Ron Paul var opstillet som præsidentkandidat for Det Republikanske Parti.
One of the burning questions regarding the recently passed bailout, and the one that almost no one has bothered to answer, is how the government intends to pay for it. Governments have three main methods by which they can raise funds: taxation, printing new money, and debt. As our $10 trillion national debt shows, the federal government has always enjoyed raising money by issuing new debt. Money is gained upfront, while the cost of repaying that debt is pushed onto future generations.
This method is especially favored today, since imposing $700 billion worth of taxes would lead to widespread public dissatisfaction. When the cost of all the recent bailouts plus the cost of all the new lending facilities the Federal Reserve has initiated are added together, we quickly reach a figure in the trillions of dollars. Even with the debt ceiling being raised to $11.3 trillion, the issuance of debt alone cannot begin to cover the cost of all the bailouts in which the government is engaged. Every indication is that the government will use both debt and inflation in its attempt to keep the economy running at full speed.
Debt financing has begun in earnest, as the national debt has increased $600 billion over the past three weeks, and most of that increase came even before the $700 billion bailout bill was passed. I fully expect that trend to continue in the near future and would not be surprised if we see another debt-limit increase slipped into another economic stimulus package that might be passed before the new year. Now that our foreign creditors are less willing to purchase our debt, what debt we cannot sell to foreigners will be monetized through the Federal Reserve, resulting in increased inflation.
In fact, money supply data for the narrowest measure, the adjusted monetary base, show an unprecedented increase, far higher than when Chairman Alan Greenspan attempted to reflate us out of trouble after the dot-com stock bubble burst. That intervention on Greenspan's part, pumping in liquidity and driving interest rates down, led to the real estate bubble, and Chairman Ben Bernanke unfortunately seems to be following the same script as his predecessor in resorting to credit creation and low interest rates. Even were this effort to succeed, it would only delay the inevitable. In order for the economy to return to normal, the Federal Reserve must cease the creation of new credit, overvalued assets must be allowed to fall in price, and malinvested resources must be allowed to liquidate and be put to use in more productive sectors.
The government's reaction to the credit crisis is based on the erroneous belief that the rate of economic growth over the past 10 to 15 years was the result of natural free-market processes, which is not the case. Rates of economic growth during the dot-com and real estate booms were clearly indicative of an overheated economy, and any attempt to try to stimulate the economy to return to such rapid growth will fail. Rather than allowing asset bubbles to pop and malinvested resources to liquidate, Federal Reserve monetary policy has attempted to pump more and more new money and credit into the system to try, in vain, to sustain the economic boom.
The monetary base jumping by such a large margin is an indicator that the Federal Reserve has not learned from its mistakes and is hoping to get out of this economic downturn by creating even more credit out of thin air. With such large increases in the monetary base and with banks legally able to hold zero reserves, the vaunted money multiplier effect could theoretically reach infinity. If our policymakers fail to come to their senses, there is a real danger that we could end up in a hyperinflationary crisis such as the ones that beset Germany in the 1920s and Argentina and Zimbabwe in more recent decades
The common measure of inflation, the consumer price index, has been so manipulated over the years that it cannot be trusted to be an accurate indicator of the true effect of inflation on people's pocketbooks. This is especially true of “core inflation,” which eliminates food and energy prices, the two staples that are most important to every American. When the CPI figure is computed using the original method of calculation, it comes out to more than 10 percent per year, which is a more accurate indicator of the inflation being felt by middle-class Americans.
For years, I pointed to the now-discontinued M3 money supply figure, the broadest measure of the total money supply, and remarked how its rate of growth far outpaced the officially reported rate of inflation. Since inflation is chronically underreported, I continue to view money supply figures as a more accurate indicator of the true direction of prices. Now that the monetary base has spiked so dramatically, the result will be seen over the next few months as this new credit works its way through the system, resulting in significantly higher inflation. Unfortunately, because M3 is no longer reported, the full effect of this inflation on the U.S. economy will go unreported in official statistics.
Our government has lived beyond its means for decades. We now face a crucial juncture, at which we determine whether to continue down the path of debt, inflation, and government intervention or choose to return to the economics of the free market, which have been ignored for almost a century. Increased debt leads to higher taxes on future generations, while increased inflation diminishes the purchasing power of American families and destroys the dollar. No society has ever been achieved prosperity through indebtedness or inflation, and the United States is no exception. We cannot afford to continue our current policies of monetary expansion and unending bailouts. Unless we return to sound monetary policy, sharply reduce government expenditures, and realize that the government cannot act as a lender of last resort, we will drive our economy to ruin.
http://www.thebigmoney.com/print/414
mandag den 13. oktober 2008
Byen er fremtidens kampplads
Kampen mod nyliberalismen flytter ud i byrummet, hvor fælles værdier skabes og ejes, hævder Antonio Negri og Michael Hardt i deres kommende bog.
Nyliberalismens projekt er at privatisere fællederne [common wealth], de værdier der skabes og ejes i fællesskab. Det siger Michael Hardt, litteraturprofessor ved Duke University i USA.
Sammen med den italienske politiske filosof Antonio Negri har Hardt under en postmoderne fane skabt furore på venstrefløjen med bøgerne »Imperiet« (Empire, udkom i 2000) og videreudviklingen »Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire« fra 2004. Nu har duoen afleveret manuskriptet til en tredje bog om kapitalismens former og potentialet for modstanden mod disse, med titlen »Common Wealth«. Bogen forventes at udkomme næste år.
»Common Wealth« er sidste del af en trilogi, et 15 år langt projekt, siger Hardt, da vi møder ham under Europas Sociale Forum i Malmö. Projektet har affødt mange studiekredse og har skabt både beundring og irritation i miljøer som definerer sig som del af den globale retfærdighedsbevægelse. Eller alterglobaliseringsbevægelsen, som den også kaldes.
Hardt og Negri er hyppigt blevet kritiseret for ikke at forholde sig til realitetene i »basis« og i stedet drive begrebsgymnastik langt ind i overbygningen. Michael Hardt mener imidlertid, at begreberne om det nye imperium (en serie af nationale og internationale organismer forenet under en dominerende ideologi) og multituden (en sammenhængende pluralitet af sociale subjekter, som ikke kan reduceres til en enhed, et begreb Hardt og Negri sætter i modsætning til ideen om »folket«) blot er blevet styrket af den seneste udvikling på verdensscenen.
JPG - 19.1 kb
Fra nationalstaten til imperiet og fra fabrikken til metropolen. Sådan kan man opsummere forandringen i kapitalismen, hvis man spørger den amerikanske filosof Michael Hardt. Hardt var en af hovedtalerne på det nyligt afholdte European Social Forum i Malmø. Forfatterkollegaen Antonio Negri skulle også have talt, men måtte melde afbud på grund af sygdom.
»Da vi skrev »Imperiet«, så vi en ny global verdensorden, der var i støbeskeen, en orden med nye styringsformer. De nykonservative i Washington har forsøgt at kuppe denne orden: gennem krigen mod terror troede de, at de kunne genskabe den traditionelle imperialisme.«
Mislykket unilateralisme
Det er blevet hævdet, at krigene i Irak og Afghanistan tilbageviste centrale præmisser i »Imperiet«. Du virker fortsat ikke særlig entusiastisk overfor modstanden mod krigen?
»Fjendens fjende er ikke nødvendigvis vores ven, og jeg føler ingen forpligtelse til at hylde krigsmodstanden. Det er muligt jeg er stædig, men jeg har ikke ændret syn efter disse krige. Irak og Afghanistan er klassiske imperalistiske eventyr udført af en idiot [George W. Bush]. Koncepterne vi brugte i »Imperiet« er i virkeligheden blot endnu mere gyldige i og med, at Bush har bevist at denne form for imperalisme er død. Det, vi ser nu, er begravelsen af unilaterialismen.«
Alligevel synes USA at fortsætte på samme måde?
»De har forsøgt, men er mislykkedes. F.eks. vil der ikke blive tale om en invasion af Iran. Måske vil nogen indvende, at det nye blot er, at USA ikke kan, men at Kina kan. Det er diskutabelt, for det ikke blot aktørerne, men selve formen, der er forandret.«
Tre faser
Hardt og Negri har distanceret sig fra klassiske teorier og termer (selv ville de måske sige omfortolket og generobret) og kritiserer modviljen mod teorifornyelse.
»I 2003–05 handlede meget af venstrefløjsanalysen om, at dette var god, gammeldags imperialisme, og folk pustede lettede ud – nu behøvede de jo ikke lede efter nye begreber og modeller«, siger Hardt.
Ifølge ham burde alle kunne se, at USA’s imperialistiske pretentioner har slået fejl, både militært og økonomisk. Han påpeger også, at nationalstaterne fortsat er vigtige, men at de fungerer i et netværk, hvor de må agere sammen med koncerner, finansinstitutioner og massemedier.
De to forfattere deler alterglobaliseringsbevægelsens hidtidige historie ind i tre faser.
»Den første gik omtrent frem til G8-mødet i Genova i 2001, og det specielle var, at man ikke demonstrerede mod for eksempel Det hvide hus, men mod forskellige institutioner. Dette »topmødehopperi« er senere blevet kritiseret, men der var tale om en ekstremt intelligent teoretisering af, hvor magten lå i det nye imperium. Pluralismen i bevægelsen indså og eksperimenterede med magten ved netop at være mangfoldig. En mangel var at bevægelsen ikke blev virkelig global«, siger Hardt.
Han mener, at den anden fase, fra 2003 til 2006, var helt dominert af antikrig og anti-Bush, hvorfor den mistede sin mangfoldighed af agendaer, taktikker og organisationer, en tilbagegang for bevægelsen.
»Nu er vi i den tredje fase, en fase der begyndte efter at Irak-krigen slog fejl. Vi ser mangfoldigheden af grupper, arbejdsformer og agendaer gøre sin re-entre, og en genfødelse af kampen i og om metropolen«.
Ud i byrummet
Netop metropolen er et centralt begreb i »Common Wealth«, og i vanlig stil lancerer Negri og Hardt en snedig hypotese: Metropolen er for multituden, hvad fabrikken var for industriproletariatet.
Hardt forklarer:
»Før forgik produktionen i fabrikkens lukkede rum. Nu foregår den på tværs af åbne rum, og vi har et skifte i den hegemoniske produktionsform.«
Når den industrielle produktionsform tidligere var hegemonisk skyldtes det ikke, at et flertal af samfundsmedlemmerne arbejdede i industrien, men at den industrielle arbejdsmåde blev påført alle andre dele af samfundet.
»Nu er det den biopolitiske produktion, som er hegemonisk. Med det mener vi alt fra at skifte sengetøj og udvikle datakoder til at arbejde i Burger King. Denne produktionsform bygger på og udvikler fælleden (eng. »The Common«), som er de ideer, fælles værdier, sprog og følelser, vi alle sammen producere i fællesskab. Fælleden kan også karakteriseres ved, at den ikke kan underkastes hverken privat eller statsligt eje uden at forringes kvalitativt«, siger Hardt.
Hardt og Negri præsenterer deres forståelse af fælleden i kontrast til dikotomien mellem det private og det offentlige. Hvis man ser det private som udtryk for kapitalismen og det offentlige eller statslige som udtryk for socialismen, mener de, at fælleden er en social og politisk form som udgør basis for kommunismen.
Metropolen er altså den biopolitiske produktions hjemsted og følgelig også det sted, hvor udbytningen finder sted – for eksempel i form af privatisering af fællederne.
»Et eksempel er den udnyttelse af fællederne, der finder sted på boligmarkedet. Tag en gade hvor kunstnere flytter ind. Der sker ting. Det bliver attraktivt at bo dér. Caféer og restauranter flytter efter for at profittere på det, som skabes i fællesskabe. Lidt efter lidt flytter de rige ind. Gentrificeringen af byen er en ekspropriation, og netop det at privatisere fællederne er nyliberalismens projekt. Og i det samme de privatiseres, bliver de mindre produktive«, hævder Hardt.
Men metropolen er samtidig et sted, hvor der kæmpes tilbage. Den er hjemsted for modstand og antagonisme på samme måde som fabrikken var det i sin tid.
»Der er ikke bare tale om en kamp i byen, men en kamp om byen, om dens form og udtryk. Tænk på piqueteroerne i Argentina. De var arbejdsløse og aktivister, uden nogen fabrik at strejke eller aktionere imod. De tog kampen ud i gaderne, til byen. Også 2005-optøjerne i Paris’ forstæder – banlieuerne – rettede sig mod byens eksklusionssymboler, mod biler, busser og skoler.«
Glæden ved at være kommunist
Michael Hardt undrer sig over, hvorfor revolutionsbegrebet er blevet så miskrediteret i bevægelsens egne rækker.
»Der er to måder at tænke revolution på, som står sejlt overfor hinanden. Den ene er at erstatte en styrende elite med en andre – og ofte bedre – styrende elite. Men på den måde skaber man et aristokrati, ikke et demokrati. Den anden måde er når revolutionen giver magten tilbage til folk, troen på at når de undertrykkende strukturer fjernes, så vil folk styre demokratisk – en slags anarkistisk drømmebillede. Jeg synes det er mere frugtbart at se på revolution som en måde at forandre menneskesindet på«, forklarer Hardt og trækker Lenin frem.
»Lenin talte om en overgangsfase, hvor folket skulle sættes i stand til at styre sig selv, om at ændre menneskets natur under proletariatets diktatur. Men man kan ikke træne folk i demokrati ved at indføre diktatur. Menneskenesindene må ændres gennem positiv praksis og deltagende strukturer. Her ligger nøglen til at »rehabilitere« revolutionen.«
Hardt karakteriserer ofte sig selv som marxist – noget mange selverklærede marxister fnyser højlydt af. Han lægger vægt på, at demokrati og kommunisme – i den betydning han bruger ordet, som noget der er intimt knyttet til fællederne – hænger uløseligt sammen.
»Jeg bruger megen energi på at tagebageerobre begge disse begreber, begreber som er blevet både forvrænget og tømt for indhold.«
En af flere vigtige inspirationskilder for Negri og Hardt er den franske filosof Michel Foucault, blandet andet hans »Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life« (Introduktion til det ikke-facistiske liv, Foucaults forord til Deleuze og Guattaris Anti-ødipus, red.). Michael Hardt mener, at forsøget på at gøre det politiske liv attraktivt og ikke så negativt fokuseret er blandt alterglobaliseringsbevægelsens vigtigste resultater.
»Fokus på kreativitet og glæde er måske den bedste vaccine mod facisme. Ja, det er netop dét, der er selve glæden ved at være kommunist«, ler han.
Eline Lønnå og Ali Esbati er begge redaktører på den norske avis Klassekampen, hvor interviewet har været bragt den 27. september 2008.
Oversat fra norsk af Niels Fastrup
Nyliberalismens projekt er at privatisere fællederne [common wealth], de værdier der skabes og ejes i fællesskab. Det siger Michael Hardt, litteraturprofessor ved Duke University i USA.
Sammen med den italienske politiske filosof Antonio Negri har Hardt under en postmoderne fane skabt furore på venstrefløjen med bøgerne »Imperiet« (Empire, udkom i 2000) og videreudviklingen »Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of Empire« fra 2004. Nu har duoen afleveret manuskriptet til en tredje bog om kapitalismens former og potentialet for modstanden mod disse, med titlen »Common Wealth«. Bogen forventes at udkomme næste år.
»Common Wealth« er sidste del af en trilogi, et 15 år langt projekt, siger Hardt, da vi møder ham under Europas Sociale Forum i Malmö. Projektet har affødt mange studiekredse og har skabt både beundring og irritation i miljøer som definerer sig som del af den globale retfærdighedsbevægelse. Eller alterglobaliseringsbevægelsen, som den også kaldes.
Hardt og Negri er hyppigt blevet kritiseret for ikke at forholde sig til realitetene i »basis« og i stedet drive begrebsgymnastik langt ind i overbygningen. Michael Hardt mener imidlertid, at begreberne om det nye imperium (en serie af nationale og internationale organismer forenet under en dominerende ideologi) og multituden (en sammenhængende pluralitet af sociale subjekter, som ikke kan reduceres til en enhed, et begreb Hardt og Negri sætter i modsætning til ideen om »folket«) blot er blevet styrket af den seneste udvikling på verdensscenen.
JPG - 19.1 kb
Fra nationalstaten til imperiet og fra fabrikken til metropolen. Sådan kan man opsummere forandringen i kapitalismen, hvis man spørger den amerikanske filosof Michael Hardt. Hardt var en af hovedtalerne på det nyligt afholdte European Social Forum i Malmø. Forfatterkollegaen Antonio Negri skulle også have talt, men måtte melde afbud på grund af sygdom.
»Da vi skrev »Imperiet«, så vi en ny global verdensorden, der var i støbeskeen, en orden med nye styringsformer. De nykonservative i Washington har forsøgt at kuppe denne orden: gennem krigen mod terror troede de, at de kunne genskabe den traditionelle imperialisme.«
Mislykket unilateralisme
Det er blevet hævdet, at krigene i Irak og Afghanistan tilbageviste centrale præmisser i »Imperiet«. Du virker fortsat ikke særlig entusiastisk overfor modstanden mod krigen?
»Fjendens fjende er ikke nødvendigvis vores ven, og jeg føler ingen forpligtelse til at hylde krigsmodstanden. Det er muligt jeg er stædig, men jeg har ikke ændret syn efter disse krige. Irak og Afghanistan er klassiske imperalistiske eventyr udført af en idiot [George W. Bush]. Koncepterne vi brugte i »Imperiet« er i virkeligheden blot endnu mere gyldige i og med, at Bush har bevist at denne form for imperalisme er død. Det, vi ser nu, er begravelsen af unilaterialismen.«
Alligevel synes USA at fortsætte på samme måde?
»De har forsøgt, men er mislykkedes. F.eks. vil der ikke blive tale om en invasion af Iran. Måske vil nogen indvende, at det nye blot er, at USA ikke kan, men at Kina kan. Det er diskutabelt, for det ikke blot aktørerne, men selve formen, der er forandret.«
Tre faser
Hardt og Negri har distanceret sig fra klassiske teorier og termer (selv ville de måske sige omfortolket og generobret) og kritiserer modviljen mod teorifornyelse.
»I 2003–05 handlede meget af venstrefløjsanalysen om, at dette var god, gammeldags imperialisme, og folk pustede lettede ud – nu behøvede de jo ikke lede efter nye begreber og modeller«, siger Hardt.
Ifølge ham burde alle kunne se, at USA’s imperialistiske pretentioner har slået fejl, både militært og økonomisk. Han påpeger også, at nationalstaterne fortsat er vigtige, men at de fungerer i et netværk, hvor de må agere sammen med koncerner, finansinstitutioner og massemedier.
De to forfattere deler alterglobaliseringsbevægelsens hidtidige historie ind i tre faser.
»Den første gik omtrent frem til G8-mødet i Genova i 2001, og det specielle var, at man ikke demonstrerede mod for eksempel Det hvide hus, men mod forskellige institutioner. Dette »topmødehopperi« er senere blevet kritiseret, men der var tale om en ekstremt intelligent teoretisering af, hvor magten lå i det nye imperium. Pluralismen i bevægelsen indså og eksperimenterede med magten ved netop at være mangfoldig. En mangel var at bevægelsen ikke blev virkelig global«, siger Hardt.
Han mener, at den anden fase, fra 2003 til 2006, var helt dominert af antikrig og anti-Bush, hvorfor den mistede sin mangfoldighed af agendaer, taktikker og organisationer, en tilbagegang for bevægelsen.
»Nu er vi i den tredje fase, en fase der begyndte efter at Irak-krigen slog fejl. Vi ser mangfoldigheden af grupper, arbejdsformer og agendaer gøre sin re-entre, og en genfødelse af kampen i og om metropolen«.
Ud i byrummet
Netop metropolen er et centralt begreb i »Common Wealth«, og i vanlig stil lancerer Negri og Hardt en snedig hypotese: Metropolen er for multituden, hvad fabrikken var for industriproletariatet.
Hardt forklarer:
»Før forgik produktionen i fabrikkens lukkede rum. Nu foregår den på tværs af åbne rum, og vi har et skifte i den hegemoniske produktionsform.«
Når den industrielle produktionsform tidligere var hegemonisk skyldtes det ikke, at et flertal af samfundsmedlemmerne arbejdede i industrien, men at den industrielle arbejdsmåde blev påført alle andre dele af samfundet.
»Nu er det den biopolitiske produktion, som er hegemonisk. Med det mener vi alt fra at skifte sengetøj og udvikle datakoder til at arbejde i Burger King. Denne produktionsform bygger på og udvikler fælleden (eng. »The Common«), som er de ideer, fælles værdier, sprog og følelser, vi alle sammen producere i fællesskab. Fælleden kan også karakteriseres ved, at den ikke kan underkastes hverken privat eller statsligt eje uden at forringes kvalitativt«, siger Hardt.
Hardt og Negri præsenterer deres forståelse af fælleden i kontrast til dikotomien mellem det private og det offentlige. Hvis man ser det private som udtryk for kapitalismen og det offentlige eller statslige som udtryk for socialismen, mener de, at fælleden er en social og politisk form som udgør basis for kommunismen.
Metropolen er altså den biopolitiske produktions hjemsted og følgelig også det sted, hvor udbytningen finder sted – for eksempel i form af privatisering af fællederne.
»Et eksempel er den udnyttelse af fællederne, der finder sted på boligmarkedet. Tag en gade hvor kunstnere flytter ind. Der sker ting. Det bliver attraktivt at bo dér. Caféer og restauranter flytter efter for at profittere på det, som skabes i fællesskabe. Lidt efter lidt flytter de rige ind. Gentrificeringen af byen er en ekspropriation, og netop det at privatisere fællederne er nyliberalismens projekt. Og i det samme de privatiseres, bliver de mindre produktive«, hævder Hardt.
Men metropolen er samtidig et sted, hvor der kæmpes tilbage. Den er hjemsted for modstand og antagonisme på samme måde som fabrikken var det i sin tid.
»Der er ikke bare tale om en kamp i byen, men en kamp om byen, om dens form og udtryk. Tænk på piqueteroerne i Argentina. De var arbejdsløse og aktivister, uden nogen fabrik at strejke eller aktionere imod. De tog kampen ud i gaderne, til byen. Også 2005-optøjerne i Paris’ forstæder – banlieuerne – rettede sig mod byens eksklusionssymboler, mod biler, busser og skoler.«
Glæden ved at være kommunist
Michael Hardt undrer sig over, hvorfor revolutionsbegrebet er blevet så miskrediteret i bevægelsens egne rækker.
»Der er to måder at tænke revolution på, som står sejlt overfor hinanden. Den ene er at erstatte en styrende elite med en andre – og ofte bedre – styrende elite. Men på den måde skaber man et aristokrati, ikke et demokrati. Den anden måde er når revolutionen giver magten tilbage til folk, troen på at når de undertrykkende strukturer fjernes, så vil folk styre demokratisk – en slags anarkistisk drømmebillede. Jeg synes det er mere frugtbart at se på revolution som en måde at forandre menneskesindet på«, forklarer Hardt og trækker Lenin frem.
»Lenin talte om en overgangsfase, hvor folket skulle sættes i stand til at styre sig selv, om at ændre menneskets natur under proletariatets diktatur. Men man kan ikke træne folk i demokrati ved at indføre diktatur. Menneskenesindene må ændres gennem positiv praksis og deltagende strukturer. Her ligger nøglen til at »rehabilitere« revolutionen.«
Hardt karakteriserer ofte sig selv som marxist – noget mange selverklærede marxister fnyser højlydt af. Han lægger vægt på, at demokrati og kommunisme – i den betydning han bruger ordet, som noget der er intimt knyttet til fællederne – hænger uløseligt sammen.
»Jeg bruger megen energi på at tagebageerobre begge disse begreber, begreber som er blevet både forvrænget og tømt for indhold.«
En af flere vigtige inspirationskilder for Negri og Hardt er den franske filosof Michel Foucault, blandet andet hans »Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life« (Introduktion til det ikke-facistiske liv, Foucaults forord til Deleuze og Guattaris Anti-ødipus, red.). Michael Hardt mener, at forsøget på at gøre det politiske liv attraktivt og ikke så negativt fokuseret er blandt alterglobaliseringsbevægelsens vigtigste resultater.
»Fokus på kreativitet og glæde er måske den bedste vaccine mod facisme. Ja, det er netop dét, der er selve glæden ved at være kommunist«, ler han.
Eline Lønnå og Ali Esbati er begge redaktører på den norske avis Klassekampen, hvor interviewet har været bragt den 27. september 2008.
Oversat fra norsk af Niels Fastrup
Motion får hjernen til at yde sit bedste.
Exercise has always been an important aspect of human life, and many understand its benefits physically. The way it releases our stress, builds our muscle tone and helps us lose excess and unwanted weight. Less often however, do we go to the gym thinking about how the exercise we are about to do will benefit our mind. Agreeing with this theory of exercise improving out cognitive capabilities is Raymond D. Fowler’s review of “ Spark: The Revolutionary New Science of Exercise and the Brain” by John J. Ratey and Eric Hagerman. He explains that the real reason we feel so good when we get our blood pumping is that it makes the brain function at its best, and in his view, this benefit of physical activity is far more significant—and captivating—than what it does for the body.
Ratey’s original approach comprises concepts drawn from various fields such as human evolution, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. His essential concept is that “the evolutionary success of the human species is rooted in the relationship of physical activity to the learning required to find and store food.” Ratey theorizes, “The relationship between food, physical activity, and learning is hardwired into the brain's circuitry." Fowler believes Ratey’s views on the mental benefit of physical exercise, but points out the problem that Ratey’s explanation is overly simplistic for neuroscientists but may be overly complex for the typical lay reader for whom the book is intended. Using extremely scientific terms with abbreviations for various instruments could turn away the average interested reader.
Fowler does point out that there are however chapters on stress, anxiety, and depression that would be of particular interest to the psychotherapist. Ratey describes the ample evidence that physical exercise ameliorates anxiety and tension, and convincing research reveals that physical exercise is efficient in treating depression. Although I will not go into the statistics here, any positive outlook on the treatment of depression leaves me optimistic. I have personally seen the effect of depression on my friends and family, and now knowing that exercise may increase the chances of alleviating depression is reassuring.
Here are a few statistics that Fowler points out from Ratey’s article that are worth noting:
• In comparison with most women, older women with higher levels of exercise (median: walking 12 hours a week) had a 20 percent lower chance of being cognitively impaired on tests of memory and general intelligence (Weuve et al.'s, 2004 study, as cited in Ratey, p. 221).
• A number of studies show a strong correlation between fitness levels and better performance on tests that target the temporal and frontal lobes (p. 225).
• Studies suggest that older men who exercise maintain a greater blood flow to the brain than inactive men, and MRI studies suggest that improved fitness is associated with an increase in brain volume.
This article really caught my eye because of my interest in the health sciences as well as my psychology background. I fully believe the mind and physical wellbeing are correlated, and that we won’t be able to be 100% complete without one or the other.
Fowler, Raymond D. “Exercise for the brain”. PsycCRITIQUES, Vol 53 (36), 2008
http://johnhawks.net:84/node/425
Ratey’s original approach comprises concepts drawn from various fields such as human evolution, cognitive psychology, and neuroscience. His essential concept is that “the evolutionary success of the human species is rooted in the relationship of physical activity to the learning required to find and store food.” Ratey theorizes, “The relationship between food, physical activity, and learning is hardwired into the brain's circuitry." Fowler believes Ratey’s views on the mental benefit of physical exercise, but points out the problem that Ratey’s explanation is overly simplistic for neuroscientists but may be overly complex for the typical lay reader for whom the book is intended. Using extremely scientific terms with abbreviations for various instruments could turn away the average interested reader.
Fowler does point out that there are however chapters on stress, anxiety, and depression that would be of particular interest to the psychotherapist. Ratey describes the ample evidence that physical exercise ameliorates anxiety and tension, and convincing research reveals that physical exercise is efficient in treating depression. Although I will not go into the statistics here, any positive outlook on the treatment of depression leaves me optimistic. I have personally seen the effect of depression on my friends and family, and now knowing that exercise may increase the chances of alleviating depression is reassuring.
Here are a few statistics that Fowler points out from Ratey’s article that are worth noting:
• In comparison with most women, older women with higher levels of exercise (median: walking 12 hours a week) had a 20 percent lower chance of being cognitively impaired on tests of memory and general intelligence (Weuve et al.'s, 2004 study, as cited in Ratey, p. 221).
• A number of studies show a strong correlation between fitness levels and better performance on tests that target the temporal and frontal lobes (p. 225).
• Studies suggest that older men who exercise maintain a greater blood flow to the brain than inactive men, and MRI studies suggest that improved fitness is associated with an increase in brain volume.
This article really caught my eye because of my interest in the health sciences as well as my psychology background. I fully believe the mind and physical wellbeing are correlated, and that we won’t be able to be 100% complete without one or the other.
Fowler, Raymond D. “Exercise for the brain”. PsycCRITIQUES, Vol 53 (36), 2008
http://johnhawks.net:84/node/425
Vaclav Havel: The Planet is not at risk. We are
Over the past few years the question has been asked ever more forcefully whether global climatic changes occur in natural cycles or not, to what degree we human beings contribute to it, what eventual threats stem from them and what can be done to prevent them.
If we are at the beginning of serious global climatic changes, as scientific studies demonstrate, and if there is a threat of changes to temperature and energy cycles on a planetary scale, it could mean a generalized danger irrespective of the area of civilization people belong to or the continent they live on. It is also obvious from published research that human activity is also one of the causes of change; we just don’t know how big its specific contribution is. Is it really necessary to know it to the last percentage point, though? By waiting for confirmation, for incontrovertible precision, aren’t we simply wasting time when we could be taking measures that are relatively painless compared to the ones we would have to adopt in the event of further delays?
Maybe we should start considering our sojourn on this Earth as a loan. There can be no doubt that for past hundred years at least, the Euro-American world has been running up a debt, and now other parts of the world are joining it and following its example. However, we have entered an era in which nature is issuing us warnings and demanding that we not only stop the debt growing but, on the contrary, start to pay it back. There is little point in asking whether we have borrowed too much or what would happen if we postponed the repayments. Anyone with a mortgage or a bank loan can easily imagine the outcome.
Estimates of the effects of possible climatic changes are hard to gauge. Our planet has never been in a state of balance, from which it could deviate through human or other influence, and then, in time, return to its original state. The planetary organism cannot be regarded as some kind of pendulum that will return to its original position after a certain period. The climatic system has evolved turbulently over billions of years and the energy flows represent a gigantic, complexly interlinked structure of networks, and of networks within networks, where everything is interlinked in diverse ways, one part being dependent on the next. One of its characteristics is that the structures will never return to precisely the same state they were in fifty or maybe five thousand years ago. They will probably evolve into a new state, which need not necessarily mean any threat to existence, so long as the change is only slight. Larger climatic changes, however, could have unforeseeable effects within the global ecosystem. Were that to happen and were the pessimistic forecasts to come true, we must ask ourselves whether human life would be possible in the new conditions. And precisely because so much uncertainty still reigns, a great deal of humility and circumspection is called for. We can’t go on endlessly fooling ourselves that there is nothing wrong and that we can go on cheerfully pursuing our consumer lifestyles, ignoring the climatic threats and postponing a solution. Maybe there is no danger of any major catastrophe in the coming years or decades. Who knows? But that doesn’t relieve us of responsibility toward future generations.
I don’t agree with those whose reaction to the possible threats is to warn against the restrictions on civil freedoms. Were the forecasts of certain climatologists to be fulfilled, our freedoms would be tantamount to the freedom of someone hanging from a twentieth-story parapet.
We live in a world ringed by a single global civilization comprising various areas of civilization. Most of them these days share one thing in common: technocracy. Priority is given to everything that is calculable, quantifiable or ratable. That is a very materialistic concept, however, and one that is drawing us toward an important crossroads for our civilization.
Whenever I reflect on all the various problems of today’s world, whether they concern the economy, society, culture, security, the ecology or civilization in general, I always end up confronting the moral question whether this or that is responsible or acceptable. The moral order and its wellspring, our conscience and responsibility, as well as human rights and the right to human rights, these are the most important issues at the beginning of the third millennium. It is necessary to return again and again to the roots of human existence and confront our sojourn on this planet with the prospects of the centuries to come. We must analyze everything open-mindedly, soberly, unideologically and unobsessively, and project our knowledge into practical policies. Maybe it is no longer a matter of simply promoting energy-saving technologies, but chiefly of introducing ecologically clean technologies that can be incorporated into the natural cycle, of diversifying resources and of not relying on just one single invention as a panacea.
I’m also skeptical about whether such a complex problem can be solved by one single branch of science. We cannot rely on mere technical measures and regulations being able to bypass or take the place of responsibility. Economic instruments and legally stipulated limits are all important of course, and they must be used and implemented. But equally important, however, is support for education, ecological training and ethics, in other words, a consciousness of the commonality of all living beings and an emphasis on shared responsibility.
We will either manage to achieve an awareness of our place as humankind in the living and life-giving organism of our planet, or we will face the threat that our evolutionary journey will be set back thousands or even millions of years. That is why we must take this issue very seriously and see it as a challenge to behave responsibility and not as an anticipation of the end of the world. The end of the world has been anticipated many times in the course of history and has never happened, of course. And it won’t happen this time either. We have no need to have fears for our planet as such. It was here before us and most likely will be here after us. But that doesn’t mean that the existence of the human race might not be at serious risk. As a result of our endeavors and our irresponsibility the climatic system on this Earth could end up in a state in which there would be no place for us. If we drag our feet, the scope for decision making – and hence for our individual freedom – could be considerably reduced.
If we are at the beginning of serious global climatic changes, as scientific studies demonstrate, and if there is a threat of changes to temperature and energy cycles on a planetary scale, it could mean a generalized danger irrespective of the area of civilization people belong to or the continent they live on. It is also obvious from published research that human activity is also one of the causes of change; we just don’t know how big its specific contribution is. Is it really necessary to know it to the last percentage point, though? By waiting for confirmation, for incontrovertible precision, aren’t we simply wasting time when we could be taking measures that are relatively painless compared to the ones we would have to adopt in the event of further delays?
Maybe we should start considering our sojourn on this Earth as a loan. There can be no doubt that for past hundred years at least, the Euro-American world has been running up a debt, and now other parts of the world are joining it and following its example. However, we have entered an era in which nature is issuing us warnings and demanding that we not only stop the debt growing but, on the contrary, start to pay it back. There is little point in asking whether we have borrowed too much or what would happen if we postponed the repayments. Anyone with a mortgage or a bank loan can easily imagine the outcome.
Estimates of the effects of possible climatic changes are hard to gauge. Our planet has never been in a state of balance, from which it could deviate through human or other influence, and then, in time, return to its original state. The planetary organism cannot be regarded as some kind of pendulum that will return to its original position after a certain period. The climatic system has evolved turbulently over billions of years and the energy flows represent a gigantic, complexly interlinked structure of networks, and of networks within networks, where everything is interlinked in diverse ways, one part being dependent on the next. One of its characteristics is that the structures will never return to precisely the same state they were in fifty or maybe five thousand years ago. They will probably evolve into a new state, which need not necessarily mean any threat to existence, so long as the change is only slight. Larger climatic changes, however, could have unforeseeable effects within the global ecosystem. Were that to happen and were the pessimistic forecasts to come true, we must ask ourselves whether human life would be possible in the new conditions. And precisely because so much uncertainty still reigns, a great deal of humility and circumspection is called for. We can’t go on endlessly fooling ourselves that there is nothing wrong and that we can go on cheerfully pursuing our consumer lifestyles, ignoring the climatic threats and postponing a solution. Maybe there is no danger of any major catastrophe in the coming years or decades. Who knows? But that doesn’t relieve us of responsibility toward future generations.
I don’t agree with those whose reaction to the possible threats is to warn against the restrictions on civil freedoms. Were the forecasts of certain climatologists to be fulfilled, our freedoms would be tantamount to the freedom of someone hanging from a twentieth-story parapet.
We live in a world ringed by a single global civilization comprising various areas of civilization. Most of them these days share one thing in common: technocracy. Priority is given to everything that is calculable, quantifiable or ratable. That is a very materialistic concept, however, and one that is drawing us toward an important crossroads for our civilization.
Whenever I reflect on all the various problems of today’s world, whether they concern the economy, society, culture, security, the ecology or civilization in general, I always end up confronting the moral question whether this or that is responsible or acceptable. The moral order and its wellspring, our conscience and responsibility, as well as human rights and the right to human rights, these are the most important issues at the beginning of the third millennium. It is necessary to return again and again to the roots of human existence and confront our sojourn on this planet with the prospects of the centuries to come. We must analyze everything open-mindedly, soberly, unideologically and unobsessively, and project our knowledge into practical policies. Maybe it is no longer a matter of simply promoting energy-saving technologies, but chiefly of introducing ecologically clean technologies that can be incorporated into the natural cycle, of diversifying resources and of not relying on just one single invention as a panacea.
I’m also skeptical about whether such a complex problem can be solved by one single branch of science. We cannot rely on mere technical measures and regulations being able to bypass or take the place of responsibility. Economic instruments and legally stipulated limits are all important of course, and they must be used and implemented. But equally important, however, is support for education, ecological training and ethics, in other words, a consciousness of the commonality of all living beings and an emphasis on shared responsibility.
We will either manage to achieve an awareness of our place as humankind in the living and life-giving organism of our planet, or we will face the threat that our evolutionary journey will be set back thousands or even millions of years. That is why we must take this issue very seriously and see it as a challenge to behave responsibility and not as an anticipation of the end of the world. The end of the world has been anticipated many times in the course of history and has never happened, of course. And it won’t happen this time either. We have no need to have fears for our planet as such. It was here before us and most likely will be here after us. But that doesn’t mean that the existence of the human race might not be at serious risk. As a result of our endeavors and our irresponsibility the climatic system on this Earth could end up in a state in which there would be no place for us. If we drag our feet, the scope for decision making – and hence for our individual freedom – could be considerably reduced.
Databasestaten Af Cory Doctorow
Da jeg flyttede fra mit hjemland Canada til Storbritannien i 2003, fandt jeg det ironisk, at familien Doctorow nu var vendt tilbage til Europa. Min far blev født af polsk-russiske forældre i en flygtningelejr i Aserbajdsjan lige før anden verdenskrigs afslutning. Mine bedsteforældre - deserterende værnepligtige fra den Røde Hær - destruerede deres dokumenter og blev, med tidens egen betegnelse, internt fordrevne.
Ved krigens afslutning drog de atter vestpå, men da de nåede Rusland, fortsatte de. Da de nåede Polen, fortsatte de. De fulgte den store flygtningestrøm ind i Tyskland, til en lejr nær Hamburg (hvor min faster blev født), før de gik ombord i et flygtningeskib og sejlede til havnebyen Halifax, hvor en bureaukrat afkortede deres navne - Doctorowicz blev til Doctorow - og gav dem en togbillet til Toronto, hvor min grandonkel Max og hans familie boede.
Min farmor er stadig i live og så frisk som en havørn. Jeg spurgte hende for nylig, hvorfor de ikke blev i Sovjetunionen. Trods sin modvilje mod militærtjenesten var hun en krigshelt. Hun havde tilbragt sine ungdomsår i civilforsvaret under den hårde tid med belejringen af Leningrad og havde som 12-årig pige gravet skyttegrave og slæbt lig, indtil hun som 15-årig blev evakueret til Sibirien. Hendes familie boede stadig i Leningrad - mor, far, lillebror. Leningrad er en majestætisk by, kosmopolitisk og pulserende selv med krigens ar på sit ansigt. I Toronto kendte hun ingen og talte ikke sproget. Hendes år som flygtning kom til at strække sig over fire hele årtier, før hun endelig for alvor kunne føle sig som canadier.
Jeg spurgte hende, hvorfor hun ikke var blevet, og hun rystede på hovedet, som om jeg havde stillet det dummeste spørgsmål i hele verden. "Det var Sovjetunionen", sagde hun. Hun viftede med hånden, famlede efter svaret. "Papirer," sagde hun til sidst. "Vi skulle gå rundt med papirer. Politiet kunne til hver en tid standse dig og tvinge dig til at vise dine papirer." Sluseportene åbnede sig: De udspionerede dig. De tvang folk til at udspionere hinanden. Din farfar ville ikke have fået lov til at blive - han var polak, og de ville ikke have ladet ham blive hos familien i Rusland, han ville have været nødt til at tage tilbage til Polen.
Mit hoved nikkede ubevidst, mens hun fortalte mig det. Jeg vidste det hele fra hentydninger og vink, der var faldet gennem årene, men jeg havde aldrig hørt hende sige alt sammen på en gang. Jeg havde endda selv set det, da vi besøgte familien i Leningrad i 1984 og vi fik vore samtaler afbrudt, når de strejfede ind på politisk område, med blikke over skulderen efter de spioner, som kunne tænkes at lytte i forventning om at kunne melde min familie til KGB.
Et halvt århundrede senere kom familien Doctorow tilbage til Europa. Jeg slog mig ned i London, hvor jeg arbejdede for Electronic Frontier Foundation, en amerikansk borgerretsbevægelse, og kørte deres europæiske aktiviteter. Jeg var så privilegeret at få status af "højtuddannet indvandrer" (den eneste visumkategori, som jeg kunne kvalificere til givet min mangel på universitetsgrad).
Nogle år senere boede jeg sammen med min kæreste og var blevet far til en britisk datter (da jeg nævnte dette for en britisk indvandringsfunktionær i Heathrow, kaldte han hende hånligt for " en halv britisk statsborger"). Vi var ved at planlægge et kæmpemæssigt bryllup for hele familien i Toronto, da nyheden kom: Indenrigsministeren havde ensidigt og med 24 timers varsel ændret reglerne for højtuddannede indvandrere, så der nu kræves en universitetsgrad. Mine advokater bekræftede: Folk, der havde været bosat i Storbritannien i årevis, som havde skabt virksomheder her og ansat briter i dem, som ejede huse og havde født britiske børn, blev smidt ud af landet og tog deres skattepenge, arbejdspladser og familier med sig.
Min kæreste og jeg gik i panik. Vi blev gift. Vi søgte et ægtefællevisum. Et par uger senere indfandt jeg mig i Indenrigsministeriets immigrationscenter i Croydon for at afgive mine biometriske data og få et visum limet ind i mit canadiske pas. Jeg fik to års pusterum. Min familie kunne blive i Storbritannien.
Så kom sidste uges bekendtgørelse: Indehavere af ægtefællevisum ville (sammen med udenlandske studerende) øjeblikkelig få udstedt obligatoriske, biometriske, radio-aflæselige ID-kort, som vi skal have på os til hver en tid. Og så begyndte jeg at kigge mig over skulderen.
Endnu engang ser det ud til, at familien Doctorow kan blive nødt til at forlade Europa. Det ID-kort, som jeg vil få udstedt, næste gang jeg fornyr mit visum, vil være knyttet til alle mine daglige aktiviteter: Lægebesøg, brug af offentlig transport, bankforretninger, skat - én enkelt identifikator, der for altid vil følge mig gennem tid og rum. Det således indsamlede dossier vil blive administreret af de samme instanser, som alene det seneste år har mistet (bogstaveligt talt) snesevis af millioner af optegnelser om folk i Storbritannien.
Det vil alt sammen være bundet til mine biometriske data, såsom fingeraftryk. Medmindre du hele tiden har handsker på, efterlader du denne identifikation konstant, hvor du end går. Disse mærker er ikke kun til rådighed for staten og den udøvende myndighed, men for alle, der har lyst til at fjerne dem fra en hvilken som helst glat overflade, du tilfældigvis har rørt ved. Hvis denne identifikation først er kompromitteret, er der ingen måde - bortset fra amputation - hvorpå den kan ændres. Tænk på den tyske indenrigsminister Wolfgang Schäuble, som er fortaler for biometrisk ID: Hans fingeraftryk blev kopieret fra et vandglas ved en offentlig debat og offentliggjort på 10.000 stykker acetat af en gruppe provokatører uden budget, som ikke stod til at få nogen økonomisk fordel af deres aktion. Vil velforsynede identitetstyve, der kan bruge de biometriske data til at begå forbrydelser og tømme bankkonti, være mindre opfindsomme?
ID-kortet vil udsende mine personlige oplysninger til personer, som befinder sig på stor afstand fra mig, og det uden mit vidende eller samtykke. RFID-elementerne i kortet er ligesom Oyster-kort [chipbaseret kort til brug i Londons undergrundsbane, o.a.] annonceret som kun læsbare på få centimeters afstand, men ligesom for Oyster-kortet har sikkerhedseksperter påvist, at kortet kan læses på snesevis af meters afstand og kan klones ved hjælp af billigt og lettilgængeligt udstyr.
Så det er heldigt, at jeg fik mit ægtefællevisum netop da jeg gjorde, før disse identitetspapirer blev gjort obligatoriske. Faktisk er det heldigt, at jeg overhovedet fik mit ægtefællevisum, eftersom Labour planlægger at begrænse det årlige antal af nye visa af enhver art til 20.000 mennesker, hvilket betyder, at briter, som gifter sig med udlændinge, ikke længere kan være sikre på at kunne bosætte sig og opfostre deres familier i Storbritannien.
Det nationale ID-kort eksisterer ikke i et tomrum. Det er en del af en enestående og hidtil uset plan om at bruge moderne teknologi til at udspionere og kontrollere menneskers færden i Storbritannien. Vore internetforbindelser bliver censureret og aflyttet af annoncører. Snart vil vore internetudbydere blive tvunget til at registrere og gemme oplysninger om al vores aktivitet online, så regeringer, ansatte med for megen tid eller enhver forbryder, der kan hacke eller bestikke sig ind i overvågningsdatabaserne, kan snage i dem. Vores billede bliver taget hundredevis af gange, hver gang vi går uden for en dør. Vore nummerplader bliver fotograferet hundredevis af gange af trafikkameraer, hvilket skaber et kort over, hvor vi har været henne. Oplysningerne på vore Oyster-kort registreres og stilles til rådighed for politi, spioner, forbrydere og hvem der nu ellers måtte være i stand til at få fat på dem.
Vi kan anholdes og tilbageholdes i ugevis uden sigtelse. Regeringen fortæller akademikere, hvilke frit tilgængelige oplysninger om terrorister, de har lov til at studere, og hvilke, de ikke må se på.
Vi opfordres til at udspionere vore naboer og indberette deres mistænkelige aktiviteter. Vi kan blive standset og visiteret uden særlig mistanke, og under disse visitationer kan og vil politifolk undersøge sådanne ting som de bøger, vi læser, og personlige notater, vi har skrevet.
Hver eneste af disse foranstaltninger blev beta-testet på dårligt stillede grupper, før den blev rullet ud til befolkningen som helhed. Overvågningskameraer var oprindelig forbeholdt bankbokse og fængsler. Aflytning og censur af Internettet begyndte i skolerne, "for at beskytte børnene".
Nu er det så meningen, at vi indvandrere skal være betatestere for Storbritanniens blinde vandring ind i overvågningssamfundet. Vi skal gå med interne pas og pressen vil sige, "Hvis du ikke kan lide det, behøver du ikke bo her - det anstår sig ikke for en gæst at klage over gæstfrihedens vilkår." Men denne beta-test er ikke beregnet på at standse ved indvandrerne. Regeringen indrømmer åbent, at indvandrerne kun er første etape af en universel udbredelse af obligatoriske ID-kort med RFID-chips. Hvad der sker for os nu, vil ske for dig næste gang.
Skønt, ikke for mig. Hvis regeringen den dag i 2010, hvor jeg fornyer mit visum, kræver at jeg går med disse papirer som betingelse for at lade mig bo her, vil familien Doctorow igen forlade sit land og finde et andet, der er mere frit. Min kone - som er født her, opvokset her, med familie her - er med mig. Vi vil ikke opdrage vores datter i databasestaten. Det er ikke sikkert.
oversættelse sakset fra Faklen.dk
Ved krigens afslutning drog de atter vestpå, men da de nåede Rusland, fortsatte de. Da de nåede Polen, fortsatte de. De fulgte den store flygtningestrøm ind i Tyskland, til en lejr nær Hamburg (hvor min faster blev født), før de gik ombord i et flygtningeskib og sejlede til havnebyen Halifax, hvor en bureaukrat afkortede deres navne - Doctorowicz blev til Doctorow - og gav dem en togbillet til Toronto, hvor min grandonkel Max og hans familie boede.
Min farmor er stadig i live og så frisk som en havørn. Jeg spurgte hende for nylig, hvorfor de ikke blev i Sovjetunionen. Trods sin modvilje mod militærtjenesten var hun en krigshelt. Hun havde tilbragt sine ungdomsår i civilforsvaret under den hårde tid med belejringen af Leningrad og havde som 12-årig pige gravet skyttegrave og slæbt lig, indtil hun som 15-årig blev evakueret til Sibirien. Hendes familie boede stadig i Leningrad - mor, far, lillebror. Leningrad er en majestætisk by, kosmopolitisk og pulserende selv med krigens ar på sit ansigt. I Toronto kendte hun ingen og talte ikke sproget. Hendes år som flygtning kom til at strække sig over fire hele årtier, før hun endelig for alvor kunne føle sig som canadier.
Jeg spurgte hende, hvorfor hun ikke var blevet, og hun rystede på hovedet, som om jeg havde stillet det dummeste spørgsmål i hele verden. "Det var Sovjetunionen", sagde hun. Hun viftede med hånden, famlede efter svaret. "Papirer," sagde hun til sidst. "Vi skulle gå rundt med papirer. Politiet kunne til hver en tid standse dig og tvinge dig til at vise dine papirer." Sluseportene åbnede sig: De udspionerede dig. De tvang folk til at udspionere hinanden. Din farfar ville ikke have fået lov til at blive - han var polak, og de ville ikke have ladet ham blive hos familien i Rusland, han ville have været nødt til at tage tilbage til Polen.
Mit hoved nikkede ubevidst, mens hun fortalte mig det. Jeg vidste det hele fra hentydninger og vink, der var faldet gennem årene, men jeg havde aldrig hørt hende sige alt sammen på en gang. Jeg havde endda selv set det, da vi besøgte familien i Leningrad i 1984 og vi fik vore samtaler afbrudt, når de strejfede ind på politisk område, med blikke over skulderen efter de spioner, som kunne tænkes at lytte i forventning om at kunne melde min familie til KGB.
Et halvt århundrede senere kom familien Doctorow tilbage til Europa. Jeg slog mig ned i London, hvor jeg arbejdede for Electronic Frontier Foundation, en amerikansk borgerretsbevægelse, og kørte deres europæiske aktiviteter. Jeg var så privilegeret at få status af "højtuddannet indvandrer" (den eneste visumkategori, som jeg kunne kvalificere til givet min mangel på universitetsgrad).
Nogle år senere boede jeg sammen med min kæreste og var blevet far til en britisk datter (da jeg nævnte dette for en britisk indvandringsfunktionær i Heathrow, kaldte han hende hånligt for " en halv britisk statsborger"). Vi var ved at planlægge et kæmpemæssigt bryllup for hele familien i Toronto, da nyheden kom: Indenrigsministeren havde ensidigt og med 24 timers varsel ændret reglerne for højtuddannede indvandrere, så der nu kræves en universitetsgrad. Mine advokater bekræftede: Folk, der havde været bosat i Storbritannien i årevis, som havde skabt virksomheder her og ansat briter i dem, som ejede huse og havde født britiske børn, blev smidt ud af landet og tog deres skattepenge, arbejdspladser og familier med sig.
Min kæreste og jeg gik i panik. Vi blev gift. Vi søgte et ægtefællevisum. Et par uger senere indfandt jeg mig i Indenrigsministeriets immigrationscenter i Croydon for at afgive mine biometriske data og få et visum limet ind i mit canadiske pas. Jeg fik to års pusterum. Min familie kunne blive i Storbritannien.
Så kom sidste uges bekendtgørelse: Indehavere af ægtefællevisum ville (sammen med udenlandske studerende) øjeblikkelig få udstedt obligatoriske, biometriske, radio-aflæselige ID-kort, som vi skal have på os til hver en tid. Og så begyndte jeg at kigge mig over skulderen.
Endnu engang ser det ud til, at familien Doctorow kan blive nødt til at forlade Europa. Det ID-kort, som jeg vil få udstedt, næste gang jeg fornyr mit visum, vil være knyttet til alle mine daglige aktiviteter: Lægebesøg, brug af offentlig transport, bankforretninger, skat - én enkelt identifikator, der for altid vil følge mig gennem tid og rum. Det således indsamlede dossier vil blive administreret af de samme instanser, som alene det seneste år har mistet (bogstaveligt talt) snesevis af millioner af optegnelser om folk i Storbritannien.
Det vil alt sammen være bundet til mine biometriske data, såsom fingeraftryk. Medmindre du hele tiden har handsker på, efterlader du denne identifikation konstant, hvor du end går. Disse mærker er ikke kun til rådighed for staten og den udøvende myndighed, men for alle, der har lyst til at fjerne dem fra en hvilken som helst glat overflade, du tilfældigvis har rørt ved. Hvis denne identifikation først er kompromitteret, er der ingen måde - bortset fra amputation - hvorpå den kan ændres. Tænk på den tyske indenrigsminister Wolfgang Schäuble, som er fortaler for biometrisk ID: Hans fingeraftryk blev kopieret fra et vandglas ved en offentlig debat og offentliggjort på 10.000 stykker acetat af en gruppe provokatører uden budget, som ikke stod til at få nogen økonomisk fordel af deres aktion. Vil velforsynede identitetstyve, der kan bruge de biometriske data til at begå forbrydelser og tømme bankkonti, være mindre opfindsomme?
ID-kortet vil udsende mine personlige oplysninger til personer, som befinder sig på stor afstand fra mig, og det uden mit vidende eller samtykke. RFID-elementerne i kortet er ligesom Oyster-kort [chipbaseret kort til brug i Londons undergrundsbane, o.a.] annonceret som kun læsbare på få centimeters afstand, men ligesom for Oyster-kortet har sikkerhedseksperter påvist, at kortet kan læses på snesevis af meters afstand og kan klones ved hjælp af billigt og lettilgængeligt udstyr.
Så det er heldigt, at jeg fik mit ægtefællevisum netop da jeg gjorde, før disse identitetspapirer blev gjort obligatoriske. Faktisk er det heldigt, at jeg overhovedet fik mit ægtefællevisum, eftersom Labour planlægger at begrænse det årlige antal af nye visa af enhver art til 20.000 mennesker, hvilket betyder, at briter, som gifter sig med udlændinge, ikke længere kan være sikre på at kunne bosætte sig og opfostre deres familier i Storbritannien.
Det nationale ID-kort eksisterer ikke i et tomrum. Det er en del af en enestående og hidtil uset plan om at bruge moderne teknologi til at udspionere og kontrollere menneskers færden i Storbritannien. Vore internetforbindelser bliver censureret og aflyttet af annoncører. Snart vil vore internetudbydere blive tvunget til at registrere og gemme oplysninger om al vores aktivitet online, så regeringer, ansatte med for megen tid eller enhver forbryder, der kan hacke eller bestikke sig ind i overvågningsdatabaserne, kan snage i dem. Vores billede bliver taget hundredevis af gange, hver gang vi går uden for en dør. Vore nummerplader bliver fotograferet hundredevis af gange af trafikkameraer, hvilket skaber et kort over, hvor vi har været henne. Oplysningerne på vore Oyster-kort registreres og stilles til rådighed for politi, spioner, forbrydere og hvem der nu ellers måtte være i stand til at få fat på dem.
Vi kan anholdes og tilbageholdes i ugevis uden sigtelse. Regeringen fortæller akademikere, hvilke frit tilgængelige oplysninger om terrorister, de har lov til at studere, og hvilke, de ikke må se på.
Vi opfordres til at udspionere vore naboer og indberette deres mistænkelige aktiviteter. Vi kan blive standset og visiteret uden særlig mistanke, og under disse visitationer kan og vil politifolk undersøge sådanne ting som de bøger, vi læser, og personlige notater, vi har skrevet.
Hver eneste af disse foranstaltninger blev beta-testet på dårligt stillede grupper, før den blev rullet ud til befolkningen som helhed. Overvågningskameraer var oprindelig forbeholdt bankbokse og fængsler. Aflytning og censur af Internettet begyndte i skolerne, "for at beskytte børnene".
Nu er det så meningen, at vi indvandrere skal være betatestere for Storbritanniens blinde vandring ind i overvågningssamfundet. Vi skal gå med interne pas og pressen vil sige, "Hvis du ikke kan lide det, behøver du ikke bo her - det anstår sig ikke for en gæst at klage over gæstfrihedens vilkår." Men denne beta-test er ikke beregnet på at standse ved indvandrerne. Regeringen indrømmer åbent, at indvandrerne kun er første etape af en universel udbredelse af obligatoriske ID-kort med RFID-chips. Hvad der sker for os nu, vil ske for dig næste gang.
Skønt, ikke for mig. Hvis regeringen den dag i 2010, hvor jeg fornyer mit visum, kræver at jeg går med disse papirer som betingelse for at lade mig bo her, vil familien Doctorow igen forlade sit land og finde et andet, der er mere frit. Min kone - som er født her, opvokset her, med familie her - er med mig. Vi vil ikke opdrage vores datter i databasestaten. Det er ikke sikkert.
oversættelse sakset fra Faklen.dk
Americas Political Cannibalism
It is no longer our economy but our democracy that is in peril. It was the economic meltdown of Yugoslavia that gave us Slobodan Milosevic. It was the collapse of the Weimar Republic that vomited up Adolf Hitler. And it was the breakdown in czarist Russia that opened the door for Vladimir Lenin and the Bolsheviks. Financial collapses lead to political extremism. The rage bubbling up from our impoverished and disenfranchised working class, glimpsed at John McCain rallies, presages a looming and dangerous right-wing backlash.
As the public begins to grasp the depth of the betrayal and abuse by our ruling class, as the Democratic and Republican parties are exposed as craven tools of our corporate state, as savings accounts, college funds and retirement plans become worthless, as unemployment skyrockets and as home values go up in smoke we must prepare for the political resurgence of a reinvigorated radical Christian right. The engine of this mass movement-as is true for all radical movements-is personal and economic despair. And despair, in an age of increasing shortages, poverty and hopelessness, will be one of our few surplus commodities.
Karl Polanyi in his book "The Great Transformation," written in 1944, laid out the devastating consequences-the depressions, wars and totalitarianism-that grow out of a so-called self-regulated free market. He grasped that "fascism, like socialism, was rooted in a market society that refused to function." He warned that a financial system always devolved, without heavy government control, into a Mafia capitalism-and a Mafia political system-which is a good description of the American government under George W. Bush. Polanyi wrote that a self-regulating market, the kind bequeathed to us since Ronald Reagan, turned human beings and the natural environment into commodities, a situation that ensures the destruction of both society and the natural environment. He decried the free market's belief that nature and human beings are objects whose worth is determined by the market. He reminded us that a society that no longer recognizes that nature and human life have a sacred dimension, an intrinsic worth beyond monetary value, ultimately commits collective suicide. Such societies cannibalize themselves until they die. Speculative excesses and growing inequality, he wrote, always destroy the foundation for a continued prosperity.
We face an environmental meltdown as well as an economic meltdown. This would not have surprised Polanyi, who fled fascist Europe in 1933 and eventually taught at Columbia University. Russia's northern coastline has begun producing huge qualities of toxic methane gas. Scientists with the International Siberian Shelf Study 2008 describe what they saw along the coastline recently as "methane chimneys" reaching from the sea floor to the ocean's surface. Methane, locked in the permafrost of Arctic landmasses, is being released at an alarming rate as average Arctic temperatures rise. Methane is a greenhouse gas 25 times more powerful than carbon dioxide. The release of millions of tons of it will dramatically accelerate the rate of global warming.
Those who run our corporate state have fought environmental regulation as tenaciously as they have fought financial regulation. They are responsible, as Polanyi predicted, for our personal impoverishment and the impoverishment of our ecosystem. We remain addicted, courtesy of the oil, gas and automobile industries and a corporate- controlled government, to fossil fuels. Species are vanishing. Fish stocks are depleted. The great human migration from coastlines and deserts has begun. And as temperatures continue to rise, huge parts of the globe will become uninhabitable. The continued release of large quantities of methane, some scientists have warned, could actually asphyxiate the human species.
The corporate con artists and criminals who have hijacked our state and rigged our financial system still speak to us in the obscure and incomprehensible language coined by specialists at elite business schools. They use terms like securitization, deleveraging, structured investment vehicles and credit default swaps. The reality, once you throw out their obnoxious jargon, is not hard to grasp. Banks lent too much money to people and financial institutions that could not pay it back. These banks are now going broke. The government is frantically giving taxpayer dollars to banks so they can be solvent and again lend money. It is not working. Bank lending remains frozen. There are ominous signs that the government may not be able to hand over enough of our money because the losses incurred by these speculators are too massive. If credit markets remain in a deep freeze, corporations such as AT&T, Ford and General Motors might go bankrupt. The downward spiral could spread like a tidal wave across the country, especially since our corporate elite, including Barack Obama, seem to have no real intention of bailing out families who can no longer pay their mortgages or credit card debts.
Lenin said that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch its currency. If our financial disaster continues there will be a widespread loss of faith in the mechanisms that regulate society. If our money becomes worthless, so does our government. All traditional standards and beliefs are shattered in a severe economic crisis. The moral order is turned upside down. The honest and industrious are wiped out while the gangsters, profiteers and speculators amass millions. Look at Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld. He walks away from his bankrupt investment house after pocketing $485 million. His investors are wiped out. An economic collapse does not only mean the degradation of trade and commerce, food shortages, bankruptcies and unemployment; it means the systematic dynamiting of the foundations of a society. I watched this happen in Yugoslavia. I fear I am watching it happen here in the United States.
The Patriot Act, the FISA Reform Act, the suspension of habeas corpus, the open use of torture in our offshore penal colonies, the stationing of a combat brigade on American soil, the seas of surveillance cameras, the brutal assaults against activists in Denver and St. Paul are converging to determine our future. Those dark forces arrayed against American democracy are waiting for a moment to strike, a national crisis that will allow them in the name of national security and moral renewal to shred the Constitution. They have the tools. They will use fear, chaos, the hatred for the ruling elites and the specter of left-wing dissent and terrorism to impose draconian controls to extinguish our democracy. And while they do it they will be waving the American flag, singing patriotic slogans and clutching the Christian cross. Fuld, I expect, will be one of many corporatists happy to contribute to the cause.
This is a defining moment in American history. The next few weeks and months will see us stabilize and weather this crisis or descend into a terrifying dystopia. I place no hope in Obama or the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is a pathetic example of liberal, bourgeois impotence, hypocrisy and complacency. It has been bought off. I will vote, if only as a form of protest against our corporate state and an homage to Polanyi's brilliance, for Ralph Nader. I would like to offer hope, but it is more important to be a realist. No ethic or act of resistance is worth anything if it is not based on the real. And the real, I am afraid, does not look good.
As the public begins to grasp the depth of the betrayal and abuse by our ruling class, as the Democratic and Republican parties are exposed as craven tools of our corporate state, as savings accounts, college funds and retirement plans become worthless, as unemployment skyrockets and as home values go up in smoke we must prepare for the political resurgence of a reinvigorated radical Christian right. The engine of this mass movement-as is true for all radical movements-is personal and economic despair. And despair, in an age of increasing shortages, poverty and hopelessness, will be one of our few surplus commodities.
Karl Polanyi in his book "The Great Transformation," written in 1944, laid out the devastating consequences-the depressions, wars and totalitarianism-that grow out of a so-called self-regulated free market. He grasped that "fascism, like socialism, was rooted in a market society that refused to function." He warned that a financial system always devolved, without heavy government control, into a Mafia capitalism-and a Mafia political system-which is a good description of the American government under George W. Bush. Polanyi wrote that a self-regulating market, the kind bequeathed to us since Ronald Reagan, turned human beings and the natural environment into commodities, a situation that ensures the destruction of both society and the natural environment. He decried the free market's belief that nature and human beings are objects whose worth is determined by the market. He reminded us that a society that no longer recognizes that nature and human life have a sacred dimension, an intrinsic worth beyond monetary value, ultimately commits collective suicide. Such societies cannibalize themselves until they die. Speculative excesses and growing inequality, he wrote, always destroy the foundation for a continued prosperity.
We face an environmental meltdown as well as an economic meltdown. This would not have surprised Polanyi, who fled fascist Europe in 1933 and eventually taught at Columbia University. Russia's northern coastline has begun producing huge qualities of toxic methane gas. Scientists with the International Siberian Shelf Study 2008 describe what they saw along the coastline recently as "methane chimneys" reaching from the sea floor to the ocean's surface. Methane, locked in the permafrost of Arctic landmasses, is being released at an alarming rate as average Arctic temperatures rise. Methane is a greenhouse gas 25 times more powerful than carbon dioxide. The release of millions of tons of it will dramatically accelerate the rate of global warming.
Those who run our corporate state have fought environmental regulation as tenaciously as they have fought financial regulation. They are responsible, as Polanyi predicted, for our personal impoverishment and the impoverishment of our ecosystem. We remain addicted, courtesy of the oil, gas and automobile industries and a corporate- controlled government, to fossil fuels. Species are vanishing. Fish stocks are depleted. The great human migration from coastlines and deserts has begun. And as temperatures continue to rise, huge parts of the globe will become uninhabitable. The continued release of large quantities of methane, some scientists have warned, could actually asphyxiate the human species.
The corporate con artists and criminals who have hijacked our state and rigged our financial system still speak to us in the obscure and incomprehensible language coined by specialists at elite business schools. They use terms like securitization, deleveraging, structured investment vehicles and credit default swaps. The reality, once you throw out their obnoxious jargon, is not hard to grasp. Banks lent too much money to people and financial institutions that could not pay it back. These banks are now going broke. The government is frantically giving taxpayer dollars to banks so they can be solvent and again lend money. It is not working. Bank lending remains frozen. There are ominous signs that the government may not be able to hand over enough of our money because the losses incurred by these speculators are too massive. If credit markets remain in a deep freeze, corporations such as AT&T, Ford and General Motors might go bankrupt. The downward spiral could spread like a tidal wave across the country, especially since our corporate elite, including Barack Obama, seem to have no real intention of bailing out families who can no longer pay their mortgages or credit card debts.
Lenin said that the best way to destroy the capitalist system was to debauch its currency. If our financial disaster continues there will be a widespread loss of faith in the mechanisms that regulate society. If our money becomes worthless, so does our government. All traditional standards and beliefs are shattered in a severe economic crisis. The moral order is turned upside down. The honest and industrious are wiped out while the gangsters, profiteers and speculators amass millions. Look at Lehman Brothers CEO Richard Fuld. He walks away from his bankrupt investment house after pocketing $485 million. His investors are wiped out. An economic collapse does not only mean the degradation of trade and commerce, food shortages, bankruptcies and unemployment; it means the systematic dynamiting of the foundations of a society. I watched this happen in Yugoslavia. I fear I am watching it happen here in the United States.
The Patriot Act, the FISA Reform Act, the suspension of habeas corpus, the open use of torture in our offshore penal colonies, the stationing of a combat brigade on American soil, the seas of surveillance cameras, the brutal assaults against activists in Denver and St. Paul are converging to determine our future. Those dark forces arrayed against American democracy are waiting for a moment to strike, a national crisis that will allow them in the name of national security and moral renewal to shred the Constitution. They have the tools. They will use fear, chaos, the hatred for the ruling elites and the specter of left-wing dissent and terrorism to impose draconian controls to extinguish our democracy. And while they do it they will be waving the American flag, singing patriotic slogans and clutching the Christian cross. Fuld, I expect, will be one of many corporatists happy to contribute to the cause.
This is a defining moment in American history. The next few weeks and months will see us stabilize and weather this crisis or descend into a terrifying dystopia. I place no hope in Obama or the Democratic Party. The Democratic Party is a pathetic example of liberal, bourgeois impotence, hypocrisy and complacency. It has been bought off. I will vote, if only as a form of protest against our corporate state and an homage to Polanyi's brilliance, for Ralph Nader. I would like to offer hope, but it is more important to be a realist. No ethic or act of resistance is worth anything if it is not based on the real. And the real, I am afraid, does not look good.
Få kender til Verdensugen for forældreløse.
October 11 marked the end of World Orphan Week. With 133 million orphans in the world today, most in Africa, Asia and Latin America, and 15 million of them orphaned due to HIV/AIDS (according to SOS Children) we have a moral responsibility to ensure the basic needs orphans around the World. These needs include health, education and welfare. Addressing poverty issues in the various regions particularly populated with high levels of orphaned or abandoned children is being done by various organizations which all need our help.
There are numerous such organizations of which I have chosen to focus on a few. One particular one that is prominent for both addressing needs and informing the public with it's regularly updated website is SOS Children's Villages, www.soschildren.org . They regularly update their website with informative on conditions and events concerning orphans and current situations and events that may effect the wellbeing of children in need. Their website is essential for receiving the latest information as related to this issue. Another organization that I have been following for a few years now is the Christina Noble Children's Foundation based in Vietnam. Christina Noble, an Irish woman who relocated to Vietnam to set up an orphanage in 1989. Her story and the story of the Christina Noble Children's Foundation can be discovered in her excellent book, "Nobody's Child", a must read. She has orphanages established in Vietnam and Mongolia. Her website is www.cncf.org . Another orphanage organization based primarily in India is the Raina Foundation. I know a bit less about them but they have an informative website at www.rainafoundation.com . Unwanted girls in India are in particularly heart breaking situations because of some of the cultural attitudes of some Indians.
Another important organization is Oxfam International. While orphans are not their primary focus their focus on poverty issues directly impacts those most in need that frequently turns out to be orphans. Oxfam says "we believe we can end poverty and injustice as part of a Global movement for change". They combat poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy. Oxfam is certainly one of the best of the International organizations. Their website is www.oxfam.org . Let me know of organizations you think are particularly good at addressing the issue and needs of orphans.
There are numerous such organizations of which I have chosen to focus on a few. One particular one that is prominent for both addressing needs and informing the public with it's regularly updated website is SOS Children's Villages, www.soschildren.org . They regularly update their website with informative on conditions and events concerning orphans and current situations and events that may effect the wellbeing of children in need. Their website is essential for receiving the latest information as related to this issue. Another organization that I have been following for a few years now is the Christina Noble Children's Foundation based in Vietnam. Christina Noble, an Irish woman who relocated to Vietnam to set up an orphanage in 1989. Her story and the story of the Christina Noble Children's Foundation can be discovered in her excellent book, "Nobody's Child", a must read. She has orphanages established in Vietnam and Mongolia. Her website is www.cncf.org . Another orphanage organization based primarily in India is the Raina Foundation. I know a bit less about them but they have an informative website at www.rainafoundation.com . Unwanted girls in India are in particularly heart breaking situations because of some of the cultural attitudes of some Indians.
Another important organization is Oxfam International. While orphans are not their primary focus their focus on poverty issues directly impacts those most in need that frequently turns out to be orphans. Oxfam says "we believe we can end poverty and injustice as part of a Global movement for change". They combat poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy. Oxfam is certainly one of the best of the International organizations. Their website is www.oxfam.org . Let me know of organizations you think are particularly good at addressing the issue and needs of orphans.
søndag den 12. oktober 2008
The Financial Tsunami: Sub-Prime Mortgage Debt is but the Tip of the Iceberg
Part 1: Deutsche Bank’s painful lesson
Even experienced banker friends tell me that they think the worst of the US banking troubles are over and that things are slowly getting back to normal. What is lacking in their rosy optimism is the realization of the scale of the ongoing deterioration in credit markets globally, centered in the American asset-backed securities market, and especially in the market for CDO’s—Collateralized Debt Obligations and CMO’s—Collateralized Mortgage Obligations. By now every serious reader has heard the term “It’s a crisis in Sub-Prime US home mortgage debt.” What almost no one I know understands is that the Sub-Prime problem is but the tip of a colossal iceberg that is in a slow meltdown. I offer one recent example to illustrate my point that the “Financial Tsunami” is only beginning.
Deutsche Bank got a hard shock a few days ago when a judge in the state of Ohio in the USA made a ruling that the bank had no legal right to foreclose on 14 homes whose owners had failed to keep current in their monthly mortgage payments. Now this might sound like small beer for Deutsche Bank, one of the world’s largest banks with over €1.1 trillion (Billionen) in assets worldwide. As Hilmar Kopper used to say, “peanuts.” It’s not at all peanuts, however, for the Anglo-Saxon banking world and its European allies like Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, HSBC or others. Why?
A US Federal Judge, C.A. Boyko in Federal District Court in Cleveland Ohio ruled to dismiss a claim by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. DB’s US subsidiary was seeking to take possession of 14 homes from Cleveland residents living in them, in order to claim the assets.
Here comes the hair in the soup. The Judge asked DB to show documents proving legal title to the 14 homes. DB could not. All DB attorneys could show was a document showing only an “intent to convey the rights in the mortgages.” They could not produce the actual mortgage, the heart of Western property rights since the Magna Charta of not longer.
Again why could Deutsche Bank not show the 14 mortgages on the 14 homes? Because they live in the exotic new world of “global securitization”, where banks like DB or Citigroup buy tens of thousands of mortgages from small local lending banks, “bundle” them into Jumbo new securities which then are rated by Moody’s or Standard & Poors or Fitch, and sell them as bonds to pension funds or other banks or private investors who naively believed they were buying bonds rated AAA, the highest, and never realized that their “bundle” of say 1,000 different home mortgages, contained maybe 20% or 200 mortgages rated “sub-prime,” i.e. of dubious credit quality.
Indeed the profits being earned in the past seven years by the world’s largest financial players from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley to HSBC, Chase, and yes, Deutsche Bank, were so staggering, few bothered to open the risk models used by the professionals who bundled the mortgages. Certainly not the Big Three rating companies who had a criminal conflict of interest in giving top debt ratings. That changed abruptly last August and since then the major banks have issued one after another report of disastrous “sub-prime” losses.
A new unexpected factor
The Ohio ruling that dismissed DB’s claim to foreclose and take back the 14 homes for non-payment, is far more than bad luck for the bank of Josef Ackermann. It is an earth-shaking precedent for all banks holding what they had thought were collateral in form of real estate property.
How this? Because of the complex structure of asset-backed securities and the widely dispersed ownership of mortgage securities (not actual mortgages but the securities based on same) no one is yet able to identify who precisely holds the physical mortgage document. Oops! A tiny legal detail our Wall Street Rocket Scientist derivatives experts ignored when they were bundling and issuing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CMO’s in the past six or seven years. As of January 2007 some $6.5 trillion of securitized mortgage debt was outstanding in the United States. That’s a lot by any measure!
In the Ohio case Deutsche Bank is acting as “Trustee” for “securitization pools” or groups of disparate investors who may reside anywhere. But the Trustee never got the legal document known as the mortgage. Judge Boyko ordered DB to prove they were the owners of the mortgages or notes and they could not. DB could only argue that the banks had foreclosed on such cases for years without challenge. The Judge then declared that the banks “seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally put to the test,” the Judge concluded, “their weak legal arguments compel the court to stop them at the gate.” Deutsche Bank has refused comment.
What next?
As news of this legal precedent spreads across the USA like a California brushfire, hundreds of thousands of struggling homeowners who took the bait in times of historically low interest rates to buy a home with often, no money paid down, and the first 2 years with extremely low interest rate in what are known as “interest only” Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), now face exploding mortgage monthly payments at just the point the US economy is sinking into severe recession. (I regret the plethora of abbreviations used here but it is the fault of Wall Street bankers not this author).
The peak period of the US real estate bubble which began in about 2002 when Alan Greenspan began the most aggressive series of rate cuts in Federal Reserve history was 2005-2006. Greenspan’s intent, as he admitted at the time, was to replace the Dot.com internet stock bubble with a real estate home investment and lending bubble. He argued that was the only way to keep the US economy from deep recession. In retrospect a recession in 2002 would have been far milder and less damaging than what we now face.
Of course, Greenspan has since safely retired, written his memoirs and handed the control (and blame) of the mess over to a young ex-Princeton professor, Ben Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can say I would never trust monetary policy for the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a Princeton economics professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered towers.
Now the last phase of every speculative bubble is the one where the animal juices get the most excited. This has been the case with every major speculative bubble since the Holland Tulip speculation of the 1630’s to the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the 1929 Wall Street crash. It was true as well with the US 2002-2007 Real Estate bubble. In the last two years of the boom in selling real estate loans, banks were convinced they could resell the mortgage loans to a Wall Street financial house who would bundle it with thousands of good better and worse quality mortgage loans and resell them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligation bonds. In the flush of greed, banks became increasingly reckless of the credit worthiness of the prospective home owners. In many cases they did not even bother to check if the person was employed. Who cares? It will be resold and securitized and the risk of mortgage default was historically low.
That was in 2005. The most Sub-prime mortgages written with Adjustable Rate Mortgage contracts were written between 2005-2006, the last and most furious phase of the US bubble. Now a whole new wave of mortgage defaults is about to explode onto the scene beginning January 2008. Between December 2007 and July 1, 2008 more than $690 Billion in mortgages will face an interest rate jump according to the contract terms of the ARMs written two years before. That means market interest rates for those mortgages will explode monthly payments just as recession drives incomes down. Hundreds of thousands of homeowners will be forced to do the last resort of any homeowner: stop monthly mortgage payments.
Here is where the Ohio court decision guarantees that the next phase of the US mortgage crisis will assume Tsunami dimension. If the Ohio Deutsche Bank precedent holds in the appeal to the Supreme Court, millions of homes will be in default but the banks prevented from seizing them as collateral assets to resell. Robert Shiller of Yale, the controversial and often correct author of the book, Irrational Exuberance, predicting the 2001-2 Dot.com stock crash, estimates US housing prices could fall as much as 50% in some areas given how home prices have diverged relative to rents.
The $690 billion worth of “interest only” ARMs due for interest rate hike between now and July 2008 are by and large not Sub-prime but a little higher quality, but only just. There are a total of $1.4 trillion in “interest only” ARMs according to the US research firm, First American Loan Performance. A recent study calculates that, as these ARMs face staggering higher interest costs in the next 9 months, more than $325 billion of the loans will default leaving 1 million property owners in technical mortgage default. But if banks are unable to reclaim the homes as assets to offset the non-performing mortgages, the US banking system and a chunk of the global banking system faces a financial gridlock that will make events to date truly “peanuts” by comparison. We will discuss the global geo-political implications of this in our next report, The Financial Tsunami: Part 2.
F. William Engdahl is the author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). His most recent book, which has just been released by Global Research is Seeds of Destruction, The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation.
Even experienced banker friends tell me that they think the worst of the US banking troubles are over and that things are slowly getting back to normal. What is lacking in their rosy optimism is the realization of the scale of the ongoing deterioration in credit markets globally, centered in the American asset-backed securities market, and especially in the market for CDO’s—Collateralized Debt Obligations and CMO’s—Collateralized Mortgage Obligations. By now every serious reader has heard the term “It’s a crisis in Sub-Prime US home mortgage debt.” What almost no one I know understands is that the Sub-Prime problem is but the tip of a colossal iceberg that is in a slow meltdown. I offer one recent example to illustrate my point that the “Financial Tsunami” is only beginning.
Deutsche Bank got a hard shock a few days ago when a judge in the state of Ohio in the USA made a ruling that the bank had no legal right to foreclose on 14 homes whose owners had failed to keep current in their monthly mortgage payments. Now this might sound like small beer for Deutsche Bank, one of the world’s largest banks with over €1.1 trillion (Billionen) in assets worldwide. As Hilmar Kopper used to say, “peanuts.” It’s not at all peanuts, however, for the Anglo-Saxon banking world and its European allies like Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays Bank, HSBC or others. Why?
A US Federal Judge, C.A. Boyko in Federal District Court in Cleveland Ohio ruled to dismiss a claim by Deutsche Bank National Trust Company. DB’s US subsidiary was seeking to take possession of 14 homes from Cleveland residents living in them, in order to claim the assets.
Here comes the hair in the soup. The Judge asked DB to show documents proving legal title to the 14 homes. DB could not. All DB attorneys could show was a document showing only an “intent to convey the rights in the mortgages.” They could not produce the actual mortgage, the heart of Western property rights since the Magna Charta of not longer.
Again why could Deutsche Bank not show the 14 mortgages on the 14 homes? Because they live in the exotic new world of “global securitization”, where banks like DB or Citigroup buy tens of thousands of mortgages from small local lending banks, “bundle” them into Jumbo new securities which then are rated by Moody’s or Standard & Poors or Fitch, and sell them as bonds to pension funds or other banks or private investors who naively believed they were buying bonds rated AAA, the highest, and never realized that their “bundle” of say 1,000 different home mortgages, contained maybe 20% or 200 mortgages rated “sub-prime,” i.e. of dubious credit quality.
Indeed the profits being earned in the past seven years by the world’s largest financial players from Goldman Sachs to Morgan Stanley to HSBC, Chase, and yes, Deutsche Bank, were so staggering, few bothered to open the risk models used by the professionals who bundled the mortgages. Certainly not the Big Three rating companies who had a criminal conflict of interest in giving top debt ratings. That changed abruptly last August and since then the major banks have issued one after another report of disastrous “sub-prime” losses.
A new unexpected factor
The Ohio ruling that dismissed DB’s claim to foreclose and take back the 14 homes for non-payment, is far more than bad luck for the bank of Josef Ackermann. It is an earth-shaking precedent for all banks holding what they had thought were collateral in form of real estate property.
How this? Because of the complex structure of asset-backed securities and the widely dispersed ownership of mortgage securities (not actual mortgages but the securities based on same) no one is yet able to identify who precisely holds the physical mortgage document. Oops! A tiny legal detail our Wall Street Rocket Scientist derivatives experts ignored when they were bundling and issuing hundreds of billions of dollars worth of CMO’s in the past six or seven years. As of January 2007 some $6.5 trillion of securitized mortgage debt was outstanding in the United States. That’s a lot by any measure!
In the Ohio case Deutsche Bank is acting as “Trustee” for “securitization pools” or groups of disparate investors who may reside anywhere. But the Trustee never got the legal document known as the mortgage. Judge Boyko ordered DB to prove they were the owners of the mortgages or notes and they could not. DB could only argue that the banks had foreclosed on such cases for years without challenge. The Judge then declared that the banks “seem to adopt the attitude that since they have been doing this for so long, unchallenged, this practice equates with legal compliance. Finally put to the test,” the Judge concluded, “their weak legal arguments compel the court to stop them at the gate.” Deutsche Bank has refused comment.
What next?
As news of this legal precedent spreads across the USA like a California brushfire, hundreds of thousands of struggling homeowners who took the bait in times of historically low interest rates to buy a home with often, no money paid down, and the first 2 years with extremely low interest rate in what are known as “interest only” Adjustable Rate Mortgages (ARMs), now face exploding mortgage monthly payments at just the point the US economy is sinking into severe recession. (I regret the plethora of abbreviations used here but it is the fault of Wall Street bankers not this author).
The peak period of the US real estate bubble which began in about 2002 when Alan Greenspan began the most aggressive series of rate cuts in Federal Reserve history was 2005-2006. Greenspan’s intent, as he admitted at the time, was to replace the Dot.com internet stock bubble with a real estate home investment and lending bubble. He argued that was the only way to keep the US economy from deep recession. In retrospect a recession in 2002 would have been far milder and less damaging than what we now face.
Of course, Greenspan has since safely retired, written his memoirs and handed the control (and blame) of the mess over to a young ex-Princeton professor, Ben Bernanke. As a Princeton graduate, I can say I would never trust monetary policy for the world’s most powerful central bank in the hands of a Princeton economics professor. Keep them in their ivy-covered towers.
Now the last phase of every speculative bubble is the one where the animal juices get the most excited. This has been the case with every major speculative bubble since the Holland Tulip speculation of the 1630’s to the South Sea Bubble of 1720 to the 1929 Wall Street crash. It was true as well with the US 2002-2007 Real Estate bubble. In the last two years of the boom in selling real estate loans, banks were convinced they could resell the mortgage loans to a Wall Street financial house who would bundle it with thousands of good better and worse quality mortgage loans and resell them as Collateralized Mortgage Obligation bonds. In the flush of greed, banks became increasingly reckless of the credit worthiness of the prospective home owners. In many cases they did not even bother to check if the person was employed. Who cares? It will be resold and securitized and the risk of mortgage default was historically low.
That was in 2005. The most Sub-prime mortgages written with Adjustable Rate Mortgage contracts were written between 2005-2006, the last and most furious phase of the US bubble. Now a whole new wave of mortgage defaults is about to explode onto the scene beginning January 2008. Between December 2007 and July 1, 2008 more than $690 Billion in mortgages will face an interest rate jump according to the contract terms of the ARMs written two years before. That means market interest rates for those mortgages will explode monthly payments just as recession drives incomes down. Hundreds of thousands of homeowners will be forced to do the last resort of any homeowner: stop monthly mortgage payments.
Here is where the Ohio court decision guarantees that the next phase of the US mortgage crisis will assume Tsunami dimension. If the Ohio Deutsche Bank precedent holds in the appeal to the Supreme Court, millions of homes will be in default but the banks prevented from seizing them as collateral assets to resell. Robert Shiller of Yale, the controversial and often correct author of the book, Irrational Exuberance, predicting the 2001-2 Dot.com stock crash, estimates US housing prices could fall as much as 50% in some areas given how home prices have diverged relative to rents.
The $690 billion worth of “interest only” ARMs due for interest rate hike between now and July 2008 are by and large not Sub-prime but a little higher quality, but only just. There are a total of $1.4 trillion in “interest only” ARMs according to the US research firm, First American Loan Performance. A recent study calculates that, as these ARMs face staggering higher interest costs in the next 9 months, more than $325 billion of the loans will default leaving 1 million property owners in technical mortgage default. But if banks are unable to reclaim the homes as assets to offset the non-performing mortgages, the US banking system and a chunk of the global banking system faces a financial gridlock that will make events to date truly “peanuts” by comparison. We will discuss the global geo-political implications of this in our next report, The Financial Tsunami: Part 2.
F. William Engdahl is the author of A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG). His most recent book, which has just been released by Global Research is Seeds of Destruction, The Hidden Agenda of Genetic Manipulation.
Slavoj Žižek: Don’t Just Do Something, Talk
One of the most striking things about the reaction to the current financial meltdown is that, as one of the participants put it: ‘No one really knows what to do.’ The reason is that expectations are part of the game: how the market reacts to a particular intervention depends not only on how much bankers and traders trust the interventions, but even more on how much they think others will trust them. Keynes compared the stock market to a competition in which the participants have to pick several pretty girls from a hundred photographs: ‘It is not a case of choosing those which, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those which average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligence to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be.‘ We are forced to make choices without having the knowledge that would enable us to make them; or, as John Gray has put it: ‘We are forced to live as if we were free.’
Joseph Stiglitz recently wrote that, although there is a growing consensus among economists that any bailout based on Henry Paulson’s plan won’t work, ‘it is impossible for politicians to do nothing in such a crisis. So we may have to pray that an agreement crafted with the toxic mix of special interests, misguided economics and right-wing ideologies that produced the crisis can somehow produce a rescue plan that works – or whose failure doesn’t do too much damage.’ He’s right: since markets are effectively based on beliefs (even beliefs about other people’s beliefs), how the markets react to the bailout depends not only on its real consequences, but on the belief of the markets in the plan’s efficiency. The bailout may work even if it is economically wrong.
There is a close similarity between the speeches George W. Bush has given since the crisis began and his addresses to the American people after 9/11. Both times, he evoked the threat to the American way of life and the necessity of fast and decisive action to cope with the danger. Both times, he called for the partial suspension of American values (guarantees of individual freedom, market capitalism) in order to save the same values.
Faced with a disaster over which we have no real influence, people will often say, stupidly, ‘Don’t just talk, do something!’ Perhaps, lately, we have been doing too much. Maybe it is time to step back, think and say the right thing. True, we often talk about doing something instead of actually doing it – but sometimes we do things in order to avoid talking and thinking about them. Like quickly throwing $700 billion at a problem instead of reflecting on how it came about.
On 23 September, the Republican senator Jim Bunning called the US Treasury’s plan for the biggest financial bailout since the Great Depression ‘un-American’:
Someone must take those losses. We can either let the people who made bad decisions bear the consequences of their actions, or we can spread that pain to others. And that is exactly what the Secretary proposes to do: take Wall Street’s pain and spread it to the taxpayers . . . This massive bailout is not the solution, it is financial socialism, and it is un-American.
Bunning was the first publicly to give the reasoning behind the GOP revolt against the bailout plan, which climaxed in its rejection on 29 September. The resistance was formulated in terms of ‘class warfare’, Wall Street against Main Street: why should we help those responsible (‘Wall Street’) and let ordinary borrowers (on ‘Main Street’) pay the price for it? Is this not a clear case of what economists call ‘moral hazard’? This is the risk that someone will behave immorally because insurance, the law or some other agency protects them against any loss that his behaviour might cause: if I am insured against fire, for example, I might take fewer fire precautions (or even burn down my premises if they are losing me money). The same goes for big banks, which are protected against big losses yet able to retain their profits.
That the criticism of the bailout plan came from conservative Republicans as well as the left should make us think. What left and right share in this case is their contempt for big speculators and corporate managers who profit from risky decisions but are protected from failures by ‘golden parachutes’. In this respect, the Enron scandal of January 2002 can be interpreted as an ironic commentary on the notion of a risk society. Thousands of employees who lost their jobs and savings were certainly exposed to risk, and had little choice in the matter. However, the top managers, who knew about the risk and also had the opportunity to intervene in the situation, minimised their exposure by cashing in their stocks and options before the bankruptcy. So while it is true that we live in a society that demands risky choices, it is one in which the powerful do the choosing, while others do the risking.
If the bailout plan really is a ‘socialist’ measure, it is a very peculiar one: a ‘socialist’ measure whose aim is to help not the poor but the rich, not those who borrow but those who lend. ‘Socialism’ is OK, it seems, when it serves to save capitalism. But what if ‘moral hazard’ is inscribed in the fundamental structure of capitalism? The problem is that there is no way to separate the welfare of Main Street from that of Wall Street. Their relationship is non-transitive: what is good for Wall Street isn’t necessarily good for Main Street, but Main Street can’t thrive if Wall Street isn’t doing well – and this asymmetry gives an a priori advantage to Wall Street.
The standard ‘trickle-down’ argument against redistribution (through progressive taxation etc) is that instead of making the poor richer, it makes the rich poorer. However, this apparently anti-interventionist attitude actually contains an argument for the current state intervention: although we all want the poor to get better, it is counter-productive to help them directly, since they are not the dynamic and productive element; the only intervention needed is to help the rich get richer, and then the profits will automatically spread down to the poor. Throw enough money at Wall Street, and it will eventually trickle down to Main Street. If you want people to have money to build, don’t give it to them directly, help those who are lending it to them. This is the only way to create genuine prosperity – otherwise, the state is merely distributing money to the needy at the expense of those who create wealth.
It is all too easy to dismiss this line of reasoning as a hypocritical defence of the rich. The problem is that as long as we are stuck with capitalism, there is a truth in it: the collapse of Wall Street really will hit ordinary workers. That is why the Democrats who supported the bailout were not being inconsistent with their leftist leanings. They would fairly be called inconsistent only if we accept the premise of Republican populists that capitalism and the free market economy are a popular, working-class affair, while state interventions are an upper-class strategy to exploit hard-working ordinary people.
There is nothing new in strong state interventions into the banking system and the economy in general. The meltdown itself is the result of such an intervention: when, in 2001, the dotcom bubble burst, it was decided to make it easier to get credit in order to redirect growth into housing. Indeed, political decisions are responsible for the texture of international economic relations in general. A couple of years ago, a CNN report on Mali described the reality of the international ‘free market’. The two pillars of the Mali economy are cotton in the south and cattle in the north, and both are in trouble because of the way that Western powers violate the same rules that they impose so brutally on Third World nations. Mali produces cotton of the highest quality, but the US government spends more money to support its cotton farmers than the entire state budget of Mali, so it is small wonder that Mali can’t compete. In the north, the European Union is the culprit: the EU subsidises every single cow to the tune of five hundred euros a year. The Mali minister for the economy said: we don’t need your help or advice or lectures on the beneficial effects of abolishing excessive state regulations; just, please, stick to your own rules about the free market and our troubles will be over. Where are the Republican defenders of the free market here? Nowhere, because the collapse of Mali is the consequence of what it means for the US to put ‘our country first’.
What all this indicates is that the market is never neutral: its operations are always regulated by political decisions. The real dilemma is not ‘state intervention or not?’ but ‘what kind of state intervention?’ And this is true politics: the struggle to define the conditions that govern our lives. The debate about the bailout deals with decisions about the fundamental features of our social and economic life, even mobilising the ghost of class struggle. As with many truly political issues, this one is non-partisan. There is no ‘objective’ expert position that should simply be applied: one has to take a political decision.
On 24 September, John McCain suspended his campaign and went to Washington, proclaiming that it was time to put aside party differences. Was this gesture really a sign of his readiness to end partisan politics in order to deal with the real problems that concern us all? Definitely not: it was a ‘Mr McCain goes to Washington’ moment. Politics is precisely the struggle to define the ‘neutral’ terrain, which is why McCain’s proposal to reach across party lines was pure political posturing, a partisan politics in the guise of non-partisanship, a desperate attempt to impose his position as universal-apolitical. What is even worse than ‘partisan politics’ is a partisan politics that tries to mask itself as non-partisan: by imposing itself as the voice of the Whole, such a politics reduces its opponents by making them agents of particular interests.
This is why Obama was right to reject McCain’s call to postpone the first presidential debate and to point out that the meltdown makes a political debate about how the two candidates would handle the crisis all the more urgent. In the 1992 election, Clinton won with the motto ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ The Democrats need to get a new message across: ‘It’s the POLITICAL economy, stupid!’ The US doesn’t need less politics, it needs more.
Joseph Stiglitz recently wrote that, although there is a growing consensus among economists that any bailout based on Henry Paulson’s plan won’t work, ‘it is impossible for politicians to do nothing in such a crisis. So we may have to pray that an agreement crafted with the toxic mix of special interests, misguided economics and right-wing ideologies that produced the crisis can somehow produce a rescue plan that works – or whose failure doesn’t do too much damage.’ He’s right: since markets are effectively based on beliefs (even beliefs about other people’s beliefs), how the markets react to the bailout depends not only on its real consequences, but on the belief of the markets in the plan’s efficiency. The bailout may work even if it is economically wrong.
There is a close similarity between the speeches George W. Bush has given since the crisis began and his addresses to the American people after 9/11. Both times, he evoked the threat to the American way of life and the necessity of fast and decisive action to cope with the danger. Both times, he called for the partial suspension of American values (guarantees of individual freedom, market capitalism) in order to save the same values.
Faced with a disaster over which we have no real influence, people will often say, stupidly, ‘Don’t just talk, do something!’ Perhaps, lately, we have been doing too much. Maybe it is time to step back, think and say the right thing. True, we often talk about doing something instead of actually doing it – but sometimes we do things in order to avoid talking and thinking about them. Like quickly throwing $700 billion at a problem instead of reflecting on how it came about.
On 23 September, the Republican senator Jim Bunning called the US Treasury’s plan for the biggest financial bailout since the Great Depression ‘un-American’:
Someone must take those losses. We can either let the people who made bad decisions bear the consequences of their actions, or we can spread that pain to others. And that is exactly what the Secretary proposes to do: take Wall Street’s pain and spread it to the taxpayers . . . This massive bailout is not the solution, it is financial socialism, and it is un-American.
Bunning was the first publicly to give the reasoning behind the GOP revolt against the bailout plan, which climaxed in its rejection on 29 September. The resistance was formulated in terms of ‘class warfare’, Wall Street against Main Street: why should we help those responsible (‘Wall Street’) and let ordinary borrowers (on ‘Main Street’) pay the price for it? Is this not a clear case of what economists call ‘moral hazard’? This is the risk that someone will behave immorally because insurance, the law or some other agency protects them against any loss that his behaviour might cause: if I am insured against fire, for example, I might take fewer fire precautions (or even burn down my premises if they are losing me money). The same goes for big banks, which are protected against big losses yet able to retain their profits.
That the criticism of the bailout plan came from conservative Republicans as well as the left should make us think. What left and right share in this case is their contempt for big speculators and corporate managers who profit from risky decisions but are protected from failures by ‘golden parachutes’. In this respect, the Enron scandal of January 2002 can be interpreted as an ironic commentary on the notion of a risk society. Thousands of employees who lost their jobs and savings were certainly exposed to risk, and had little choice in the matter. However, the top managers, who knew about the risk and also had the opportunity to intervene in the situation, minimised their exposure by cashing in their stocks and options before the bankruptcy. So while it is true that we live in a society that demands risky choices, it is one in which the powerful do the choosing, while others do the risking.
If the bailout plan really is a ‘socialist’ measure, it is a very peculiar one: a ‘socialist’ measure whose aim is to help not the poor but the rich, not those who borrow but those who lend. ‘Socialism’ is OK, it seems, when it serves to save capitalism. But what if ‘moral hazard’ is inscribed in the fundamental structure of capitalism? The problem is that there is no way to separate the welfare of Main Street from that of Wall Street. Their relationship is non-transitive: what is good for Wall Street isn’t necessarily good for Main Street, but Main Street can’t thrive if Wall Street isn’t doing well – and this asymmetry gives an a priori advantage to Wall Street.
The standard ‘trickle-down’ argument against redistribution (through progressive taxation etc) is that instead of making the poor richer, it makes the rich poorer. However, this apparently anti-interventionist attitude actually contains an argument for the current state intervention: although we all want the poor to get better, it is counter-productive to help them directly, since they are not the dynamic and productive element; the only intervention needed is to help the rich get richer, and then the profits will automatically spread down to the poor. Throw enough money at Wall Street, and it will eventually trickle down to Main Street. If you want people to have money to build, don’t give it to them directly, help those who are lending it to them. This is the only way to create genuine prosperity – otherwise, the state is merely distributing money to the needy at the expense of those who create wealth.
It is all too easy to dismiss this line of reasoning as a hypocritical defence of the rich. The problem is that as long as we are stuck with capitalism, there is a truth in it: the collapse of Wall Street really will hit ordinary workers. That is why the Democrats who supported the bailout were not being inconsistent with their leftist leanings. They would fairly be called inconsistent only if we accept the premise of Republican populists that capitalism and the free market economy are a popular, working-class affair, while state interventions are an upper-class strategy to exploit hard-working ordinary people.
There is nothing new in strong state interventions into the banking system and the economy in general. The meltdown itself is the result of such an intervention: when, in 2001, the dotcom bubble burst, it was decided to make it easier to get credit in order to redirect growth into housing. Indeed, political decisions are responsible for the texture of international economic relations in general. A couple of years ago, a CNN report on Mali described the reality of the international ‘free market’. The two pillars of the Mali economy are cotton in the south and cattle in the north, and both are in trouble because of the way that Western powers violate the same rules that they impose so brutally on Third World nations. Mali produces cotton of the highest quality, but the US government spends more money to support its cotton farmers than the entire state budget of Mali, so it is small wonder that Mali can’t compete. In the north, the European Union is the culprit: the EU subsidises every single cow to the tune of five hundred euros a year. The Mali minister for the economy said: we don’t need your help or advice or lectures on the beneficial effects of abolishing excessive state regulations; just, please, stick to your own rules about the free market and our troubles will be over. Where are the Republican defenders of the free market here? Nowhere, because the collapse of Mali is the consequence of what it means for the US to put ‘our country first’.
What all this indicates is that the market is never neutral: its operations are always regulated by political decisions. The real dilemma is not ‘state intervention or not?’ but ‘what kind of state intervention?’ And this is true politics: the struggle to define the conditions that govern our lives. The debate about the bailout deals with decisions about the fundamental features of our social and economic life, even mobilising the ghost of class struggle. As with many truly political issues, this one is non-partisan. There is no ‘objective’ expert position that should simply be applied: one has to take a political decision.
On 24 September, John McCain suspended his campaign and went to Washington, proclaiming that it was time to put aside party differences. Was this gesture really a sign of his readiness to end partisan politics in order to deal with the real problems that concern us all? Definitely not: it was a ‘Mr McCain goes to Washington’ moment. Politics is precisely the struggle to define the ‘neutral’ terrain, which is why McCain’s proposal to reach across party lines was pure political posturing, a partisan politics in the guise of non-partisanship, a desperate attempt to impose his position as universal-apolitical. What is even worse than ‘partisan politics’ is a partisan politics that tries to mask itself as non-partisan: by imposing itself as the voice of the Whole, such a politics reduces its opponents by making them agents of particular interests.
This is why Obama was right to reject McCain’s call to postpone the first presidential debate and to point out that the meltdown makes a political debate about how the two candidates would handle the crisis all the more urgent. In the 1992 election, Clinton won with the motto ‘It’s the economy, stupid!’ The Democrats need to get a new message across: ‘It’s the POLITICAL economy, stupid!’ The US doesn’t need less politics, it needs more.
Slavoj Žižek: Resistance Is Surrender
One of the clearest lessons of the last few decades is that capitalism is indestructible. Marx compared it to a vampire, and one of the salient points of comparison now appears to be that vampires always rise up again after being stabbed to death. Even Mao’s attempt, in the Cultural Revolution, to wipe out the traces of capitalism, ended up in its triumphant return.
Today’s Left reacts in a wide variety of ways to the hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy. It might, for example, accept the hegemony, but continue to fight for reform within its rules (this is Third Way social democracy).
Or, it accepts that the hegemony is here to stay, but should nonetheless be resisted from its ‘interstices’.
Or, it accepts the futility of all struggle, since the hegemony is so all-encompassing that nothing can really be done except wait for an outburst of ‘divine violence’ – a revolutionary version of Heidegger’s ‘only God can save us.’
Or, it recognises the temporary futility of the struggle. In today’s triumph of global capitalism, the argument goes, true resistance is not possible, so all we can do till the revolutionary spirit of the global working class is renewed is defend what remains of the welfare state, confronting those in power with demands we know they cannot fulfil, and otherwise withdraw into cultural studies, where one can quietly pursue the work of criticism.
Or, it emphasises the fact that the problem is a more fundamental one, that global capitalism is ultimately an effect of the underlying principles of technology or ‘instrumental reason’.
Or, it posits that one can undermine global capitalism and state power, not by directly attacking them, but by refocusing the field of struggle on everyday practices, where one can ‘build a new world’; in this way, the foundations of the power of capital and the state will be gradually undermined, and, at some point, the state will collapse (the exemplar of this approach is the Zapatista movement).
Or, it takes the ‘postmodern’ route, shifting the accent from anti-capitalist struggle to the multiple forms of politico-ideological struggle for hegemony, emphasising the importance of discursive re-articulation.
Or, it wagers that one can repeat at the postmodern level the classical Marxist gesture of enacting the ‘determinate negation’ of capitalism: with today’s rise of ‘cognitive work’, the contradiction between social production and capitalist relations has become starker than ever, rendering possible for the first time ‘absolute democracy’ (this would be Hardt and Negri’s position).
These positions are not presented as a way of avoiding some ‘true’ radical Left politics – what they are trying to get around is, indeed, the lack of such a position. This defeat of the Left is not the whole story of the last thirty years, however. There is another, no less surprising, lesson to be learned from the Chinese Communists’ presiding over arguably the most explosive development of capitalism in history, and from the growth of West European Third Way social democracy. It is, in short: we can do it better. In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel’s terms, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. Thatcher wasn’t a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism.
The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the ‘old paradigm’: the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left.
Simon Critchley’s recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[*] For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the ‘infinitely demanding’ call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the ‘real-political’ one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). ‘Of course,’ Critchley writes,
history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes.
So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’ one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, ‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect’?
These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles.
The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’
It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital’s ‘resistance’ to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? ‘No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place’? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn’t such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as ‘Subcomediante Marcos’? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who ‘resist’ the state.
The lesson here is that the truly subversive thing is not to insist on ‘infinite’ demands we know those in power cannot fulfil. Since they know that we know it, such an ‘infinitely demanding’ attitude presents no problem for those in power: ‘So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.’ The thing to do is, on the contrary, to bombard those in power with strategically well-selected, precise, finite demands, which can’t be met with the same excuse.
Today’s Left reacts in a wide variety of ways to the hegemony of global capitalism and its political supplement, liberal democracy. It might, for example, accept the hegemony, but continue to fight for reform within its rules (this is Third Way social democracy).
Or, it accepts that the hegemony is here to stay, but should nonetheless be resisted from its ‘interstices’.
Or, it accepts the futility of all struggle, since the hegemony is so all-encompassing that nothing can really be done except wait for an outburst of ‘divine violence’ – a revolutionary version of Heidegger’s ‘only God can save us.’
Or, it recognises the temporary futility of the struggle. In today’s triumph of global capitalism, the argument goes, true resistance is not possible, so all we can do till the revolutionary spirit of the global working class is renewed is defend what remains of the welfare state, confronting those in power with demands we know they cannot fulfil, and otherwise withdraw into cultural studies, where one can quietly pursue the work of criticism.
Or, it emphasises the fact that the problem is a more fundamental one, that global capitalism is ultimately an effect of the underlying principles of technology or ‘instrumental reason’.
Or, it posits that one can undermine global capitalism and state power, not by directly attacking them, but by refocusing the field of struggle on everyday practices, where one can ‘build a new world’; in this way, the foundations of the power of capital and the state will be gradually undermined, and, at some point, the state will collapse (the exemplar of this approach is the Zapatista movement).
Or, it takes the ‘postmodern’ route, shifting the accent from anti-capitalist struggle to the multiple forms of politico-ideological struggle for hegemony, emphasising the importance of discursive re-articulation.
Or, it wagers that one can repeat at the postmodern level the classical Marxist gesture of enacting the ‘determinate negation’ of capitalism: with today’s rise of ‘cognitive work’, the contradiction between social production and capitalist relations has become starker than ever, rendering possible for the first time ‘absolute democracy’ (this would be Hardt and Negri’s position).
These positions are not presented as a way of avoiding some ‘true’ radical Left politics – what they are trying to get around is, indeed, the lack of such a position. This defeat of the Left is not the whole story of the last thirty years, however. There is another, no less surprising, lesson to be learned from the Chinese Communists’ presiding over arguably the most explosive development of capitalism in history, and from the growth of West European Third Way social democracy. It is, in short: we can do it better. In the UK, the Thatcher revolution was, at the time, chaotic and impulsive, marked by unpredictable contingencies. It was Tony Blair who was able to institutionalise it, or, in Hegel’s terms, to raise (what first appeared as) a contingency, a historical accident, into a necessity. Thatcher wasn’t a Thatcherite, she was merely herself; it was Blair (more than Major) who truly gave form to Thatcherism.
The response of some critics on the postmodern Left to this predicament is to call for a new politics of resistance. Those who still insist on fighting state power, let alone seizing it, are accused of remaining stuck within the ‘old paradigm’: the task today, their critics say, is to resist state power by withdrawing from its terrain and creating new spaces outside its control. This is, of course, the obverse of accepting the triumph of capitalism. The politics of resistance is nothing but the moralising supplement to a Third Way Left.
Simon Critchley’s recent book, Infinitely Demanding, is an almost perfect embodiment of this position.[*] For Critchley, the liberal-democratic state is here to stay. Attempts to abolish the state failed miserably; consequently, the new politics has to be located at a distance from it: anti-war movements, ecological organisations, groups protesting against racist or sexist abuses, and other forms of local self-organisation. It must be a politics of resistance to the state, of bombarding the state with impossible demands, of denouncing the limitations of state mechanisms. The main argument for conducting the politics of resistance at a distance from the state hinges on the ethical dimension of the ‘infinitely demanding’ call for justice: no state can heed this call, since its ultimate goal is the ‘real-political’ one of ensuring its own reproduction (its economic growth, public safety, etc). ‘Of course,’ Critchley writes,
history is habitually written by the people with the guns and sticks and one cannot expect to defeat them with mocking satire and feather dusters. Yet, as the history of ultra-leftist active nihilism eloquently shows, one is lost the moment one picks up the guns and sticks. Anarchic political resistance should not seek to mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty it opposes.
So what should, say, the US Democrats do? Stop competing for state power and withdraw to the interstices of the state, leaving state power to the Republicans and start a campaign of anarchic resistance to it? And what would Critchley do if he were facing an adversary like Hitler? Surely in such a case one should ‘mimic and mirror the archic violent sovereignty’ one opposes? Shouldn’t the Left draw a distinction between the circumstances in which one would resort to violence in confronting the state, and those in which all one can and should do is use ‘mocking satire and feather dusters’? The ambiguity of Critchley’s position resides in a strange non sequitur: if the state is here to stay, if it is impossible to abolish it (or capitalism), why retreat from it? Why not act with(in) the state? Why not accept the basic premise of the Third Way? Why limit oneself to a politics which, as Critchley puts it, ‘calls the state into question and calls the established order to account, not in order to do away with the state, desirable though that might well be in some utopian sense, but in order to better it or attenuate its malicious effect’?
These words simply demonstrate that today’s liberal-democratic state and the dream of an ‘infinitely demanding’ anarchic politics exist in a relationship of mutual parasitism: anarchic agents do the ethical thinking, and the state does the work of running and regulating society. Critchley’s anarchic ethico-political agent acts like a superego, comfortably bombarding the state with demands; and the more the state tries to satisfy these demands, the more guilty it is seen to be. In compliance with this logic, the anarchic agents focus their protest not on open dictatorships, but on the hypocrisy of liberal democracies, who are accused of betraying their own professed principles.
The big demonstrations in London and Washington against the US attack on Iraq a few years ago offer an exemplary case of this strange symbiotic relationship between power and resistance. Their paradoxical outcome was that both sides were satisfied. The protesters saved their beautiful souls: they made it clear that they don’t agree with the government’s policy on Iraq. Those in power calmly accepted it, even profited from it: not only did the protests in no way prevent the already-made decision to attack Iraq; they also served to legitimise it. Thus George Bush’s reaction to mass demonstrations protesting his visit to London, in effect: ‘You see, this is what we are fighting for, so that what people are doing here – protesting against their government policy – will be possible also in Iraq!’
It is striking that the course on which Hugo Chávez has embarked since 2006 is the exact opposite of the one chosen by the postmodern Left: far from resisting state power, he grabbed it (first by an attempted coup, then democratically), ruthlessly using the Venezuelan state apparatuses to promote his goals. Furthermore, he is militarising the barrios, and organising the training of armed units there. And, the ultimate scare: now that he is feeling the economic effects of capital’s ‘resistance’ to his rule (temporary shortages of some goods in the state-subsidised supermarkets), he has announced plans to consolidate the 24 parties that support him into a single party. Even some of his allies are sceptical about this move: will it come at the expense of the popular movements that have given the Venezuelan revolution its élan? However, this choice, though risky, should be fully endorsed: the task is to make the new party function not as a typical state socialist (or Peronist) party, but as a vehicle for the mobilisation of new forms of politics (like the grass roots slum committees). What should we say to someone like Chávez? ‘No, do not grab state power, just withdraw, leave the state and the current situation in place’? Chávez is often dismissed as a clown – but wouldn’t such a withdrawal just reduce him to a version of Subcomandante Marcos, whom many Mexican leftists now refer to as ‘Subcomediante Marcos’? Today, it is the great capitalists – Bill Gates, corporate polluters, fox hunters – who ‘resist’ the state.
The lesson here is that the truly subversive thing is not to insist on ‘infinite’ demands we know those in power cannot fulfil. Since they know that we know it, such an ‘infinitely demanding’ attitude presents no problem for those in power: ‘So wonderful that, with your critical demands, you remind us what kind of world we would all like to live in. Unfortunately, we live in the real world, where we have to make do with what is possible.’ The thing to do is, on the contrary, to bombard those in power with strategically well-selected, precise, finite demands, which can’t be met with the same excuse.
lørdag den 11. oktober 2008
Pentagon Wants $450 Billion Increase Over Next Five Years
Pentagon officials have prepared a new estimate for defense spending that is $450 billion more over the next five years than previously announced figures.
The new estimate, which the Pentagon plans to release shortly before President Bush leaves office, would serve as a marker for the new president and is meant to place pressure on him to either drastically increase the size of the defense budget or defend any reluctance to do so, according to several former senior budget officials who are close to the discussions.
Experts note that releasing such documents in the twilight of an administration is a well-worn tactic, and that incoming presidents often disregard such guidance in order to pursue their own priorities.
And with the nation’s economy caught up in a global financial meltdown, it remains unclear whether either Sen. John McCain , R-Ariz., Sen. Barack Obama , D-Ill., or a Democratic Congress would support such large increases for defense next year.
“This is a political document,” said one former senior budget official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It sets up the new administration immediately to have to make a decision of how to deal with the perception that they are either cutting defense or adding to it.”
Dov Zakheim, the Pentagon’s top budget official from 2001 to 2004, who is not involved in the current discussions, agreed.
“The thinking behind it is pretty straightforward,” Zakheim said. “They are setting a baseline for a new administration that then will have to defend cutting it.”
The fiscal 2010 portion of the estimate includes a $57 billion increase, out of which $30 billion would go for a vaguely defined contingency fund and $14 billion would go for replacing or fixing existing equipment, called reset, and modernization, the former officials said.
They added that those items reflect the Pentagon’s attempt to anticipate the end of huge supplemental war allotments that have hidden the costs of resetting and modernizing the nation’s war-torn force. Both presidential candidates have pledged to scale back supplemental war spending.
The Pentagon comptroller’s office refused repeated requests for comment on the figures outlined by the former officials stating that it was premature to discuss future budgets because they were still being worked on.
Earlier Budgets Insufficient
The new budget numbers reflect the Defense Department’s acknowledgement that the coming bow wave of ever-rising procurement costs, combined with the nonstop growth of defense entitlement spending, will render its already record- high budgets grossly insufficient in the years ahead.
But the numbers also seem to condradict the National Defense Strategy released recently by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates , which called for tough tradeoffs in spending in an environment of limited resources.
“We cannot do everything, or function equally well across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately we must make choices,” Gates wrote.
The new estimate, which has not been publicly released, would raise the fiscal 2010 budget number announced by the administration this year from $527 billion to $584 billion, not counting operations costs for the ongoing wars.
Money to prosecute the ongoing wars is not included in the new estimate, meaning the military would still need significant supplemental appropriations in addition to the increased budget request.
Supplemental appropriations have been used to fund procurement and personnel costs that are predictable and therefore should be placed into the regular budget, said Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“We’re going to have to figure out how to get off supplementals,” Mullen told a group of Washington reporters Thursday. “My strategic approach is to start to implant those things that are in supplementals that we think we’ve got to have into the baseline budget. We need to start doing that. We’re working our way through the next budget now.”
While reset and modernization funds in the new estimate are relatively non-controversial, the $30 billion contingency fund could face stiff opposition on Capitol Hill. That money, if approved, would be available to rapidly deploy active duty forces overseas in the event of an unexpected crisis.
In 2001 and 2002, lawmakers rejected attempts by Pentagon leaders to secure a contingency fund, from which they could draw money without requesting additional permission from Congress.
“The Congress always saw this from their perspective as a slush fund,” said Zakheim, “Whereas the defense department has said it needed this kind of money because it could never project what exactly would be needed in the event of an emergency.”
Presidential Candidates Differ
The candidates differ on whether or not large increases in overall defense budgets are wise or even doable.
McCain has promised to freeze all discretionary spending except for national security, and is pushing for an additional 150,000 troops above current plans, to be paid for within the base budget.
Obama only supports the current planned increase of 92,000 Army and Marine Corps personnel.
Both candidates have called for a wholesale reform of the Pentagon’s acquisitions system in an effort to control procurement costs, which have ballooned in recent years due to mismanagement.
“The practical fact is that these programs can’t all go into production without a very significant increase in the resources for defense, and I don’t think in light of the current fiscal situation that’s going to be possible,” said former Air Force Secretary Whit Peters, who advises Obama.
Supplemental spending bills, which have funded most of the $859 billion appropriated for the Iraq and Afghanistan and global operations to counter terrorism since 2001, are set to be scaled back no matter which candidate wins in November.
“I see the future of supplementals as dramatically reduced to genuinely unanticipated needs, like fluctuations in the price of fuel, not programmatic costs or known spending needs,” said McCain in written responses to questions submitted by CQ. “It’s a bad way to do business, and I will bring it to an end.”
Peters agreed that large supplemental spending packages would end.
“The supplementals have confused things tremendously,” he said, adding that Obama realizes some of the items in the supplementals will have to be folded back into the base budget.
Reasons For Extra Funds Unclear
Exactly how the Pentagon’s new spending estimate will be communicated to Congress or the incoming administration remains unclear.
In April, the White House Office of Management and Budget sent out guidance to all federal agencies that there would be no full budget drill this fall and no formal fiscal 2010 budget submission.
All agencies were directed to project future budgets based on current costs, which OMB will then compile into a budget database. But since OMB won’t go through a formal scrubbing process for the submissions as it has done in previous years, it will be up to the next president to decide what to do with the numbers.
“The 2010 budget will be submitted by the next president, not the current president,” said OMB spokeswoman Corinne Hirsch. “This administration will certainly be sharing its priorities with the incoming administration in a variety of ways, but that will be outside the formal budget process.”
Hirsch said OMB had not received the defense department’s numbers yet, although an OMB memo had said they were due in September.
“What is clear is that these additional funds that the Pentagon wants to include in their budget and their five year plan are way beyond the fiscal guidance that OMB gave the department of defense earlier this year,” one former official explained.
Moreover, the new numbers are not aligned with any long-term strategic or budgetary rationale that might allow OMB or Congress to judge their wisdom or their impact on the nation’s worsening economic situation, the official said.
“The idea that the Pentagon Comptroller’s office wanted these additional funds has been fairly well known,” the former official said. “But there is little out there to give anybody the understanding of why.”
The new estimate, which the Pentagon plans to release shortly before President Bush leaves office, would serve as a marker for the new president and is meant to place pressure on him to either drastically increase the size of the defense budget or defend any reluctance to do so, according to several former senior budget officials who are close to the discussions.
Experts note that releasing such documents in the twilight of an administration is a well-worn tactic, and that incoming presidents often disregard such guidance in order to pursue their own priorities.
And with the nation’s economy caught up in a global financial meltdown, it remains unclear whether either Sen. John McCain , R-Ariz., Sen. Barack Obama , D-Ill., or a Democratic Congress would support such large increases for defense next year.
“This is a political document,” said one former senior budget official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “It sets up the new administration immediately to have to make a decision of how to deal with the perception that they are either cutting defense or adding to it.”
Dov Zakheim, the Pentagon’s top budget official from 2001 to 2004, who is not involved in the current discussions, agreed.
“The thinking behind it is pretty straightforward,” Zakheim said. “They are setting a baseline for a new administration that then will have to defend cutting it.”
The fiscal 2010 portion of the estimate includes a $57 billion increase, out of which $30 billion would go for a vaguely defined contingency fund and $14 billion would go for replacing or fixing existing equipment, called reset, and modernization, the former officials said.
They added that those items reflect the Pentagon’s attempt to anticipate the end of huge supplemental war allotments that have hidden the costs of resetting and modernizing the nation’s war-torn force. Both presidential candidates have pledged to scale back supplemental war spending.
The Pentagon comptroller’s office refused repeated requests for comment on the figures outlined by the former officials stating that it was premature to discuss future budgets because they were still being worked on.
Earlier Budgets Insufficient
The new budget numbers reflect the Defense Department’s acknowledgement that the coming bow wave of ever-rising procurement costs, combined with the nonstop growth of defense entitlement spending, will render its already record- high budgets grossly insufficient in the years ahead.
But the numbers also seem to condradict the National Defense Strategy released recently by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates , which called for tough tradeoffs in spending in an environment of limited resources.
“We cannot do everything, or function equally well across the spectrum of conflict. Ultimately we must make choices,” Gates wrote.
The new estimate, which has not been publicly released, would raise the fiscal 2010 budget number announced by the administration this year from $527 billion to $584 billion, not counting operations costs for the ongoing wars.
Money to prosecute the ongoing wars is not included in the new estimate, meaning the military would still need significant supplemental appropriations in addition to the increased budget request.
Supplemental appropriations have been used to fund procurement and personnel costs that are predictable and therefore should be placed into the regular budget, said Admiral Michael Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
“We’re going to have to figure out how to get off supplementals,” Mullen told a group of Washington reporters Thursday. “My strategic approach is to start to implant those things that are in supplementals that we think we’ve got to have into the baseline budget. We need to start doing that. We’re working our way through the next budget now.”
While reset and modernization funds in the new estimate are relatively non-controversial, the $30 billion contingency fund could face stiff opposition on Capitol Hill. That money, if approved, would be available to rapidly deploy active duty forces overseas in the event of an unexpected crisis.
In 2001 and 2002, lawmakers rejected attempts by Pentagon leaders to secure a contingency fund, from which they could draw money without requesting additional permission from Congress.
“The Congress always saw this from their perspective as a slush fund,” said Zakheim, “Whereas the defense department has said it needed this kind of money because it could never project what exactly would be needed in the event of an emergency.”
Presidential Candidates Differ
The candidates differ on whether or not large increases in overall defense budgets are wise or even doable.
McCain has promised to freeze all discretionary spending except for national security, and is pushing for an additional 150,000 troops above current plans, to be paid for within the base budget.
Obama only supports the current planned increase of 92,000 Army and Marine Corps personnel.
Both candidates have called for a wholesale reform of the Pentagon’s acquisitions system in an effort to control procurement costs, which have ballooned in recent years due to mismanagement.
“The practical fact is that these programs can’t all go into production without a very significant increase in the resources for defense, and I don’t think in light of the current fiscal situation that’s going to be possible,” said former Air Force Secretary Whit Peters, who advises Obama.
Supplemental spending bills, which have funded most of the $859 billion appropriated for the Iraq and Afghanistan and global operations to counter terrorism since 2001, are set to be scaled back no matter which candidate wins in November.
“I see the future of supplementals as dramatically reduced to genuinely unanticipated needs, like fluctuations in the price of fuel, not programmatic costs or known spending needs,” said McCain in written responses to questions submitted by CQ. “It’s a bad way to do business, and I will bring it to an end.”
Peters agreed that large supplemental spending packages would end.
“The supplementals have confused things tremendously,” he said, adding that Obama realizes some of the items in the supplementals will have to be folded back into the base budget.
Reasons For Extra Funds Unclear
Exactly how the Pentagon’s new spending estimate will be communicated to Congress or the incoming administration remains unclear.
In April, the White House Office of Management and Budget sent out guidance to all federal agencies that there would be no full budget drill this fall and no formal fiscal 2010 budget submission.
All agencies were directed to project future budgets based on current costs, which OMB will then compile into a budget database. But since OMB won’t go through a formal scrubbing process for the submissions as it has done in previous years, it will be up to the next president to decide what to do with the numbers.
“The 2010 budget will be submitted by the next president, not the current president,” said OMB spokeswoman Corinne Hirsch. “This administration will certainly be sharing its priorities with the incoming administration in a variety of ways, but that will be outside the formal budget process.”
Hirsch said OMB had not received the defense department’s numbers yet, although an OMB memo had said they were due in September.
“What is clear is that these additional funds that the Pentagon wants to include in their budget and their five year plan are way beyond the fiscal guidance that OMB gave the department of defense earlier this year,” one former official explained.
Moreover, the new numbers are not aligned with any long-term strategic or budgetary rationale that might allow OMB or Congress to judge their wisdom or their impact on the nation’s worsening economic situation, the official said.
“The idea that the Pentagon Comptroller’s office wanted these additional funds has been fairly well known,” the former official said. “But there is little out there to give anybody the understanding of why.”
Finanskrisen er reaganismens endeligt af Francis Fukuyama
Reagans og Thatchers version af kapitalismen er brudt sammen. Troen på, at skattelettelser er selvfinansierende og finansmarkedet selvregulerende, er død. Resultatet er en krise, der rækker langt ud over, hvem der vinder præsidentvalget i næste måned, skriver Francis Fukuyama, der i sin tid skrev liberalisme-biblen 'Historiens afslutning'
Amerikas velrenommerede investeringsbanker går konkurs. Over en billion dollars i aktiemarkedsværdier forsvinder på et enkelt døgn. De amerikanske skatteydere får udskrevet en regning på 700 milliarder dollars. Dimensionerne af 2008-krakket på Wall Street kunne næppe være mere overvældende. Nu spørger mange amerikanere, hvorfor de må betale så svimlende summer for at hindre økonomien i at bryde sammen. Kun få er imidlertid begyndt at diskutere de mere uhåndgribelige, men for USA potentielt langt større omkostninger - nemlig hvor stor skade den finansielle nedsmeltning har gjort på Amerika som varemærke.
Ideer hører til Amerikas vigtigste eksportartikler. Og lige siden Ronald Reagan blev valgt til præsident, er der især to fundamentalt amerikanske idéer, som har domineret den globale tænkning. Den første var en bestemt opfattelse af kapitalismen, ifølge hvilken lave skatter, svag regulering og en slanket statsmagt ville være drivkræfter for økonomisk vækst. Reaganismen brød og vendte en århundrede lang tendens i retning af stadig stærkere og stedse mere omfattende statsmagt. Deregulering blev tidens slagord - ikke blot i USA men i hele verden.
Den anden store idé var ideen om Amerika som en global forkæmper for udbredelse af det liberale demokrati, som blev anset for at være den bedste vej til en mere velstående og åben international orden. USA's magt og indflydelse hvilede ikke kun på militær supermagtsstyrke og dollars, men på det faktum, at de fleste mennesker følte sig tiltrukket af den amerikanske form for selvforvaltning og ønskede at omforme deres samfund i samme retning - en faktor, som politologen Joseph Nye betegner som 'blød magt'.
Et afgørende valg
Det kan være svært at se i øjnene, hvor slemt disse signatur-træk ved Amerikas særlige varemærke nu er bragt i miskredit. Mellem 2002 og 2007, mens verden endnu nød godt af en enestående periode med vækst, var det ingen sag at ignorere de europæiske socialister og latinamerikanske populister, når de stemplede den amerikanske økonomiske model som 'cowboy-kapitalisme'. Men nu er lokomotivet for denne vækst - den amerikanske økonomi - kørt af sporet og truer med at trække resten af verden med sig. Og hvad værre er: Synderen er ingen anden end den amerikanske model selv. Under mantraet 'mindre stat' afstod Washington fra at foretage den adækvate regulering af Amerikas finansielle sektor og gjorde det dermed muligt for denne at forvolde enorm skade på resten af samfundet.
Allerede før krakket var demokratiet kompromitteret. Da Saddam viste sig ikke at besidde masseødelæggelsesvåben, forsøgte Bush-regeringen at retfærdiggøre sin Irak-krig ved at knytte den til en bredere dagsorden om at 'udbrede frihed'. Pludselig var fremme af demokrati det vigtigste våben i krigen mod terror. Men for mange mennesker verden over lød USA's retorik om demokrati snarere som et påskud for at udbrede USA's herredømme.
Det afgørende valg, Amerika nu står over for, rækker langt ud over, hvilken økonomisk hjælpepakke, der vil virke bedst, eller hvem der vinder præsidentvalget. Det amerikanske varemærke sættes nu på en hård prøve på et tidspunkt, hvor andre modeller - det være sig den kinesiske eller den russiske - opleves som stadigt mere attraktive. Genoprettelsen af vort gode navn og genoplivelsen af vores varemærkes dragende magt er på mange måder en lige så stor udfordring som at stabilisere den finansielle sektor. Barack Obama og John McCain kommer med hver deres potentiale til at løfte til opgaven. Men uanset hvem af dem, der vinder, vil der forestå en årelang kamp op ad bakke. Og vi kan ikke tage fat på denne kamp, før vi klart har indset, hvad der gik galt, hvilke aspekter af den amerikanske model, der er bevaringsværdige, hvilke der skal forbedres, og hvilke der skal kasseres helt.
Reaganismens impuls
Mange kommentatorer har bemærket, at nedsmeltningen på Wall Street markerer afslutningen på Reagan-æraen. Det er utvivlsomt en korrekt konstatering - også selv hvis det skulle lykkes at få McCain valgt til præsident i november. Store ideer kommer til verden inden for rammerne af særlige historiske epoker. Og kun de færreste store ideer overlever, når konteksten ændrer sig dramatisk, hvilket er grunden til, at de politiske paradigmer er tilbøjelige til at skifte fra venstre til højre og tilbage igen i cykliske forløb, der kan strække sig over generationer.
Reaganismen - eller dens britiske variant, thatcherismen - var den nødvendige impuls for sin tid. Siden Franklin Roosevelts New Deal i 1930'erne havde statsmagten kun vokset sig større i nationer verden over. 1970'ernes store velfærdsstater og økonomier var ved at blive kvalt af bureaukrati. De fungerede håbløst. Dengang var telefoner dyre og vanskelige at anskaffe, flyrejser var en luksus for de rige, og de fleste mennesker satte deres opsparing ind på bankkonti med lave, regulerede rentesatser. Gavmilde velfærdsprogrammer, der skulle støtte eneforsørgere, gjorde det lidet attraktivt for fattige familier at arbejde og forblive gift, og mange familier gik i opløsning. Reagans og Thatchers revolutioner gjorde det lettere at ansætte og fyre arbejdere, hvad der ganske vist gav voldsomt smertelige gnidninger, efterhånden som traditionelle industrier måtte indskrænke eller lukke ned. Men de lagde også grunden til næsten tre årtier med vækst og fremkomsten af helt nye sektorer som informations-og biotek-branchen.
Sin internationale platform fik Reagan-revolutionen med det såkaldte Washington Consensus, ifølge hvilket Washington - og de institutioner, der står under dets indflydelse som Den Internationale Valutafond og Verdensbanken - skulle anspore udviklingslandene til at åbne deres økonomier. Men skønt Washington Consensus rutinemæssigt bliver hånligt forkastet af populister som Venezuelas Hugo Chávez, formåede denne politik i nogen grad at lette de smertelige følger af den latinamerikanske gældskrise i begyndelsen af 1980'erne, da hyperinflation plagede lande som Argentina og Brasilien. Lignende markedsvenlige politikker er også en del af forklaringen på, at Kina og Indien har udviklet sig til de økonomiske kraftcentre, de er i dag.
Hvis nogen skulle savne yderligere belæg, behøver de blot kaste et blik på verdens mest ekstreme eksempler på statsstyrede, centraldirigerede økonomier - nemlig dem, man havde opbygget i det tidligere Sovjetunionen og de øvrige kommunistiske stater. I 1970'erne var disse i næsten alle henseender sakket agterud for deres kapitalistiske rivaler. Deres totale sammenbrud efter Berlinmurens fald leverede beviset på, at sådanne velfærdsstater på steroider var en historisk blindgyde.
Som så mange andre samfundsforandrende bevægelser kørte Reagan-revolutionen af sporet, fordi den for mange tilhængere blev til en uangribelig ideologi frem for en pragmatisk reaktion på velfærdsstatens excesser. To principper var hævet over enhver tvivl: Skattelettelser blev regnet for selvfinansierende, og de finansielle markeder blev regnet for selvregulerende.
Globaliseringen skjulte fejlene
Før 1980'erne var konservative regeringer skattepolitisk tilbageholdende, forstået på den måde, at de var uvillige til at bruge flere penge, end skatterne indbragte. Men med Reaganomics vandt den tanke, at stort set alle skattelettelser ville stimulere vækst, så regeringen i sidste ende ville få større indtægter. Men faktisk var den traditionelle opfattelse den korrekte: Sænker man skatterne uden at beskære udgifterne, bliver resultatet underskud. Reagans skattenedsættelser i 1980'erne skabte da også et stort underskud, mens Clinton skattestigninger i 1990'erne frembragte et overskud. Bushs skattelettelser i begyndelsen af det 21. århundrede medførte et endnu større underskud. Den omstændighed, at den amerikanske økonomi voksede lige så hurtigt i Clinton-årene som under Reagan, formåede af en eller anden grund ikke at ryste den faste konservative tro på skattelettelser som den sikre vej til vækst.
Mere væsentligt var det, at globaliseringen i årtier skjulte fejlene i det neoliberale ræsonnement. I udlandet var man tilsyneladende uendeligt villige til at beholde de amerikanske dollars, som gjorde det muligt for USA's regering at køre med underskud og samtidig fastholde en høj vækst - noget, intet udviklingsland ville kunne slippe afsted med. Og derfor skal vicepræsident Dick Cheney allerede fra begyndelsen have beroliget præsident Bush med, at læren af 1980'erne var, at "underskud spiller ingen rolle".
Den anden trosartikel fra Reagan-æraen - den om finansiel deregulering - blev drevet frem som gældende politik af en uhellig alliance mellem sande troende og Wall Street-virksomheder og blev i 1990'erne sågar også accepteret af demokraterne som sandhedens evangelium. Dens fortalere hævdede, at gamle faste reguleringslove som Glas-Steagall-loven fra depressionstiden (som satte skel mellem banker og investeringsbanker) stod i vejen for innovation og undergravede konkurrenceevnen i Amerikas finansielle institutioner. Det var helt rigtigt set. Der var bare det ved det, at dereguleringen fremkaldte en strøm af nye innovative produkter som f.eks. de investeringspakker med subprime-lån, som udgør kernen i den nuværende krise. Nogle republikanere har stadig ikke forstået sammenhængen, hvilket fremgår af deres alternative forslag til en hjælpepakke, som involverer endnu større skattelettelser for hedgefonde.
Problemet er, at Wall Street fungerer meget anderledes end f.eks. Silicon Valley, hvor en svag regulering er så abs0lut er formålstjenlig. Finansielle institutioner bygger på tillid, som kun kan trives, hvis statsmagten sikrer deres gennemsigtighed og sætter grænser for de chancer, som de kan tage med andre folks penge. Sektoren adskiller sig også derved, at et sammenbrud i et pengeinstitut ikke blot skader aktionærer og ansatte, men tillige en mængde uskyldige udenforstående (som i økonomernes lidenskabsløse fagsprog betegnes som 'negative eksternaliteter').
10 års advarsler
Der har i det seneste årti været klare tegn på, at Reagan-revolutionen var slået ind på et farligt vildspor. Et tidligt varsel var Asiens finanskrise i 1997-98. Efter amerikansk rådgivning og pres havde lande som Thailand og Sydkorea i begyndelsen af 1990'erne liberaliseret deres kapitalmarkeder. En masse 'varme penge' begyndte strømme til disse økonomier, hvorved de skabte en spekulativ boble og derpå skyndte sig at trække sig tilbage igen, da de første tegn på problemer meldte sig. Lyder det som noget, vi kender? Derimod kunne lande som Kina og Malaysia, som ikke fulgte de amerikanske råd, men holdt deres finansielle markeder lukkede eller strengt regulerede, konstatere, at deres position var langt mindre sårbar.
Et andet advarselssignal var det strukturelle underskud, som Amerika begyndte at ophobe. Kina og en række andre lande begyndte efter 1997 at opkøbe amerikanske dollar som led i en bevidst strategi for at undervurdere deres valuta, holde hjulene i gang på deres fabrikker og beskytte sig mod finansielle chok. Efter 11. september passede dette Amerika fint, for det betød, at vi kunne sænke skatterne, finansiere en forbrugsfest, betale for to dyre krige og køre videre med et budgetunderskud på samme tid. De kolossale og stigende handelsunderskud, som dette resulterede i - 700 milliarder dollar om året i 2007 - var åbenlyst uholdbare, og det stod klart, at før eller senere ville man i udlandet beslutte sig for, at Amerika nok alligevel ikke var så godt et sted at anbringe sine penge. Den faldende amerikanske dollar indikerer, at vi nu har nået dette punkt. Det turde nu være indlysende, at underskud - i modsætning til hvad Cheney hævdede - i høj grad spiller en rolle.
Selv på hjemmefronten var dereguleringernes bagside åbenlys, længe før sammenbruddet på Wall Street. I Californien kom elpriserne helt ud af kontrol i 2000-2001 på grund af dereguleringen på det statslige marked for energi, som skruppelløse selskaber som Enron forstod at spille på til egen fordel. Enron selv og en lang række andre virksomheder gik i 2004 konkurs efter fusk med regnskaberne. Og i USA steg uligheden i det forgangne årti, fordi gevinsterne fra den økonomiske vækst i uforholdsmæssig grad kom til rigere og bedre uddannede amerikanere til gode, hvorimod indkomsterne for arbejderklassen stagnerede. Til sidst kom så også den forkludrede besættelse af Irak og den lige så forkludrede reaktion på orkanen Katrina, der eksponerede den offentlige sektors svaghed oppefra og ned - et resultat af årtiers underfinansiering og den lave prestige, som offentligt ansatte måtte lide under fra Reagans tid og frem.
Skelsættende
Alt dette kunne unægtelig tyde på, at Reagans æra burde have været afsluttet for et godt stykke tid siden. Men det gjorde den ikke, dels fordi Det Demokratiske Parti ikke forstod at stille med overbevisende kandidater og argumenter, men også på grund af et særligt aspekt ved Amerika, der stiller vort land meget anderledes end Europa. I de europæiske lande stemmer de mindre veluddannede borgere af arbejderklassebaggrund konsekvent på socialistiske, kommunistiske og andre venstreorienterede partier, ud fra den forventning at dermed er deres økonomiske interesser bedst tjent. Men i USA kan de tilsvarende samfundslag svinge enten til venstre eller højre. De bakkede op om Roosevelts stordemokratiske koalition under New Deal - en koalition, som holdt helt frem til Lyndon Johnsons Great Society-velfærdspolitik i 1960'erne. Men de begyndte at stemme republikansk under Nixon og Reagan, gik over til Clinton i 1990'erne og vendte så atter tilbage til den republikanske fold under George W. Bush. Når så mange fra disse lag stemmer republikansk, skyldes det, at kulturelle spørgsmål som religion, patriotisme, familieværdier og retten til at eje skydevåben kan overtrumfe de økonomiske temaer.
Denne gruppe vælgere kommer til at afgøre valget i november, ikke mindst på grund af deres talstærke tilstedeværelse i en håndfuld svingstater som Ohio og Pennsylvania. Vil de svinge i retning af den noget reserverede Harvard-uddannede Obama, hvis politiske dagsorden i højere grad afspejler deres økonomiske interesser? Eller vil de holde sig til mennesker, de bedre kan identificere sig med som John McCain og Sarah Palin? Der skulle i sin tid den økonomisk krise af enorme dimensioner fra 1929 til 1931 til for at bringe en demokratisk regering til magten. Meningsmålingerne i begyndelsen af oktober 2008 kunne tyde på, at vi har nået til lignende skelsættende punkt.
Demokrati som brand
Den anden afgørende komponent i det amerikanske varemærke er demokratiet og De Forenede Staters erklærede vilje at støtte andre demokratier i verden. Denne idealistiske ledetråd i USA's udenrigspolitik har været konstant igennem forrige århundrede, fra Woodrow Wilson's Folkeforbund over Roosevelts Four Freedoms til Reagans opfordring til Mikhail Gorbatjov om at "nedrive denne mur".
At fremme demokratiets udbredelse - gennem diplomati, støtte til grupper i civilsamfundet, frie medier og lignende, har aldrig været kontroversielt. Men nu er problemet, at da Bush-regeringen brugte 'demokratiet' til at retfærdiggøre Irak-krigen, blev dette af mange opfattet som et kodeord for militær intervention og regimeskift - det kaos, der udløstes i Irak, gjorde ikke ligefrem demokratiets sag en tjeneste. Navnlig Mellemøsten er et minefelt for enhver amerikansk regering, i og med at USA støtter ikkedemokratiske allierede som Saudi-Arabien, men afviser samarbejde med grupper som Hamas og Hizbollah, der kom til magten gennem valg eller bygger deres indflydelse på stor folkelig tilslutning. Vi har ikke megen troværdighed i USA, når vi forfægter en 'frihed-dagsorden'.
Den amerikanske model er også blevet alvorligt plettet af Bush-administrationens brug af tortur. Efter 11. september viste amerikanerne sig i foruroligende grad at være rede til at ofre den forfatningsmæssige beskyttelse af hensyn til sikkerheden. Og siden har Guantánamo Bay og de hætteklædter fanger fra Abu Ghraib i mange ikke-amerikaneres øjne erstattet Frihedsgudinden som symbol på Amerika.
Tabte positioner
Uanset hvem der vinder præsidentvalget om tre uger, vil skiftet til et nyt paradigme i amerikansk og international politik allerede være sat i gang. Demokraterne vil sandsynligvis kunne øge deres flertal i Parlamentet og Senatet. En enorm populistisk vrede er under opsejling, efterhånden som Wall Streets nedsmeltning forplanter sig til Main Street. Allerede nu er der en voksende enighed om behovet for at re-regulere store dele af økonomien.
Globalt vil USA ikke længere kunne nyde godt af den dominerende position, som det har indtaget indtil nu, hvilket understreges af Ruslands invasion af Georgien. Amerikas evne til at forme den globale økonomi gennem handelsaftaler, IMF og Verdensbanken vil også blive mindsket. Det samme vil vore finansielle ressourcer. Og i mange dele af verden vil amerikanske rådgivning, ideer og tilmed bistand være mindre velkommen end nu.
Hvilken kandidat vil under disse omstændigheder være i den bedste position til at give Amerikas et nyt og bedre ry?
Barack Obama er åbenlyst mindst belastet af den førte politik og den nylige fortid, og hans forsonlige og bredt appellerende stil forsøger at bevæge sig ud over dagens politiske fronter. I hjertet synes han snarere at være pragmatiker end ideolog. Men hans evne til at skabe konsensus vil blive sat på en hård prøve, når han skal træffe svære valg for bringe ikke kun republikanere, men også oprørske demokrater ind i folden.
John McCain har på sin side ført sig frem i de seneste uger som en moderne Teddy Roosevelt, tordnet imod Wall Street og forlangt at få udleveret chefen for New Yorks Børs, Chris Coxs hoved på et fad. Han kan meget vel være den eneste republikaner, der - under megen skrigen og sparken - vil kunne bringe sit parti ind i en post-Reagan æra. Men man får let det indtryk, at han i sit hoved ikke helt har besluttet sig for, hvilken slags republikaner han helst vil være, eller hvilke principper der skal definere det nye Amerika.
Ud af spændetrøjen
Amerikansk indflydelse kan og vil blive genoprettet. Da verden som helhed må forventes at blive ramt af et økonomisk tilbageslag, forekommer det ikke indlysende, at den kinesiske eller russiske model vil klare sig mærkbart bedre end den amerikanske version. USA er tidligere kommet sig efter de alvorlige tilbageslag i 1930'erne og 1970'erne, takket være vort systems tilpasningsdygtighed og modstandskraften i vor befolkning.
Ikke desto mindre vil endnu et comeback forudsætte, at vi har evnen til at gennemføre grundlæggende ændringer. For det første må vi bryde fri af Reagan-æraens spændetrøje i forhold til skatter og regulering. Nok vækker skattenedsættelser behag, men de stimulerer ikke nødvendigvis væksten eller betaler for sig selv. I lyset af vor finanspolitiske situation er det helt nødvendigt, at nogen ærligt og redeligt fortæller amerikanerne, at de fremover selv kommer til at betale mere for at få vort samfund på ret køl igen. Flere dereguleringer eller flere myndighedssvigt i forhold til at følge med markeder, der udvikler sig hastigt, kan blive utrolig kostbare, som vi har set. Hele den amerikanske offentlige sektor er underfinansieret, afprofessionaliseret og demoraliseret. Der er brug for at genopbygge den og indgive den en ny følelse af stolthed. Der findes visse opgaver, som kun statsmagten kan varetage at løse.
Når vi gennemfører disse ændringer, vil der naturligvis være en vis risiko for, at den statslige indblanding bliver for stor. Finansielle institutioner har brug for et stærkt tilsyn, men det står ikke klart, at dette også skulle gælde andre sektorer af økonomien. Frihandel er fortsat en stærk drivkraft for økonomisk vækst og vil forblive et instrument for USA's diplomati. Vi bør give bedre bistand til, at arbejdstagere kan tilpasse sig de skiftende globale vilkår frem for at forsvare deres nuværende job. Nok fører skattelettelser ikke automatisk til større velstand, men det gør en uhæmmet vækst i de offentlige udgifter heller ikke. Omkostningerne ved hjælpepakkerne og den langsigtede svage dollar betyder, at inflation vil være en alvorlig trussel i fremtiden. En uansvarlig finanspolitik kan nemt forværre problemerne.
Og selv om færre ikke-amerikanere formentlig vil ønske at lytte til vore råd, vil mange stadig kunne drage fordele af at efterligne visse aspekter af Reagan-modellen. Dette gælder dog helt sikkert ikke i forhold til deregulering af finansmarkederne. Men i det kontinentale Europa får arbejdstagere stadig tilbudt lange ferier, korte arbejdsuger, jobgarantier og en lang række andre fordele, som svækker deres produktivitet og ikke er økonomisk bæredygtige.
En vanskelig ny virkelighed
Det lidet opbyggelige svar på Wall Street-krisen må være, at den største forandring, vi må gennemføre, er af politisk art. Reagan-revolutionen brød de liberales og demokraternes 50 år lange dominans i amerikansk politik og åbnede op for nye tilgange til tidens problemer. Men som årene er gået, er det, som engang var banebrydende nye tanker, degenereret til stivnede dogmer. Den politiske debats kvalitet er blevet forringet af en polariserende diskurs, hvor ensidige politikere ikke blot drager deres modstanderes ideer i tvivl, men også deres motiver. Alt dette gør det sværere for os at tilpasse USA til den nye og vanskelige virkelighed, vi står overfor. Så den ultimative duelighedsprøve for den amerikanske model vil være dens evne til at genopfinde sig selv forfra. God branding er, for nu at citere en præsidentkandidat, ikke et spørgsmål om at smøre læbestift på en gris. Det handler om at have det rigtige produkt at sælge i første instans. Dette er en opgave, som Amerikas demokrati nu har fået skåret ud i pap.
Francis Fukuyama er professor i international politisk økonomi på John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Amerikas velrenommerede investeringsbanker går konkurs. Over en billion dollars i aktiemarkedsværdier forsvinder på et enkelt døgn. De amerikanske skatteydere får udskrevet en regning på 700 milliarder dollars. Dimensionerne af 2008-krakket på Wall Street kunne næppe være mere overvældende. Nu spørger mange amerikanere, hvorfor de må betale så svimlende summer for at hindre økonomien i at bryde sammen. Kun få er imidlertid begyndt at diskutere de mere uhåndgribelige, men for USA potentielt langt større omkostninger - nemlig hvor stor skade den finansielle nedsmeltning har gjort på Amerika som varemærke.
Ideer hører til Amerikas vigtigste eksportartikler. Og lige siden Ronald Reagan blev valgt til præsident, er der især to fundamentalt amerikanske idéer, som har domineret den globale tænkning. Den første var en bestemt opfattelse af kapitalismen, ifølge hvilken lave skatter, svag regulering og en slanket statsmagt ville være drivkræfter for økonomisk vækst. Reaganismen brød og vendte en århundrede lang tendens i retning af stadig stærkere og stedse mere omfattende statsmagt. Deregulering blev tidens slagord - ikke blot i USA men i hele verden.
Den anden store idé var ideen om Amerika som en global forkæmper for udbredelse af det liberale demokrati, som blev anset for at være den bedste vej til en mere velstående og åben international orden. USA's magt og indflydelse hvilede ikke kun på militær supermagtsstyrke og dollars, men på det faktum, at de fleste mennesker følte sig tiltrukket af den amerikanske form for selvforvaltning og ønskede at omforme deres samfund i samme retning - en faktor, som politologen Joseph Nye betegner som 'blød magt'.
Et afgørende valg
Det kan være svært at se i øjnene, hvor slemt disse signatur-træk ved Amerikas særlige varemærke nu er bragt i miskredit. Mellem 2002 og 2007, mens verden endnu nød godt af en enestående periode med vækst, var det ingen sag at ignorere de europæiske socialister og latinamerikanske populister, når de stemplede den amerikanske økonomiske model som 'cowboy-kapitalisme'. Men nu er lokomotivet for denne vækst - den amerikanske økonomi - kørt af sporet og truer med at trække resten af verden med sig. Og hvad værre er: Synderen er ingen anden end den amerikanske model selv. Under mantraet 'mindre stat' afstod Washington fra at foretage den adækvate regulering af Amerikas finansielle sektor og gjorde det dermed muligt for denne at forvolde enorm skade på resten af samfundet.
Allerede før krakket var demokratiet kompromitteret. Da Saddam viste sig ikke at besidde masseødelæggelsesvåben, forsøgte Bush-regeringen at retfærdiggøre sin Irak-krig ved at knytte den til en bredere dagsorden om at 'udbrede frihed'. Pludselig var fremme af demokrati det vigtigste våben i krigen mod terror. Men for mange mennesker verden over lød USA's retorik om demokrati snarere som et påskud for at udbrede USA's herredømme.
Det afgørende valg, Amerika nu står over for, rækker langt ud over, hvilken økonomisk hjælpepakke, der vil virke bedst, eller hvem der vinder præsidentvalget. Det amerikanske varemærke sættes nu på en hård prøve på et tidspunkt, hvor andre modeller - det være sig den kinesiske eller den russiske - opleves som stadigt mere attraktive. Genoprettelsen af vort gode navn og genoplivelsen af vores varemærkes dragende magt er på mange måder en lige så stor udfordring som at stabilisere den finansielle sektor. Barack Obama og John McCain kommer med hver deres potentiale til at løfte til opgaven. Men uanset hvem af dem, der vinder, vil der forestå en årelang kamp op ad bakke. Og vi kan ikke tage fat på denne kamp, før vi klart har indset, hvad der gik galt, hvilke aspekter af den amerikanske model, der er bevaringsværdige, hvilke der skal forbedres, og hvilke der skal kasseres helt.
Reaganismens impuls
Mange kommentatorer har bemærket, at nedsmeltningen på Wall Street markerer afslutningen på Reagan-æraen. Det er utvivlsomt en korrekt konstatering - også selv hvis det skulle lykkes at få McCain valgt til præsident i november. Store ideer kommer til verden inden for rammerne af særlige historiske epoker. Og kun de færreste store ideer overlever, når konteksten ændrer sig dramatisk, hvilket er grunden til, at de politiske paradigmer er tilbøjelige til at skifte fra venstre til højre og tilbage igen i cykliske forløb, der kan strække sig over generationer.
Reaganismen - eller dens britiske variant, thatcherismen - var den nødvendige impuls for sin tid. Siden Franklin Roosevelts New Deal i 1930'erne havde statsmagten kun vokset sig større i nationer verden over. 1970'ernes store velfærdsstater og økonomier var ved at blive kvalt af bureaukrati. De fungerede håbløst. Dengang var telefoner dyre og vanskelige at anskaffe, flyrejser var en luksus for de rige, og de fleste mennesker satte deres opsparing ind på bankkonti med lave, regulerede rentesatser. Gavmilde velfærdsprogrammer, der skulle støtte eneforsørgere, gjorde det lidet attraktivt for fattige familier at arbejde og forblive gift, og mange familier gik i opløsning. Reagans og Thatchers revolutioner gjorde det lettere at ansætte og fyre arbejdere, hvad der ganske vist gav voldsomt smertelige gnidninger, efterhånden som traditionelle industrier måtte indskrænke eller lukke ned. Men de lagde også grunden til næsten tre årtier med vækst og fremkomsten af helt nye sektorer som informations-og biotek-branchen.
Sin internationale platform fik Reagan-revolutionen med det såkaldte Washington Consensus, ifølge hvilket Washington - og de institutioner, der står under dets indflydelse som Den Internationale Valutafond og Verdensbanken - skulle anspore udviklingslandene til at åbne deres økonomier. Men skønt Washington Consensus rutinemæssigt bliver hånligt forkastet af populister som Venezuelas Hugo Chávez, formåede denne politik i nogen grad at lette de smertelige følger af den latinamerikanske gældskrise i begyndelsen af 1980'erne, da hyperinflation plagede lande som Argentina og Brasilien. Lignende markedsvenlige politikker er også en del af forklaringen på, at Kina og Indien har udviklet sig til de økonomiske kraftcentre, de er i dag.
Hvis nogen skulle savne yderligere belæg, behøver de blot kaste et blik på verdens mest ekstreme eksempler på statsstyrede, centraldirigerede økonomier - nemlig dem, man havde opbygget i det tidligere Sovjetunionen og de øvrige kommunistiske stater. I 1970'erne var disse i næsten alle henseender sakket agterud for deres kapitalistiske rivaler. Deres totale sammenbrud efter Berlinmurens fald leverede beviset på, at sådanne velfærdsstater på steroider var en historisk blindgyde.
Som så mange andre samfundsforandrende bevægelser kørte Reagan-revolutionen af sporet, fordi den for mange tilhængere blev til en uangribelig ideologi frem for en pragmatisk reaktion på velfærdsstatens excesser. To principper var hævet over enhver tvivl: Skattelettelser blev regnet for selvfinansierende, og de finansielle markeder blev regnet for selvregulerende.
Globaliseringen skjulte fejlene
Før 1980'erne var konservative regeringer skattepolitisk tilbageholdende, forstået på den måde, at de var uvillige til at bruge flere penge, end skatterne indbragte. Men med Reaganomics vandt den tanke, at stort set alle skattelettelser ville stimulere vækst, så regeringen i sidste ende ville få større indtægter. Men faktisk var den traditionelle opfattelse den korrekte: Sænker man skatterne uden at beskære udgifterne, bliver resultatet underskud. Reagans skattenedsættelser i 1980'erne skabte da også et stort underskud, mens Clinton skattestigninger i 1990'erne frembragte et overskud. Bushs skattelettelser i begyndelsen af det 21. århundrede medførte et endnu større underskud. Den omstændighed, at den amerikanske økonomi voksede lige så hurtigt i Clinton-årene som under Reagan, formåede af en eller anden grund ikke at ryste den faste konservative tro på skattelettelser som den sikre vej til vækst.
Mere væsentligt var det, at globaliseringen i årtier skjulte fejlene i det neoliberale ræsonnement. I udlandet var man tilsyneladende uendeligt villige til at beholde de amerikanske dollars, som gjorde det muligt for USA's regering at køre med underskud og samtidig fastholde en høj vækst - noget, intet udviklingsland ville kunne slippe afsted med. Og derfor skal vicepræsident Dick Cheney allerede fra begyndelsen have beroliget præsident Bush med, at læren af 1980'erne var, at "underskud spiller ingen rolle".
Den anden trosartikel fra Reagan-æraen - den om finansiel deregulering - blev drevet frem som gældende politik af en uhellig alliance mellem sande troende og Wall Street-virksomheder og blev i 1990'erne sågar også accepteret af demokraterne som sandhedens evangelium. Dens fortalere hævdede, at gamle faste reguleringslove som Glas-Steagall-loven fra depressionstiden (som satte skel mellem banker og investeringsbanker) stod i vejen for innovation og undergravede konkurrenceevnen i Amerikas finansielle institutioner. Det var helt rigtigt set. Der var bare det ved det, at dereguleringen fremkaldte en strøm af nye innovative produkter som f.eks. de investeringspakker med subprime-lån, som udgør kernen i den nuværende krise. Nogle republikanere har stadig ikke forstået sammenhængen, hvilket fremgår af deres alternative forslag til en hjælpepakke, som involverer endnu større skattelettelser for hedgefonde.
Problemet er, at Wall Street fungerer meget anderledes end f.eks. Silicon Valley, hvor en svag regulering er så abs0lut er formålstjenlig. Finansielle institutioner bygger på tillid, som kun kan trives, hvis statsmagten sikrer deres gennemsigtighed og sætter grænser for de chancer, som de kan tage med andre folks penge. Sektoren adskiller sig også derved, at et sammenbrud i et pengeinstitut ikke blot skader aktionærer og ansatte, men tillige en mængde uskyldige udenforstående (som i økonomernes lidenskabsløse fagsprog betegnes som 'negative eksternaliteter').
10 års advarsler
Der har i det seneste årti været klare tegn på, at Reagan-revolutionen var slået ind på et farligt vildspor. Et tidligt varsel var Asiens finanskrise i 1997-98. Efter amerikansk rådgivning og pres havde lande som Thailand og Sydkorea i begyndelsen af 1990'erne liberaliseret deres kapitalmarkeder. En masse 'varme penge' begyndte strømme til disse økonomier, hvorved de skabte en spekulativ boble og derpå skyndte sig at trække sig tilbage igen, da de første tegn på problemer meldte sig. Lyder det som noget, vi kender? Derimod kunne lande som Kina og Malaysia, som ikke fulgte de amerikanske råd, men holdt deres finansielle markeder lukkede eller strengt regulerede, konstatere, at deres position var langt mindre sårbar.
Et andet advarselssignal var det strukturelle underskud, som Amerika begyndte at ophobe. Kina og en række andre lande begyndte efter 1997 at opkøbe amerikanske dollar som led i en bevidst strategi for at undervurdere deres valuta, holde hjulene i gang på deres fabrikker og beskytte sig mod finansielle chok. Efter 11. september passede dette Amerika fint, for det betød, at vi kunne sænke skatterne, finansiere en forbrugsfest, betale for to dyre krige og køre videre med et budgetunderskud på samme tid. De kolossale og stigende handelsunderskud, som dette resulterede i - 700 milliarder dollar om året i 2007 - var åbenlyst uholdbare, og det stod klart, at før eller senere ville man i udlandet beslutte sig for, at Amerika nok alligevel ikke var så godt et sted at anbringe sine penge. Den faldende amerikanske dollar indikerer, at vi nu har nået dette punkt. Det turde nu være indlysende, at underskud - i modsætning til hvad Cheney hævdede - i høj grad spiller en rolle.
Selv på hjemmefronten var dereguleringernes bagside åbenlys, længe før sammenbruddet på Wall Street. I Californien kom elpriserne helt ud af kontrol i 2000-2001 på grund af dereguleringen på det statslige marked for energi, som skruppelløse selskaber som Enron forstod at spille på til egen fordel. Enron selv og en lang række andre virksomheder gik i 2004 konkurs efter fusk med regnskaberne. Og i USA steg uligheden i det forgangne årti, fordi gevinsterne fra den økonomiske vækst i uforholdsmæssig grad kom til rigere og bedre uddannede amerikanere til gode, hvorimod indkomsterne for arbejderklassen stagnerede. Til sidst kom så også den forkludrede besættelse af Irak og den lige så forkludrede reaktion på orkanen Katrina, der eksponerede den offentlige sektors svaghed oppefra og ned - et resultat af årtiers underfinansiering og den lave prestige, som offentligt ansatte måtte lide under fra Reagans tid og frem.
Skelsættende
Alt dette kunne unægtelig tyde på, at Reagans æra burde have været afsluttet for et godt stykke tid siden. Men det gjorde den ikke, dels fordi Det Demokratiske Parti ikke forstod at stille med overbevisende kandidater og argumenter, men også på grund af et særligt aspekt ved Amerika, der stiller vort land meget anderledes end Europa. I de europæiske lande stemmer de mindre veluddannede borgere af arbejderklassebaggrund konsekvent på socialistiske, kommunistiske og andre venstreorienterede partier, ud fra den forventning at dermed er deres økonomiske interesser bedst tjent. Men i USA kan de tilsvarende samfundslag svinge enten til venstre eller højre. De bakkede op om Roosevelts stordemokratiske koalition under New Deal - en koalition, som holdt helt frem til Lyndon Johnsons Great Society-velfærdspolitik i 1960'erne. Men de begyndte at stemme republikansk under Nixon og Reagan, gik over til Clinton i 1990'erne og vendte så atter tilbage til den republikanske fold under George W. Bush. Når så mange fra disse lag stemmer republikansk, skyldes det, at kulturelle spørgsmål som religion, patriotisme, familieværdier og retten til at eje skydevåben kan overtrumfe de økonomiske temaer.
Denne gruppe vælgere kommer til at afgøre valget i november, ikke mindst på grund af deres talstærke tilstedeværelse i en håndfuld svingstater som Ohio og Pennsylvania. Vil de svinge i retning af den noget reserverede Harvard-uddannede Obama, hvis politiske dagsorden i højere grad afspejler deres økonomiske interesser? Eller vil de holde sig til mennesker, de bedre kan identificere sig med som John McCain og Sarah Palin? Der skulle i sin tid den økonomisk krise af enorme dimensioner fra 1929 til 1931 til for at bringe en demokratisk regering til magten. Meningsmålingerne i begyndelsen af oktober 2008 kunne tyde på, at vi har nået til lignende skelsættende punkt.
Demokrati som brand
Den anden afgørende komponent i det amerikanske varemærke er demokratiet og De Forenede Staters erklærede vilje at støtte andre demokratier i verden. Denne idealistiske ledetråd i USA's udenrigspolitik har været konstant igennem forrige århundrede, fra Woodrow Wilson's Folkeforbund over Roosevelts Four Freedoms til Reagans opfordring til Mikhail Gorbatjov om at "nedrive denne mur".
At fremme demokratiets udbredelse - gennem diplomati, støtte til grupper i civilsamfundet, frie medier og lignende, har aldrig været kontroversielt. Men nu er problemet, at da Bush-regeringen brugte 'demokratiet' til at retfærdiggøre Irak-krigen, blev dette af mange opfattet som et kodeord for militær intervention og regimeskift - det kaos, der udløstes i Irak, gjorde ikke ligefrem demokratiets sag en tjeneste. Navnlig Mellemøsten er et minefelt for enhver amerikansk regering, i og med at USA støtter ikkedemokratiske allierede som Saudi-Arabien, men afviser samarbejde med grupper som Hamas og Hizbollah, der kom til magten gennem valg eller bygger deres indflydelse på stor folkelig tilslutning. Vi har ikke megen troværdighed i USA, når vi forfægter en 'frihed-dagsorden'.
Den amerikanske model er også blevet alvorligt plettet af Bush-administrationens brug af tortur. Efter 11. september viste amerikanerne sig i foruroligende grad at være rede til at ofre den forfatningsmæssige beskyttelse af hensyn til sikkerheden. Og siden har Guantánamo Bay og de hætteklædter fanger fra Abu Ghraib i mange ikke-amerikaneres øjne erstattet Frihedsgudinden som symbol på Amerika.
Tabte positioner
Uanset hvem der vinder præsidentvalget om tre uger, vil skiftet til et nyt paradigme i amerikansk og international politik allerede være sat i gang. Demokraterne vil sandsynligvis kunne øge deres flertal i Parlamentet og Senatet. En enorm populistisk vrede er under opsejling, efterhånden som Wall Streets nedsmeltning forplanter sig til Main Street. Allerede nu er der en voksende enighed om behovet for at re-regulere store dele af økonomien.
Globalt vil USA ikke længere kunne nyde godt af den dominerende position, som det har indtaget indtil nu, hvilket understreges af Ruslands invasion af Georgien. Amerikas evne til at forme den globale økonomi gennem handelsaftaler, IMF og Verdensbanken vil også blive mindsket. Det samme vil vore finansielle ressourcer. Og i mange dele af verden vil amerikanske rådgivning, ideer og tilmed bistand være mindre velkommen end nu.
Hvilken kandidat vil under disse omstændigheder være i den bedste position til at give Amerikas et nyt og bedre ry?
Barack Obama er åbenlyst mindst belastet af den førte politik og den nylige fortid, og hans forsonlige og bredt appellerende stil forsøger at bevæge sig ud over dagens politiske fronter. I hjertet synes han snarere at være pragmatiker end ideolog. Men hans evne til at skabe konsensus vil blive sat på en hård prøve, når han skal træffe svære valg for bringe ikke kun republikanere, men også oprørske demokrater ind i folden.
John McCain har på sin side ført sig frem i de seneste uger som en moderne Teddy Roosevelt, tordnet imod Wall Street og forlangt at få udleveret chefen for New Yorks Børs, Chris Coxs hoved på et fad. Han kan meget vel være den eneste republikaner, der - under megen skrigen og sparken - vil kunne bringe sit parti ind i en post-Reagan æra. Men man får let det indtryk, at han i sit hoved ikke helt har besluttet sig for, hvilken slags republikaner han helst vil være, eller hvilke principper der skal definere det nye Amerika.
Ud af spændetrøjen
Amerikansk indflydelse kan og vil blive genoprettet. Da verden som helhed må forventes at blive ramt af et økonomisk tilbageslag, forekommer det ikke indlysende, at den kinesiske eller russiske model vil klare sig mærkbart bedre end den amerikanske version. USA er tidligere kommet sig efter de alvorlige tilbageslag i 1930'erne og 1970'erne, takket være vort systems tilpasningsdygtighed og modstandskraften i vor befolkning.
Ikke desto mindre vil endnu et comeback forudsætte, at vi har evnen til at gennemføre grundlæggende ændringer. For det første må vi bryde fri af Reagan-æraens spændetrøje i forhold til skatter og regulering. Nok vækker skattenedsættelser behag, men de stimulerer ikke nødvendigvis væksten eller betaler for sig selv. I lyset af vor finanspolitiske situation er det helt nødvendigt, at nogen ærligt og redeligt fortæller amerikanerne, at de fremover selv kommer til at betale mere for at få vort samfund på ret køl igen. Flere dereguleringer eller flere myndighedssvigt i forhold til at følge med markeder, der udvikler sig hastigt, kan blive utrolig kostbare, som vi har set. Hele den amerikanske offentlige sektor er underfinansieret, afprofessionaliseret og demoraliseret. Der er brug for at genopbygge den og indgive den en ny følelse af stolthed. Der findes visse opgaver, som kun statsmagten kan varetage at løse.
Når vi gennemfører disse ændringer, vil der naturligvis være en vis risiko for, at den statslige indblanding bliver for stor. Finansielle institutioner har brug for et stærkt tilsyn, men det står ikke klart, at dette også skulle gælde andre sektorer af økonomien. Frihandel er fortsat en stærk drivkraft for økonomisk vækst og vil forblive et instrument for USA's diplomati. Vi bør give bedre bistand til, at arbejdstagere kan tilpasse sig de skiftende globale vilkår frem for at forsvare deres nuværende job. Nok fører skattelettelser ikke automatisk til større velstand, men det gør en uhæmmet vækst i de offentlige udgifter heller ikke. Omkostningerne ved hjælpepakkerne og den langsigtede svage dollar betyder, at inflation vil være en alvorlig trussel i fremtiden. En uansvarlig finanspolitik kan nemt forværre problemerne.
Og selv om færre ikke-amerikanere formentlig vil ønske at lytte til vore råd, vil mange stadig kunne drage fordele af at efterligne visse aspekter af Reagan-modellen. Dette gælder dog helt sikkert ikke i forhold til deregulering af finansmarkederne. Men i det kontinentale Europa får arbejdstagere stadig tilbudt lange ferier, korte arbejdsuger, jobgarantier og en lang række andre fordele, som svækker deres produktivitet og ikke er økonomisk bæredygtige.
En vanskelig ny virkelighed
Det lidet opbyggelige svar på Wall Street-krisen må være, at den største forandring, vi må gennemføre, er af politisk art. Reagan-revolutionen brød de liberales og demokraternes 50 år lange dominans i amerikansk politik og åbnede op for nye tilgange til tidens problemer. Men som årene er gået, er det, som engang var banebrydende nye tanker, degenereret til stivnede dogmer. Den politiske debats kvalitet er blevet forringet af en polariserende diskurs, hvor ensidige politikere ikke blot drager deres modstanderes ideer i tvivl, men også deres motiver. Alt dette gør det sværere for os at tilpasse USA til den nye og vanskelige virkelighed, vi står overfor. Så den ultimative duelighedsprøve for den amerikanske model vil være dens evne til at genopfinde sig selv forfra. God branding er, for nu at citere en præsidentkandidat, ikke et spørgsmål om at smøre læbestift på en gris. Det handler om at have det rigtige produkt at sælge i første instans. Dette er en opgave, som Amerikas demokrati nu har fået skåret ud i pap.
Francis Fukuyama er professor i international politisk økonomi på John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.
Abonner på:
Opslag (Atom)