Shamir Hamid: Understanding Revolutionary Egypt.

Leder af Brookings Institutes Doha Center, Shamir Hamid, om Det Muslimske Broderskab og deres mest sandsynlige rolle i et post-Mubarak Ægypten.

I was in Egypt covering the Nov. 28 parliamentary elections - quite possibly the most rigged in the country's history. In Medinat Nasr and Shubra, I talked to the Muslim Brotherhood "whips" (the representatives who count the votes). They ran me through all the violations, one by one. They didn't seem angry as much as resigned.

Today, though, the Brotherhood finds itself in a markedly different situation. They are the country's largest, best organized opposition force at a time when anti-regime protesters are searching for leadership, and not finding it. But this leadership void has also placed Egypt's Islamists in the unenviable position of being a potentially decisive force just as the world becomes increasingly nervous at the prospect of their rise.

The Brotherhood -- the slow, bumbling giant it is -- is unlikely to fully awaken just yet. The group has always believed that it had history on its side. Whenever I would ask Brotherhood leader Esam al-Erian why they didn't seem to have a clear strategy for change, he would just sit back and say, "we are patient." Now, it knows for sure: One day, Egypt will become democratic. And one day it will be in government, although most likely as junior partner in a liberal-leftist coalition.

Foreign Policy - Shamir Hamid: Understanding Revolutionary Egypt.

Ægypten-ekspert Shadi Hamid om Det Muslimske Broderskab

While there are legitimate concerns about the group's positions on both domestic and foreign policy, the Brotherhood of today is not the Brotherhood of yesterday. Decades ago, it renounced violence. More recently, the group has publicly committed itself, in Arabic, to many of the foundational components of democratic life, including alternation of power, popular sovereignty, and judicial independence. In its political programs, the Brotherhood has largely stripped its programs of traditional Islamist content. Where the Brotherhood once talked endlessly about "application of shariah law" (tatbiq al-shariah), it now settles for vague expressions promoting Islamic values and morals. Meanwhile, its vocabulary has shifted from favoring an "Islamic state" to a "civil, democratic state with an Islamic reference."

The Brotherhood, to be sure, is not a force for liberalism, nor is it likely to become so anytime soon. The group holds views that most Americans would be uncomfortable with, including on women's rights and segregation of the sexes. But we're not voting in Egyptian elections; Egyptians are.

Ultimately, though, American fears about the Brotherhood are not about gender equality or religious freedom. After all, one of America's closest allies is the most theocratic country in the world. Saudi Arabia, as conservative as it is, supports U.S. security objectives in the region. The real concern is whether the Brotherhood, known for its inflammatory rhetoric against Israel and the United States, would work against U.S. regional interests. Crucially, would it attempt to cancel the peace treaty with Israel—long the cornerstone of the U.S.-Egypt relationship? Such an outcome is unlikely; the Brotherhood is well aware that this is a red line for the international community. Any new, transitional government—which will be tasked with rebuilding a battered country—will not want to harm its relationship with Washington and risk losing billions of dollars in much-needed assistance.

Slate: Should We Fear The Muslim Brotherhood.