mandag den 9. maj 2011
onsdag den 4. maj 2011
tirsdag den 3. maj 2011
Dagens Citat: Martin Luther King jr.
"I mourn the loss of thousands of precious lives, but I will not rejoice the death of one, not even an enemy. Returning hate for hate multiplies hate, adding deeper darkness to a night already devoid of stars. Darkness cannot drive out darkness, only light can do that. Hate cannot drive out hate: only love can do that."
Mordet på Osama Bin Laden.
Angrebet på tvillingetårnene den 11. september 2001 var det man i amerikanske efterretningscirkler kalder 'blowback' dvs. en uintenderet konsekvens af den førte politik. Nærmere bestemt en konsekvens af træningen og bevæbningen af de hellige islamiske krigere (mujaheedin) som man flittigt anvendte i proxy-krigen mod Sovjetunionen i Afghanistan i 1980'erne. Det var nemlig i disse år, at Osama bin Laden modtog sin militære træning, sammen med titusinder af andre som blev trænet i de træningslejre som den pakistanske efterretningstjeneste ISI opførte i samarbejde med CIA, hvilket senere skulle komme til at skabe grundlaget for såvel Al Qaeda som Taliban.
Efter krigen i Afghanistan rejste Osama Bin Laden tilbage til Saudi-Arabien, hvor han med stor sandsynlighed blev påvirket af de tanker som skulle forme hans anti-vestlige sindelag. Bin Laden anså Israels besættelse af Jerusalem, islams tredjehelligste by, som et voldsomt zionistisk angreb på islam og han havde yderligere meget lidt tilovers for den vestlige levevis og ønskede derfor at bekæmpe alle former for vestliggørelse af den islamiske verden.
Da Saddam Hussein indtog Kuwait spurgte Bin Laden det saudi-arabiske kongehus om tilladelse til at bekæmpe Saddam Hussein med de hellige krigere han havde allieret sig med i Afghanistan. Det havde man hos landets ledelse svært ved at se den lysende idé i og da det Saudi-Arabiske styre valgte at støtte op om USA under den første golfkrig, forlod han landet i vrede og flyttede til Sudan hvor han begyndte sin terroristkarriere. Da den sudanesiske jord begyndte at brænde under ham flyttede han sine aktiviteter tilbage til Afghanistan hvor han genoptog kontakten til sine hellige krigervenner og blev ganske tæt tilknyttet til Talibans daværende leder Mullah Omar. Fast Forward til 9-11.
Det mest vellykkede terrorangreb i historien fremprovokerede en hurtig amerikansk respons, idet man som bekendt gik i krig med Afghanistan, hvilket var nøjagtig hvad terrornetværket ønskede allermest, idet Al Qaedas strategi var at lokke USA ud i en langvarig udmattelseskrig, i forhåbning om, at denne ultimativt skulle få samme konsekvenser for supermagten, som krigen i Afghanistan i 1980'erne fik for USSR, nemlig økonomisk kollaps, forårsaget af hvad der over tid ville blive ubetalelige krigsomkostninger. Hvad man imidlertid nok ikke havde forventet i den tidlige del af det nye årtusinde var, at USA blot to år senere invaderede endnu et muslimsk land, men endnu engang var den amerikanske udenrigspolitik vand på Al Qaedas mølle, for invasionen skabte grundlaget for en omfattende rekruttering i Irak, hvor unge irakiske mænd stod i kø for at bekæmpe invasionsmagterne med alle mulige midler.
Bin Laden, hans medsammensvorne og deres sympatisører har hele tiden været en marginal gruppering, som langt hovedparten af verdens muslimer har taget afstand fra, ikke desto mindre har man haft held med at sprede de bagvedliggende tanker og strategier i en række lande i Vesten, Mellemøsten og Asien. De mange oprør i mellemøstlige lande hvor regionens muslimer har krævet reformer, frihedsrettigheder og demokratisering indikerer dog, at Al Qaeda ikke har haft held med at sprede deres ideologi i et omfang der vil gå hen og få større betydning for regionens udvikling, i det mindste på kort sigt, tværtimod lader det til at kun meget få bakker op om Al Qaedas ultimative målsætning – genindførelsen af kalifatet.
Al Qaeda har aldrig været en centralt administreret organisation, men snarere et meget løst sammenhængende netværk af ligesindede som kan slutte sig til et sæt af idéer eller principper for voldelig religiøs og politisk oprørskamp mod USA og hegemonens tro støtter i den muslimske verden. Så selvom Al Qaeda har mistet mange af netværkets mest prominente medlemmer og - såvidt vides - alle deres træningslejre, er netværket langt fra afgået ved døden, idet limen der forbinder de involverede snarere er et sæt af idéer end netværkets forskellige personer og et sæt af idéer er ganske enkelt langt sværere at komme til livs end en gruppe af mennesker. Bin Laden var da heller aldrig arkitekten bag netværkets strategiske tænkning, men snarere en art åndelig leder. Den strategiske del - dvs. udformningen af principperne for oprørskampen - har Ayman al-Zawahiri stået for og han er stadig i live, såvidt vi ved.
Spørgsmålet om hvordan Osama Bin Laden har haft held med at gemme sig i en pakistansk by tæt på en militærbase, angiveligt i årevis, uden at den pakistanske stat har været vidende om det, er her ganske interessant, for var det virkelig tilfældet eller har den pakistanske regering i årevis været bekendt med hvor han befandt sig og således dækket over ham? Mange finder det forståeligt nok lidet plausibelt at den pakistanske regering har været så inkompetent. Den indiske forfatter Salman Rushdie går endda så langt som til at kalde Pakistan for en terroriststat og man kan da også let ledes til at frygte, at der i visse voldsforherligende kredse vil blive fremsat krav om yderligere interventioner i landet med udgangspunkt i lignende anklager.
Incitamentet til at bekrige en nation med en atomar våbenkapacitet med udgangspunkt i ovennævnte kritik er imidlertid nok ret begrænset og endvidere bliver det ganske svært at mobilisere støtte til noget sådant under den igangværende økonomiske krise, så det kommer næppe til at ske. Til gengæld har man nok god grund til at frygte, at der vil ske en yderligere optrapning af drone-angreb i Af-Pak regionen, samt yderligere krænkelser af Pakistans territoriale integritet med henvisninger til landets inkompetence (og manglende vilje) ift. til bekæmpelsen af terrorisme. Den opinionsmæssige grobund for yderligere statslige voldshandlinger er i hvert fald ganske god for tiden, for som den amerikanske forfatningsadvokat og systemkritiker Glenn Greenwald udtrykte det i en blogpost forleden: "Whenever America uses violence in a way that makes its citizens cheer, beam with nationalistic pride, and rally around their leader, more violence is typically guaranteed."
fredag den 29. april 2011
Bevar Fristaden!
De borgerlige har i årtier haft et horn i siden på Christiania.
Det, at man har formået at tage et i årtier ubrugt og forfaldent område i brug til kulturliv, beboelse og samfundsmæssige alternativer og hvad der vel er Danmarks største socialcenter, har alle dage været noget nær umuligt at sluge for de borgerlige.
Under påskud af at ville bekæmpe et ulovligt rusmiddel, som ingen fornuftige mennesker kan forstå hvorfor er illegalt, har man gennem ti år forsøgt sig med at indføre en miniature-udgave af en stærkt repressiv politistat på Christiania: Såkaldt præventive anholdelser og vilkårlige visitationer; mange hundrede uanmeldte politibesøg på Stadens restaurationer; ugentlige magtprojektioner i form af kampklædte betjente i dusinvis der intimiderende vandrer rundt.
Beskeden er svær at tage fejl af: Inordn jer under den statsligt dikterede korrekte levevis eller find jer i at magtens knusende jernnæve griber hele jeres tilværelse i sit kvælertag!
Demonstration i morgen klokken 11 fra Christianshavns Torv
onsdag den 20. april 2011
Secret memos expose link between oil firms and invasion of Iraq
The British newspaper The Independent yesterday:
Plans to exploit Iraq's oil reserves were discussed by government ministers and the world's largest oil companies the year before Britain took a leading role in invading Iraq, government documents show.
Graphic: Iraq's burgeoning oil industry
The papers, revealed here for the first time, raise new questions over Britain's involvement in the war, which had divided Tony Blair's cabinet and was voted through only after his claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
The minutes of a series of meetings between ministers and senior oil executives are at odds with the public denials of self-interest from oil companies and Western governments at the time.
The documents were not offered as evidence in the ongoing Chilcot Inquiry into the UK's involvement in the Iraq war. In March 2003, just before Britain went to war, Shell denounced reports that it had held talks with Downing Street about Iraqi oil as "highly inaccurate". BP denied that it had any "strategic interest" in Iraq, while Tony Blair described "the oil conspiracy theory" as "the most absurd".
But documents from October and November the previous year paint a very different picture.
Five months before the March 2003 invasion, Baroness Symons, then the Trade Minister, told BP that the Government believed British energy firms should be given a share of Iraq's enormous oil and gas reserves as a reward for Tony Blair's military commitment to US plans for regime change.
The papers show that Lady Symons agreed to lobby the Bush administration on BP's behalf because the oil giant feared it was being "locked out" of deals that Washington was quietly striking with US, French and Russian governments and their energy firms.
Minutes of a meeting with BP, Shell and BG (formerly British Gas) on 31 October 2002 read: "Baroness Symons agreed that it would be difficult to justify British companies losing out in Iraq in that way if the UK had itself been a conspicuous supporter of the US government throughout the crisis."
The minister then promised to "report back to the companies before Christmas" on her lobbying efforts.
The Foreign Office invited BP in on 6 November 2002 to talk about opportunities in Iraq "post regime change". Its minutes state: "Iraq is the big oil prospect. BP is desperate to get in there and anxious that political deals should not deny them the opportunity."
After another meeting, this one in October 2002, the Foreign Office's Middle East director at the time, Edward Chaplin, noted: "Shell and BP could not afford not to have a stake in [Iraq] for the sake of their long-term future... We were determined to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a post-Saddam Iraq."
Whereas BP was insisting in public that it had "no strategic interest" in Iraq, in private it told the Foreign Office that Iraq was "more important than anything we've seen for a long time".
BP was concerned that if Washington allowed TotalFinaElf's existing contact with Saddam Hussein to stand after the invasion it would make the French conglomerate the world's leading oil company. BP told the Government it was willing to take "big risks" to get a share of the Iraqi reserves, the second largest in the world.
Over 1,000 documents were obtained under Freedom of Information over five years by the oil campaigner Greg Muttitt. They reveal that at least five meetings were held between civil servants, ministers and BP and Shell in late 2002.
The 20-year contracts signed in the wake of the invasion were the largest in the history of the oil industry. They covered half of Iraq's reserves – 60 billion barrels of oil, bought up by companies such as BP and CNPC (China National Petroleum Company), whose joint consortium alone stands to make £403m ($658m) profit per year from the Rumaila field in southern Iraq.
Last week, Iraq raised its oil output to the highest level for almost decade, 2.7 million barrels a day – seen as especially important at the moment given the regional volatility and loss of Libyan output. Many opponents of the war suspected that one of Washington's main ambitions in invading Iraq was to secure a cheap and plentiful source of oil.
Mr Muttitt, whose book Fuel on the Fire is published next week, said: "Before the war, the Government went to great lengths to insist it had no interest in Iraq's oil. These documents provide the evidence that give the lie to those claims.
"We see that oil was in fact one of the Government's most important strategic considerations, and it secretly colluded with oil companies to give them access to that huge prize."
Lady Symons, 59, later took up an advisory post with a UK merchant bank that cashed in on post-war Iraq reconstruction contracts. Last month she severed links as an unpaid adviser to Libya's National Economic Development Board after Colonel Gaddafi started firing on protesters. Last night, BP and Shell declined to comment.
www.fuelonthefire.com
Source: The Independent.
Plans to exploit Iraq's oil reserves were discussed by government ministers and the world's largest oil companies the year before Britain took a leading role in invading Iraq, government documents show.
Graphic: Iraq's burgeoning oil industry
The papers, revealed here for the first time, raise new questions over Britain's involvement in the war, which had divided Tony Blair's cabinet and was voted through only after his claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction.
The minutes of a series of meetings between ministers and senior oil executives are at odds with the public denials of self-interest from oil companies and Western governments at the time.
The documents were not offered as evidence in the ongoing Chilcot Inquiry into the UK's involvement in the Iraq war. In March 2003, just before Britain went to war, Shell denounced reports that it had held talks with Downing Street about Iraqi oil as "highly inaccurate". BP denied that it had any "strategic interest" in Iraq, while Tony Blair described "the oil conspiracy theory" as "the most absurd".
But documents from October and November the previous year paint a very different picture.
Five months before the March 2003 invasion, Baroness Symons, then the Trade Minister, told BP that the Government believed British energy firms should be given a share of Iraq's enormous oil and gas reserves as a reward for Tony Blair's military commitment to US plans for regime change.
The papers show that Lady Symons agreed to lobby the Bush administration on BP's behalf because the oil giant feared it was being "locked out" of deals that Washington was quietly striking with US, French and Russian governments and their energy firms.
Minutes of a meeting with BP, Shell and BG (formerly British Gas) on 31 October 2002 read: "Baroness Symons agreed that it would be difficult to justify British companies losing out in Iraq in that way if the UK had itself been a conspicuous supporter of the US government throughout the crisis."
The minister then promised to "report back to the companies before Christmas" on her lobbying efforts.
The Foreign Office invited BP in on 6 November 2002 to talk about opportunities in Iraq "post regime change". Its minutes state: "Iraq is the big oil prospect. BP is desperate to get in there and anxious that political deals should not deny them the opportunity."
After another meeting, this one in October 2002, the Foreign Office's Middle East director at the time, Edward Chaplin, noted: "Shell and BP could not afford not to have a stake in [Iraq] for the sake of their long-term future... We were determined to get a fair slice of the action for UK companies in a post-Saddam Iraq."
Whereas BP was insisting in public that it had "no strategic interest" in Iraq, in private it told the Foreign Office that Iraq was "more important than anything we've seen for a long time".
BP was concerned that if Washington allowed TotalFinaElf's existing contact with Saddam Hussein to stand after the invasion it would make the French conglomerate the world's leading oil company. BP told the Government it was willing to take "big risks" to get a share of the Iraqi reserves, the second largest in the world.
Over 1,000 documents were obtained under Freedom of Information over five years by the oil campaigner Greg Muttitt. They reveal that at least five meetings were held between civil servants, ministers and BP and Shell in late 2002.
The 20-year contracts signed in the wake of the invasion were the largest in the history of the oil industry. They covered half of Iraq's reserves – 60 billion barrels of oil, bought up by companies such as BP and CNPC (China National Petroleum Company), whose joint consortium alone stands to make £403m ($658m) profit per year from the Rumaila field in southern Iraq.
Last week, Iraq raised its oil output to the highest level for almost decade, 2.7 million barrels a day – seen as especially important at the moment given the regional volatility and loss of Libyan output. Many opponents of the war suspected that one of Washington's main ambitions in invading Iraq was to secure a cheap and plentiful source of oil.
Mr Muttitt, whose book Fuel on the Fire is published next week, said: "Before the war, the Government went to great lengths to insist it had no interest in Iraq's oil. These documents provide the evidence that give the lie to those claims.
"We see that oil was in fact one of the Government's most important strategic considerations, and it secretly colluded with oil companies to give them access to that huge prize."
Lady Symons, 59, later took up an advisory post with a UK merchant bank that cashed in on post-war Iraq reconstruction contracts. Last month she severed links as an unpaid adviser to Libya's National Economic Development Board after Colonel Gaddafi started firing on protesters. Last night, BP and Shell declined to comment.
www.fuelonthefire.com
Source: The Independent.
tirsdag den 19. april 2011
lørdag den 16. april 2011
fredag den 8. april 2011
Dagens Citat: David Letterman
"So now the CIA is arming the Libyan rebels. Great! You know what that means? In 10 years we'll be fighting them."
torsdag den 7. april 2011
Søren Pind Kontra Kendsgerningerne.
Søren Pind hævder i dag i Jyllandsposten, at angribskrigen mod Irak var startskuddet til det arabiske forår. Søren Pind er “helt sikker på, at demokratiet i Irak har inspireret under det arabiske forår.” Irak-krigen var iflg. Pind “bestemt en faktor for, at det [arabiske forår] kunne lade sig gøre,” hvilket foranlediger udviklingsministeren til at konkludere “at modstanderne af Irak-krigen får en sværere og sværere sag, som tiden går.” Det fortjener en kort gendrivelse, men så heller ikke mere:
* Der er ikke - og har ikke på noget tidspunkt været - et funktionelt demokrati i Irak, hvorfor påstanden om at "demokratiet i Irak" har virket som inspirationskilde for oprørerne i bl.a. Ægypten og Tunesien er svær at tage seriøs. For lidt over en måned siden fængslede den amerikansk støttede Nouri al-Maliki-regering 300 journalister, advokater og intellektuelle for at stoppe igangværende protester imod regeringen, mens op mod tredive mennesker blev dræbt. Disse kendsgerninger er vist ikke ligefrem et udtryk for en succesfuld demokratisering af landet!
* Uanset om der på et tidspunkt skulle komme til at ske en ændring af den nuværende situation hen imod en funktionel demokratisk orden så implicerer dette ikke, at krigsmodstanderne bliver nødt til at sluge nogle kameler, da angrebskrigen mod Irak blev solgt til befolkningerne i Danmark, Storbrittanien og USA som en sikkerhedspolitisk motiveret krig der havde med afvæbning af Saddam Hussein-regimets påståede masseødelæggelsesvåben at gøre. At dette var ren og skær svindel, løgn og bedrag er idag velkendt og det kommer næppe i nogen nær fremtid til at blive en god sag for krigsfortalerne.
* Søren Pind kommer ikke i artiklen nærmere ind på hvordan det mere præcist hænger sammen, når han påstår, at Irak-krigen gjorde det arabiske forår mulig, hvilket selvfølgelig gør det svært at gendrive. Det er imidlertid kendsgerninger, at mens Iraks vej mod en forhåbentlig bedre og mere demokratisk orden på sigt er sket oppefra, er oprørene i Ægypten og Tunesien - og mange andre steder i den arabiske del af verden - sket nedefra. Muligheden for modstand mod Saddam Husseins styre blev endvidere i høj grad begrænset af sanktionerne man påførte landet som forvoldte at landets befolkning blev så underernærede, at oprør gennem længere tid næppe overhovedet var en fysisk mulighed.
* Interessant er det da også i denne sammenhæng at fremhæve, at Pinds påståede demokratisering af Irak ikke kan siges at have skabt et positivere billede af USAs tilstedeværelse i regionen. Den amerikanske tænketank, The Brookings Institute, udgav i slutning af 2010 deres årlige 'Arab Public Opinion Poll'. Iflg. denne undersøgelse er man langt fra begejstret for den amerikanske tilstedeværelse i regionen.
Til spørgsmålet "What TWO steps by the United States would improve your views of the United States the most?" svarede 45% "Withdrawal from Iraq", mens 35% svarede "Withdrawal from Arabian Peninsula." Blot 13% mente at "Pushing more to spread democracy" ville gavne deres syn på USA.
Til spørgsmålet "Which TWO of the following factors do you believe are most important in driving American policy in the Middle East?" Svarede 49% "protecting Israel", 45% "controlling oil", 33% "weakening the muslim world", 33% "preserving regional and global dominance", 13% "preventing spread of nuclear weapons", 9% "promoting peace and stability". Det var kun 2% af de adspurgte som mente drivkraften bag den amerikanske udenrigspolitik i regionen var "Promoting democracy".
Til spørgsmålet "Name TWO countries that you think pose the biggest threat to you", svarede 88% "Israel", 77% "USA" og 10% "Iran".
Forsøget på at hvidvaske Irak-krigen er ikke Søren Pinds første forsøg på at omskrive historien til egen fordel. Check i forlængelse af dette indlæg min artikel fra den 7. Marts 'Skandaløs Hvidvaskning' på Kontradoxa. Suppler desuden ovenstående med mit blogindlæg 'Søren Pind om den aktivistiske udenrigspolitik' fra november 2010.
onsdag den 6. april 2011
Eugenics
"Eugenics is the "applied science or the biosocial movement which advocates the use of practices aimed at improving the genetic composition of a population," usually referring to human populations."
Wikipedia.
The Telegraph.
Wikipedia.
Government Advisory Panel: Test children's genes before they have sex.
Children should be encouraged to undergo genetic testing before they become sexually active to check whether they could pass on “hidden” abnormalities to their offspring, a government advisory group will say this week.
The Telegraph.
War Dollars Could Fill Deficit Gaps of All State Budgets.
In a commentary on Huffington Post yesterday William Hartung, the director of the Arms and Security Project at the Center for International Policy, estimated that the amount of money spent on the war in Afghanistan could fill the deficit gaps of all state budgets:
Source: William Hartung, America's Costliest War, Huffington Post April 5. 2011.
"...Those genuinely concerned about war costs need to go where the money is -- Afghanistan. The Pentagon has asked for $113 billion to fight the war there for this year, roughly two and one-half times what has been requested to support the United States' dwindling commitment in Iraq. That gap will only increase as troop numbers in Iraq continue to fall. To put this in some perspective, the entire Gross Domestic Product of Afghanistan is about $29 billion per year, which means that annual U.S. expenditures on the war are nearly four times the value of the entire Afghan economy. That number would obviously change if the drug economy were taken into account, but it is stunning nonetheless.
The tax dollars being spent on Afghanistan are enough to offset the $100 billion per year that House Republicans are seeking to cut from next year's budget, or enough to fill the projected budget gaps of the 44 states that expect to run deficits in 2012. In other words, if the Afghan war ended and the funds allocated for it were returned to the states, no state in America would run a deficit next year. This would save millions of jobs of teachers, police, firefighters and other public employees while holding the line on basic services like Medicaid and income support for families in poverty. This would in turn be good for the economy as a whole. Military spending creates fewer jobs than virtually any other form of expenditure, from education to housing to transportation. So shifting funds away from war spending will result in a net increase in jobs nationwide...."
Source: William Hartung, America's Costliest War, Huffington Post April 5. 2011.
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