for planer om et attentat. Og tuneserne regnes for dem, der skulle gøre det. Der tales i offentligheden, som om, det er noget, vi ved. Men det, vi ved, er faktisk, at vi ikke ved det. Vi kan ikke påberåbe os den uskyld, som tilkommer dem, der ikke ved, at de ikke ved det. Og når dette enten behændigt glemmes eller bevidst ignoreres, synes det berettiget at tale om en trist udvikling.
onsdag den 3. december 2008
Blogging against surveillance, or: who's the terrorist?
On July 31 of last year, at 7 in the morning armed police stormed into the apartment where my partner Andrej Holm, I and our two children live. We learned that day that he was a terrorism suspect and that an investigation had been going on for almost a year. Andrej was arrested and flown to Germany's Court of Justice the next day. The search of our home lasted 15 hours. I was forced to wake my children, dress them and make them have breakfast with an armed policeman watching us. That day my new life started, a life as the partner of one of Germany's top terrorists.
Andrej spent three weeks in investigative detention. The arrest warrant was signed on grounds that caused a public outcry, not only in Germany but also in many other countries. Open letters were sent to the court that were signed by several thousand people protesting against the arrests. Among the signatures were those of David Harvey, Mike Davis, Saskia Sassen, Richard Sennett and Peter Marcuse.
What had happened?
Some hours before Germany's federal police came to us, three men were arrested near Berlin, who were said to have tried to set fire to several army vehicles. The original investigation was started against four other men, of which Andrej is one, who are suspected to be the authors of texts by a group called “militante gruppe” (mg, militant group). The group is known in Germany for damaging property for years, but never using violence against people. The texts claim responsibility for arson attacks against cars and buildings in and around Berlin since 2001. German anti-terror law §129a of the penal code was used to start an anti-terror-investigation against the four. All of them write and publish online. Andrej works as a sociologist on issues such as gentrification and the situation of tenants. Outside academia he is actively involved in tenants' organizations and movements that deal with gentrification and urban development. Using words such as 'gentrification', 'marxist-leninist', 'precarisation' oder 'reproduction' in their texts was enough to start complete surveillance (a linguistic analysis by the Federal Police later showed it's most unlikely they wrote these texts). As we saw later in the files, the profile for the 'militant group' was based on several assumptions: Members of the 'militant group' are assumed to
* have close ties within the group (all four have been good friends for years)
* be political activists (of the left)
* have no prior police record
* use 'conspiratorial behaviour', such as encrypting email, using anonymous mail addresses (not made of proper first and last names)
* be critical researchers and as such have access to libraries and a variety of daily papers, a profound political and historical knowledge.
How to make a terrorist
The initial suspicion based on an internet research for similarities in writing and vocabulary led to different measures of surveillance: phone tapping, video cameras pointed at living spaces, emails and internet traffic being monitored, bugging devices in cars, bugging operations on people's conversations etc. None of these produced valid evidence, so every two or three months surveillance measures were extended. Anti-terror-investigations according to §129a of the penal code are known and infamous for the fact that they are carried out secretly and only less than 5% ever produce enough evidence to lead to actual court cases. The vast majority entail lengthy investigations, during which huge amounts of data (mostly on activists) are collected and after years the case is dropped without anyone ever knowing about it.
Not the 'terrorist' deeds themselves are being prosecuted, but rather membership or support of the said terrorist organization. Therefore investigations focus on 'who knows who and why'. For the time being we know of four such cases carried out against 40 activists in Germany last year. Participation in protests against the G8 played a prominent, but not the only role. In all four cases the names of more than 2000 people were found in the files that were handed over to the defendants: a good indication of what these investigations are really good for.
In 'our' case most likely all people who had any kind of interaction with Andrej during 2006/07 were checked by the police. Doing this they noticed two meetings that allegedly took place in February and April of 2007 with someone who was later included in the investigation as a fifth suspect, and then two others who were in touch with this 'No. 5'. The two meetings took place under "highly conspiratorial circumstances": no mobile phones were taken along, the meeting had been arranged through so-called anonymous email accounts and during the meeting – a walk outside – the two turned around several times.
The three who were later included in the investigation are the same three who were arrested after the alleged attempted arson attack. Some hours later special police forces stormed our home and Andrej became 'the brain behind the militant group'. My identity changed to being 'the terrorist's partner'.
Becoming 'the terrorist's partner'
I was in shock. All of Berlin was on summer break. The few of us who were not away got together to gather the little we understood about the accusation. The media rejoiced with headlines such as 'Federal Police finally succeeded in arresting long searched for terror group' and we had to deal with media inquiries, talking to lawyers, talking to relatives, talking to friends, colleagues, neighbors and our children. We had to find out about life in prison, start a campaign for donations to pay for lawyers, make a website, agree on how to proceed between a rather heterogeneous group of suspects and even more heterogeneous network of friends and supporters and discuss how to deal with the media.
I realized slowly that my children and I were the collateral damage to this case. My computer was confiscated, things were taken from my desk, all of my belongings searched. My kids (2 and 5 years old last summer) lived through two searches carried out by armed police. Their father was kidnapped and disappeared for weeks.
Being a political activist myself, I am of course aware of the fact that phones can be tapped and that this is used extensively against activists. In Germany close to 40.000 phones (including mobiles) are tapped each year – we have a total population of 80 million. (http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/13600.pdf). To realize and later to read on paper that this concerns you is an entirely different thing from the somewhat abstract idea that you may be subjected to it.
When Andrej was released on bail after three weeks, Germany's Federal Prosecutor filed a complaint and wanted him back in detention right away, based on the idea that he might flee the country or the danger of repetition. How do you repeat membership in a terrorist organization? One of the many mysteries inside the prosecutors mind. The complaint was not granted right away, but instead Germany's Court of Justice decided it needed time to reflect thoroughly on the details of the arrest warrant (which was the origin of the huge wave of solidarity that was perceived widely in the media), the question of whether the so-called group actually qualified as 'terrorist' and whether the presented evidence justified detention.
Obviuos surveillance
It was impossible to overlook that Andrej was the focus of police observation. Our phones went crazy – not just once did people try to call Andrejs mobile number but ended up in my phone instead. When I in turn also tried to call him, I got my own mailbox talking to me. Our TV behaved oddly (as a result of silent, or stealth pings that were sent to Andrej's mobile phone regularly to locate him). Emails disappeared.
At some point in the middle of this, I considered starting a weblog about it. Nobody to my knowledge had ever done a blog about living with anti-terror surveillance. It was not an easy decision: were people going to believe me? Would I be portrayed as crazy or paranoid? On the other hand, unlike many other people, I know for certain that surveillance is taking place and why not write about what it feels like? Germany had a major debate about data retention last summer – the law was just passed and was to go into effect 2008 (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_retention for details). A new anti-terror federal police law was discussed in parliament and a public debate about data protection grew to dimensions nobody had thought possible some months before. The War on Terror serves to justify more repressive laws here as well. A blog about the consequences of such an investigation to a family that is admittedly interested (and actively involved) in politics, but otherwise not exactly your typical terrorist stereotype opened many eyes.
The idea of blogging had not appealed to me very much before, precisely because I am quite fond of my privacy. Why present my personal daily life to a widely anonymous public? Absurd. But now, when my privacy was already violated beyond anything imaginable, why not talk about what it feels like to people who are more sympathetic than the Federal Prosecutor? Why not talk about how ridiculous the 'facts' to prove the case really are? And there are so many amazingly strange interpretations in the files of how we live our life, of what Andrej said on the phone, of what my mother said on the phone, that I thought nobody would believe these details just a few months later.
A weblog to protect my privacy
I can't think of many situations when it would make sense to publish details about yourself on a website with the intention to protect your privacy. In this case it did make sense. We were subjected to a powerful and (for us) uncontrollable invasion of our life: we had the said video cameras pointing at the doors of the house we live in, phones tapped, email and internet traffic monitored, mail read, the stealth pings sent to Andrejs mobile phone to locate him every hour, undercover agents following him around and who knows what else. It's likely that this is going on until now. Surveillance by police and secret services done in a very obvious way for you to notice is (also) meant to scare you, maybe to provoke reactions. Is also meant to scare others who just might have the same inclination to want to make the world a better place. Fear works best when your alone with it. Publishing details about how this fear is incited is not only a good way to open eyes about how the 'War on Terror' looks likefrom the receiving end but is also a great method to stay sane and get it of (some of) the fear.
And so I started blogging. Mostly in German, basically because I don't find the time to translate more and maybe also because I thought that there would be more German readers interested - it is a minor case of terrorism, if you want, and hardly known outside Germany. You can find some texts in English here: http://annalist.noblogs.org/category/en.
Reactions
I wasn't familiar with the world of blogs, and probably still am not very much. I didn't have time to find out how to 'make your blog popular' and was not particularly interested in that. I wasn't really sure how much attention I'd like, and so I started by publishing in the blog the same things I had previously sent by email to people interested in the development of the case and in how we personally were doing. And I only told people I knew about it. It took about three weeks until some of the more popular political German blogs picked it up, wrote about us and the number of visits exploded. In the beginning people wondered whether this, whether I 'was real'. The blog got lots of comments and it was obvious that many people were completely shocked about what was going on. They compared the investigation to what they imagined having taken place in the Soviet Union, in China, North Korea, East German, but not 'here', in a Western democracy, a constitutional state. Another group consists of people who want to help us secure our privacy by explaining about email encryption, switching SIM cards in mobile phone and the like, not realizing that at least in the first months we actively avoided anything that could only appear as though we wanted to behave in a conspiratorial way, as this was one of the reasons Andrej became a suspect to begin with.
I thought it was pretty funny that being 'the sociologist's wife' (we are not married), people seemed to assume that Linux or encryption is something I'd never heard of. Many people expressed fear that already by reading my blog or even commenting on it they might endanger themselves. I was glad they did anyway. Others expressed admiration for us to have chosen to be so public about the case. All of this was great and very important support that made it much easier to deal with the ongoing stress and tension that come with the threat of being tried as a terrorist.
Development of the investigation
Fortunately Germany's Court of Justice took several decisions that were very favorable for Andrej. In a first, two months after the prosecutor's objection to his release on bail, the court decided not only to not allow the objection, but instead completely withdrew the arrest warrant, arguing that 'pure assumptions are not sufficient'. This decision was perceived as a 'slap in the face' of Germany's Federal Prosecutor by many journalists. One months later the same court had to decide whether the 'militant group' can be considered a 'terrorist organization' and decided against this. The German definition for terrorism demands that a terrorist act is meant and able to shake the state to its very foundations, or else to terrify the population as such. When Germany's minister of justice, Brigitte Zypries, was asked in an interview with Der Spiegel, one of the biggest political weekly magazines, about the case against the alleged members of the 'militant group', she said that she thought that the attacks of September 11 are a terrible tragedy, but in her definition not a terrorist act as it didn't manage to endanger the American state. We were rather surprised by this, to say the least. In November the Court of Justice decided that the 'militant group' can't be considered to be terrorist and ordered the other three arrested to be released on bail. At this point, the investigation is being conducted on the basis of §129 (instead of §129a), which prosecutes criminal instead of terrorist organizations, with possible sentences of up to five instead of ten years.
When Andrej was arrested for 'being terrorist', on the grounds of being intelligent, knowing many people from different spheres of society, accessing libraries and publishing texts, being an activist, behaving in what is seen as a conspiratorial way (not always taking the mobile phone along or using encryption) it felt that if this is possible, then it is thinkable that they'd even sentence him to a prison term. With months of public support and more details of the investigation becoming public, like many others, I started believing that this nightmare is terminal, that the case would have to be dropped eventually. Most people don't realize that the investigation is actually still going on. All of our phone calls are still being listened to, our emails read, Andrej's every step is being watched. Germany discusses online searches of computers and using hidden cameras in people's living spaces to detect terrorists, and we know that the secret service is using what the police only dream of. It has been an extremely straining life for a year and a half now, but I am convinced that a good way to survive something like this, which terrorized us, our children, families and friends, is to not go into hiding. I understand the feeling very well of wanting to not move anymore until it's all over, to not provoke any (legal) action when you're in the focus of this kind of attention. To do the contrary - seek as much public attention and thus support as possible - was the best thing we could do.
Links:
http://annalist.noblogs.org/category/en
http://einstellung.so36.net/en
http://einstellung.so36.net/en/ps/392
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrej_Holm
http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,,2153121,00.html
Copyright according to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed.en.
Andrej spent three weeks in investigative detention. The arrest warrant was signed on grounds that caused a public outcry, not only in Germany but also in many other countries. Open letters were sent to the court that were signed by several thousand people protesting against the arrests. Among the signatures were those of David Harvey, Mike Davis, Saskia Sassen, Richard Sennett and Peter Marcuse.
What had happened?
Some hours before Germany's federal police came to us, three men were arrested near Berlin, who were said to have tried to set fire to several army vehicles. The original investigation was started against four other men, of which Andrej is one, who are suspected to be the authors of texts by a group called “militante gruppe” (mg, militant group). The group is known in Germany for damaging property for years, but never using violence against people. The texts claim responsibility for arson attacks against cars and buildings in and around Berlin since 2001. German anti-terror law §129a of the penal code was used to start an anti-terror-investigation against the four. All of them write and publish online. Andrej works as a sociologist on issues such as gentrification and the situation of tenants. Outside academia he is actively involved in tenants' organizations and movements that deal with gentrification and urban development. Using words such as 'gentrification', 'marxist-leninist', 'precarisation' oder 'reproduction' in their texts was enough to start complete surveillance (a linguistic analysis by the Federal Police later showed it's most unlikely they wrote these texts). As we saw later in the files, the profile for the 'militant group' was based on several assumptions: Members of the 'militant group' are assumed to
* have close ties within the group (all four have been good friends for years)
* be political activists (of the left)
* have no prior police record
* use 'conspiratorial behaviour', such as encrypting email, using anonymous mail addresses (not made of proper first and last names)
* be critical researchers and as such have access to libraries and a variety of daily papers, a profound political and historical knowledge.
How to make a terrorist
The initial suspicion based on an internet research for similarities in writing and vocabulary led to different measures of surveillance: phone tapping, video cameras pointed at living spaces, emails and internet traffic being monitored, bugging devices in cars, bugging operations on people's conversations etc. None of these produced valid evidence, so every two or three months surveillance measures were extended. Anti-terror-investigations according to §129a of the penal code are known and infamous for the fact that they are carried out secretly and only less than 5% ever produce enough evidence to lead to actual court cases. The vast majority entail lengthy investigations, during which huge amounts of data (mostly on activists) are collected and after years the case is dropped without anyone ever knowing about it.
Not the 'terrorist' deeds themselves are being prosecuted, but rather membership or support of the said terrorist organization. Therefore investigations focus on 'who knows who and why'. For the time being we know of four such cases carried out against 40 activists in Germany last year. Participation in protests against the G8 played a prominent, but not the only role. In all four cases the names of more than 2000 people were found in the files that were handed over to the defendants: a good indication of what these investigations are really good for.
In 'our' case most likely all people who had any kind of interaction with Andrej during 2006/07 were checked by the police. Doing this they noticed two meetings that allegedly took place in February and April of 2007 with someone who was later included in the investigation as a fifth suspect, and then two others who were in touch with this 'No. 5'. The two meetings took place under "highly conspiratorial circumstances": no mobile phones were taken along, the meeting had been arranged through so-called anonymous email accounts and during the meeting – a walk outside – the two turned around several times.
The three who were later included in the investigation are the same three who were arrested after the alleged attempted arson attack. Some hours later special police forces stormed our home and Andrej became 'the brain behind the militant group'. My identity changed to being 'the terrorist's partner'.
Becoming 'the terrorist's partner'
I was in shock. All of Berlin was on summer break. The few of us who were not away got together to gather the little we understood about the accusation. The media rejoiced with headlines such as 'Federal Police finally succeeded in arresting long searched for terror group' and we had to deal with media inquiries, talking to lawyers, talking to relatives, talking to friends, colleagues, neighbors and our children. We had to find out about life in prison, start a campaign for donations to pay for lawyers, make a website, agree on how to proceed between a rather heterogeneous group of suspects and even more heterogeneous network of friends and supporters and discuss how to deal with the media.
I realized slowly that my children and I were the collateral damage to this case. My computer was confiscated, things were taken from my desk, all of my belongings searched. My kids (2 and 5 years old last summer) lived through two searches carried out by armed police. Their father was kidnapped and disappeared for weeks.
Being a political activist myself, I am of course aware of the fact that phones can be tapped and that this is used extensively against activists. In Germany close to 40.000 phones (including mobiles) are tapped each year – we have a total population of 80 million. (http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/13600.pdf). To realize and later to read on paper that this concerns you is an entirely different thing from the somewhat abstract idea that you may be subjected to it.
When Andrej was released on bail after three weeks, Germany's Federal Prosecutor filed a complaint and wanted him back in detention right away, based on the idea that he might flee the country or the danger of repetition. How do you repeat membership in a terrorist organization? One of the many mysteries inside the prosecutors mind. The complaint was not granted right away, but instead Germany's Court of Justice decided it needed time to reflect thoroughly on the details of the arrest warrant (which was the origin of the huge wave of solidarity that was perceived widely in the media), the question of whether the so-called group actually qualified as 'terrorist' and whether the presented evidence justified detention.
Obviuos surveillance
It was impossible to overlook that Andrej was the focus of police observation. Our phones went crazy – not just once did people try to call Andrejs mobile number but ended up in my phone instead. When I in turn also tried to call him, I got my own mailbox talking to me. Our TV behaved oddly (as a result of silent, or stealth pings that were sent to Andrej's mobile phone regularly to locate him). Emails disappeared.
At some point in the middle of this, I considered starting a weblog about it. Nobody to my knowledge had ever done a blog about living with anti-terror surveillance. It was not an easy decision: were people going to believe me? Would I be portrayed as crazy or paranoid? On the other hand, unlike many other people, I know for certain that surveillance is taking place and why not write about what it feels like? Germany had a major debate about data retention last summer – the law was just passed and was to go into effect 2008 (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_retention for details). A new anti-terror federal police law was discussed in parliament and a public debate about data protection grew to dimensions nobody had thought possible some months before. The War on Terror serves to justify more repressive laws here as well. A blog about the consequences of such an investigation to a family that is admittedly interested (and actively involved) in politics, but otherwise not exactly your typical terrorist stereotype opened many eyes.
The idea of blogging had not appealed to me very much before, precisely because I am quite fond of my privacy. Why present my personal daily life to a widely anonymous public? Absurd. But now, when my privacy was already violated beyond anything imaginable, why not talk about what it feels like to people who are more sympathetic than the Federal Prosecutor? Why not talk about how ridiculous the 'facts' to prove the case really are? And there are so many amazingly strange interpretations in the files of how we live our life, of what Andrej said on the phone, of what my mother said on the phone, that I thought nobody would believe these details just a few months later.
A weblog to protect my privacy
I can't think of many situations when it would make sense to publish details about yourself on a website with the intention to protect your privacy. In this case it did make sense. We were subjected to a powerful and (for us) uncontrollable invasion of our life: we had the said video cameras pointing at the doors of the house we live in, phones tapped, email and internet traffic monitored, mail read, the stealth pings sent to Andrejs mobile phone to locate him every hour, undercover agents following him around and who knows what else. It's likely that this is going on until now. Surveillance by police and secret services done in a very obvious way for you to notice is (also) meant to scare you, maybe to provoke reactions. Is also meant to scare others who just might have the same inclination to want to make the world a better place. Fear works best when your alone with it. Publishing details about how this fear is incited is not only a good way to open eyes about how the 'War on Terror' looks likefrom the receiving end but is also a great method to stay sane and get it of (some of) the fear.
And so I started blogging. Mostly in German, basically because I don't find the time to translate more and maybe also because I thought that there would be more German readers interested - it is a minor case of terrorism, if you want, and hardly known outside Germany. You can find some texts in English here: http://annalist.noblogs.org/category/en.
Reactions
I wasn't familiar with the world of blogs, and probably still am not very much. I didn't have time to find out how to 'make your blog popular' and was not particularly interested in that. I wasn't really sure how much attention I'd like, and so I started by publishing in the blog the same things I had previously sent by email to people interested in the development of the case and in how we personally were doing. And I only told people I knew about it. It took about three weeks until some of the more popular political German blogs picked it up, wrote about us and the number of visits exploded. In the beginning people wondered whether this, whether I 'was real'. The blog got lots of comments and it was obvious that many people were completely shocked about what was going on. They compared the investigation to what they imagined having taken place in the Soviet Union, in China, North Korea, East German, but not 'here', in a Western democracy, a constitutional state. Another group consists of people who want to help us secure our privacy by explaining about email encryption, switching SIM cards in mobile phone and the like, not realizing that at least in the first months we actively avoided anything that could only appear as though we wanted to behave in a conspiratorial way, as this was one of the reasons Andrej became a suspect to begin with.
I thought it was pretty funny that being 'the sociologist's wife' (we are not married), people seemed to assume that Linux or encryption is something I'd never heard of. Many people expressed fear that already by reading my blog or even commenting on it they might endanger themselves. I was glad they did anyway. Others expressed admiration for us to have chosen to be so public about the case. All of this was great and very important support that made it much easier to deal with the ongoing stress and tension that come with the threat of being tried as a terrorist.
Development of the investigation
Fortunately Germany's Court of Justice took several decisions that were very favorable for Andrej. In a first, two months after the prosecutor's objection to his release on bail, the court decided not only to not allow the objection, but instead completely withdrew the arrest warrant, arguing that 'pure assumptions are not sufficient'. This decision was perceived as a 'slap in the face' of Germany's Federal Prosecutor by many journalists. One months later the same court had to decide whether the 'militant group' can be considered a 'terrorist organization' and decided against this. The German definition for terrorism demands that a terrorist act is meant and able to shake the state to its very foundations, or else to terrify the population as such. When Germany's minister of justice, Brigitte Zypries, was asked in an interview with Der Spiegel, one of the biggest political weekly magazines, about the case against the alleged members of the 'militant group', she said that she thought that the attacks of September 11 are a terrible tragedy, but in her definition not a terrorist act as it didn't manage to endanger the American state. We were rather surprised by this, to say the least. In November the Court of Justice decided that the 'militant group' can't be considered to be terrorist and ordered the other three arrested to be released on bail. At this point, the investigation is being conducted on the basis of §129 (instead of §129a), which prosecutes criminal instead of terrorist organizations, with possible sentences of up to five instead of ten years.
When Andrej was arrested for 'being terrorist', on the grounds of being intelligent, knowing many people from different spheres of society, accessing libraries and publishing texts, being an activist, behaving in what is seen as a conspiratorial way (not always taking the mobile phone along or using encryption) it felt that if this is possible, then it is thinkable that they'd even sentence him to a prison term. With months of public support and more details of the investigation becoming public, like many others, I started believing that this nightmare is terminal, that the case would have to be dropped eventually. Most people don't realize that the investigation is actually still going on. All of our phone calls are still being listened to, our emails read, Andrej's every step is being watched. Germany discusses online searches of computers and using hidden cameras in people's living spaces to detect terrorists, and we know that the secret service is using what the police only dream of. It has been an extremely straining life for a year and a half now, but I am convinced that a good way to survive something like this, which terrorized us, our children, families and friends, is to not go into hiding. I understand the feeling very well of wanting to not move anymore until it's all over, to not provoke any (legal) action when you're in the focus of this kind of attention. To do the contrary - seek as much public attention and thus support as possible - was the best thing we could do.
Links:
http://annalist.noblogs.org/category/en
http://einstellung.so36.net/en
http://einstellung.so36.net/en/ps/392
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Andrej_Holm
http://education.guardian.co.uk/higher/worldwide/story/0,,2153121,00.html
Copyright according to http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/3.0/deed.en.
WTF? TERRORISM OR TRAGICOMEDY?
TERRORISM OR TRAGICOMEDY?
On the morning of November 11, 150 police officers, most of which belonged to the anti-terrorist brigades, surrounded a village of 350 inhabitants on the Millevaches plateau, before raiding a farm in order to arrest nine young people (who ran the local grocery store and tried to revive the cultural life of the village). Four days later, these nine people were sent before an anti-terrorist judge and “accused of criminal conspiracy with terrorist intentions.” The newspapers reported that the Ministry of the Interior and the Secretary of State “had congratulated local and state police for their diligence.” Everything is in order, or so it would appear. But let’s try to examine the facts a little more closely and grasp the reasons and the results of this “diligence.”
First the reasons: the young people under investigation “were tracked by the police because they belonged to the ultra-left and the anarcho autonomous milieu.” As the entourage of the Ministry of the Interior specifies, “their discourse is very radical and they have links with foreign groups.” But there is more: certain of the suspects “participate regularly in political demonstrations,” and, for example, “in protests against the Fichier Edvige (Exploitation Documentaire et Valorisation de l'Information Générale) and against the intensification of laws restricting immigration.” So political activism (this is the only possible meaning of linguistic monstrosities such as “anarcho autonomous milieu”) or the active exercise of political freedoms, and employing a radical discourse are therefore sufficient reasons to call in the anti-terrorist division of the police (SDAT) and the central intelligence office of the Interior (DCRI). But anyone possessing a minimum of political conscience could not help sharing the concerns of these young people when faced with the degradations of democracy entailed by the Fichier Edvige, biometrical technologies and the hardening of immigration laws.
As for the results, one might expect that investigators found weapons, explosives and Molotov cocktails on the farm in Millevaches. Far from it. SDAT officers discovered “documents containing detailed information on railway transportation, including exact arrival and departure times of trains.” In plain French: an SNCF train schedule. But they also confiscated “climbing gear.” In simple French: a ladder, such as one might find in any country house.
Now let’s turn our attention to the suspects and, above all, to the presumed head of this terrorist gang, “a 33 year old leader from a well-off Parisian background, living off an allowance from his parents.” This is Julien Coupat, a young philosopher who (with some friends) formerly published Tiqqun, a journal whose political analyses – while no doubt debatable – count among the most intelligent of our time. I knew Julien Coupat during that period and, from an intellectual point of view, I continue to hold him in high esteem.
Let’s move on and examine the only concrete fact in this whole story. The suspects’ activities are supposedly connected with criminal acts against the SNCF that on November 8 caused delays of certain TGV trains on the Paris-Lille line. The devices in question, if we are to believe the declarations of the police and the SNCF agents themselves, can in no way cause harm to people: they can, in the worst case, hinder communications between trains causing delays. In Italy, trains are often late, but so far no one has dreamed of accusing the national railway of terrorism. It’s a case of minor offences, even if we don’t condone them. On November 13, a police report prudently affirmed that there are perhaps “perpetrators among those in custody, but it is not possible to attribute a criminal act to any one of them.”
The only possible conclusion to this shadowy affair is that those engaged in activism against the (in any case debatable) way social and economic problems are managed today are considered ipso facto as potential terrorists, when not even one act can justify this accusation. We must have the courage to say with clarity that today, numerous European countries (in particular France and Italy), have introduced laws and police measures that we would previously have judged barbaric and anti-democratic, and that these are no less extreme than those put into effect in Italy under fascism. One such measure authorizes the detention for ninety-six hours of a group of young – perhaps careless – people, to whom “it is not possible to attribute a criminal act.” Another, equally serious, is the adoption of laws that criminalize association, the formulations of which are left intentionally vague and that allow the classification of political acts as having terrorist “intentions” or “inclinations,” acts that until now were never in themselves considered terrorist.
Kilde: http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101267186-terrorisme-ou-tragi-comedie
On the morning of November 11, 150 police officers, most of which belonged to the anti-terrorist brigades, surrounded a village of 350 inhabitants on the Millevaches plateau, before raiding a farm in order to arrest nine young people (who ran the local grocery store and tried to revive the cultural life of the village). Four days later, these nine people were sent before an anti-terrorist judge and “accused of criminal conspiracy with terrorist intentions.” The newspapers reported that the Ministry of the Interior and the Secretary of State “had congratulated local and state police for their diligence.” Everything is in order, or so it would appear. But let’s try to examine the facts a little more closely and grasp the reasons and the results of this “diligence.”
First the reasons: the young people under investigation “were tracked by the police because they belonged to the ultra-left and the anarcho autonomous milieu.” As the entourage of the Ministry of the Interior specifies, “their discourse is very radical and they have links with foreign groups.” But there is more: certain of the suspects “participate regularly in political demonstrations,” and, for example, “in protests against the Fichier Edvige (Exploitation Documentaire et Valorisation de l'Information Générale) and against the intensification of laws restricting immigration.” So political activism (this is the only possible meaning of linguistic monstrosities such as “anarcho autonomous milieu”) or the active exercise of political freedoms, and employing a radical discourse are therefore sufficient reasons to call in the anti-terrorist division of the police (SDAT) and the central intelligence office of the Interior (DCRI). But anyone possessing a minimum of political conscience could not help sharing the concerns of these young people when faced with the degradations of democracy entailed by the Fichier Edvige, biometrical technologies and the hardening of immigration laws.
As for the results, one might expect that investigators found weapons, explosives and Molotov cocktails on the farm in Millevaches. Far from it. SDAT officers discovered “documents containing detailed information on railway transportation, including exact arrival and departure times of trains.” In plain French: an SNCF train schedule. But they also confiscated “climbing gear.” In simple French: a ladder, such as one might find in any country house.
Now let’s turn our attention to the suspects and, above all, to the presumed head of this terrorist gang, “a 33 year old leader from a well-off Parisian background, living off an allowance from his parents.” This is Julien Coupat, a young philosopher who (with some friends) formerly published Tiqqun, a journal whose political analyses – while no doubt debatable – count among the most intelligent of our time. I knew Julien Coupat during that period and, from an intellectual point of view, I continue to hold him in high esteem.
Let’s move on and examine the only concrete fact in this whole story. The suspects’ activities are supposedly connected with criminal acts against the SNCF that on November 8 caused delays of certain TGV trains on the Paris-Lille line. The devices in question, if we are to believe the declarations of the police and the SNCF agents themselves, can in no way cause harm to people: they can, in the worst case, hinder communications between trains causing delays. In Italy, trains are often late, but so far no one has dreamed of accusing the national railway of terrorism. It’s a case of minor offences, even if we don’t condone them. On November 13, a police report prudently affirmed that there are perhaps “perpetrators among those in custody, but it is not possible to attribute a criminal act to any one of them.”
The only possible conclusion to this shadowy affair is that those engaged in activism against the (in any case debatable) way social and economic problems are managed today are considered ipso facto as potential terrorists, when not even one act can justify this accusation. We must have the courage to say with clarity that today, numerous European countries (in particular France and Italy), have introduced laws and police measures that we would previously have judged barbaric and anti-democratic, and that these are no less extreme than those put into effect in Italy under fascism. One such measure authorizes the detention for ninety-six hours of a group of young – perhaps careless – people, to whom “it is not possible to attribute a criminal act.” Another, equally serious, is the adoption of laws that criminalize association, the formulations of which are left intentionally vague and that allow the classification of political acts as having terrorist “intentions” or “inclinations,” acts that until now were never in themselves considered terrorist.
Kilde: http://www.liberation.fr/societe/0101267186-terrorisme-ou-tragi-comedie
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